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By Julia Lück 
 
Abstract 
The dissertation investigates journalistic news narrations. It aims at assessing their 
deliberative qualities by applying a quantitative instrument for a content analysis of 
newspapers that focuses comparatively on climate change coverage in Brazil, Germany, and 
the United States.  
For this study, narrative news in the journalistic context is understood as a form of writing 
that differs from the conventional inverted pyramid style of traditional newspaper coverage by 
telling news stories in a sequential order, focusing on agents, their actions, and emotions as 
well as including additional details and hypothetical information. Narratives in a non-fictional 
media environment are a phenomenon about which the scholarly debate is ambiguous when it 
comes to an assessment of benefits and harms. Narratives in the context of so-called hard 
news have been evaluated differently, ranging from the negative assessments of intensified 
personalization and simplification to stressing the positive effects of increased accessibility to 
an issue and providing space for alternative and challenging interpretations.  
Nevertheless, extensive theoretical considerations regarding journalistic narratives and their 
specific impact on public deliberation, especially within the mass media context and mediated 
deliberation, are rare. This study deals with this gap from a theoretical and empirical 
perspective. It aims at assessing narrative news coverage against the discussion of news 
quality in times of increasing economic constraints, by reviewing their deliberative 
performance. The investigations systematically look at the fulfillment of deliberative ideals 
such as the inclusion of actors and ideas on the input dimension of the public sphere, the 
occurrence of opposing arguments on the throughput dimension, and the openness or closure 
of the debate on the output dimension. Context knowledge about the journalistic cultures, 
historical developments of journalism, and the political and media systems of the three 
countries Brazil, Germany and the US is used to describe under which conditions narrative 
news is more likely to fulfill positive functions of public deliberation.  
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To investigate the deliberative quality of journalistic narratives in the coverage on climate 
change, a quantitative content analysis was conducted of German, Brazilian and US 
newspaper coverage on the UN climate change conferences of Cancun, Mexico (2010); 
Durban, South Africa (2011); Doha, Qatar (2012); and Warsaw, Poland (2013). The sample 
contains two widely read daily quality newspapers for each country. Narrative and 
deliberative elements were deduced theoretically for quantitative operationalization.  
Results reveal that there is no general relationship between narrativity and the deliberative 
quality. There is no indication that narrative news writing is either good or bad in deliberative 
terms; it is rather context dependent. The results show that the newspaper coverage of all 
three countries differs in the use of narrative elements, the application of different story types, 
and in their general deliberative quality. While the Brazilian coverage generally has a high 
degree of narrativity and mainly uses story types that emphasize the urgency of climate 
change, it has a rather low deliberative quality. The opposite is the case for the US, which has 
a lower degree of narrativity, mainly using unexcited story types, and provides a higher 
deliberative quality. In both cases, narrative writing compared to non-narrative writing 
accounts for higher or lower deliberative quality only on some dimensions, but no consistent 
pattern was found. The picture is more diverse in Germany, with a less unambiguous use of 
narratives and story types, and a mixed deliberative quality. However, the relationship 
between higher narrativity and deliberative quality is most salient in this case.  
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1 Introduction 
Extensive global economic liberalization and political deregulation have had significant 
structural consequences for news media companies during the last decades (Umbricht & 
Esser, 2014). Technical innovations and the rapid rise of online phenomena, such as 
search engines like Google or the free online encyclopedia Wikipedia, as well as social 
networks like Facebook challenge the information sovereignty and interpretative 
authority of traditional media. To remain competitive, a growing pressure to increase 
efficiencies and to lower costs has led to substantial cost cutting on staff in newsrooms, 
as well as to a reduction of journalists who are specialized in specific news sections, 
and, in addition, to shorter formats and a higher service orientation (Neveu, 2014; 
Umbricht & Esser, 2014). Traditional newspapers fight against a declining newspaper 
circulation, an aging readership, and a significant decrease in the amount of time that 
people spend reading newspapers per day in order to hold market share positions and 
advertising revenues (Kramer, 2000). The rise of online news media, today permanently 
accessible through mobile devices, and 24-hour TV news channels with ongoing 
breaking news (Conboy & Steel, 2008) increase the pressure, and make the traditional 
morning newspaper seem almost obsolete as soon as it arrives at the breakfast table.  
Against this background of rising economic pressure, scholars have expressed their 
concerns about the decline in the quality of news and vitally criticized a shift from hard 
news to soft news, to personalization, sensationalism, infotainment, and the reduction of 
policy-relevant information (Plasser, 2005). These trends, commonly labeled with terms 
such as audience orientation or commercialization (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), are 
connected to a negligence of central news values which are assumed to be important for 
the maintenance of a democratic public sphere that builds on well-informed participants 
and audiences (Dunn, 2003). Instead, the dedication to profit maximization, as critics 
fear according to Webster (2011, p.22), “leads to content that is escapist, shallow and 
hucksterist because the media producers must achieve highest possible audience figures 
while creating least possible controversy.” What is widely called the crisis of journalism 
may be explained with an ongoing process of rationalization, which Neveu (2014, 
p. 534) calls a “double process of impoverishment, of disconnection of journalism with 
a significant part of the readership’s expectations and abilities.” Western journalism, 
however, has always been marked by a double character: on the one hand, serving the 
common interest as a social institution and even a fourth estate with a significant 
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relevance for democracies; on the other hand, serving individual (economic) interests as 
an industry that has always been bound to pragmatic conditions such as deadlines and 
outreach (Weischenberg, 1998). Increasing commercialization is a threat to media 
systems as social institutions when they shift “away from the world of politics towards 
the world of commerce” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 277).  
Entman (2010, p. 105) appeals to “interrupt the vicious circle binding lower quality 
news production to less-informed and less-interested citizens” and calls for creative 
solutions. For him, this includes a “need for narrative” (p. 113). Nerone (2008) already 
identifies a comeback of narrative forms, especially in print media: “As newspapers 
recede further from mass circulation and breaking news, they have developed a new 
openness to narrative and literary styles.” However, narratives in a non-fictional media 
environment are a phenomenon about which the scholarly debate is rather ambiguous, 
when it comes to an assessment of benefits and harms. Although often primarily 
associated with human interest and soft-news journalism rather than with hard news, the 
role of narratives is far from being sufficiently investigated. Narratives emerge in the 
context of so-called hard news, where they have been evaluated variously, ranging from 
the negative assessments of intensified personalization and simplification (Lester & 
Hutchins, 2012), to the positive effects of increased accessibility to an issue, as well as 
providing space for alternative and challenging interpretations (Cottle, 2000). Entman 
(2010, p. 113), referring to Iyengar (1991), emphasizes that narratives can “connect 
dots” and counteract fragmentation by connecting single events to their long-term 
thematic contexts. Kramer (2000) argues that narratives help to engage readers more 
deeply when they offer information on events through good storytelling. Beyond that, 
narratives can help people to discover unknown or hidden social worlds, for example, 
by “humanizing” experiences to which readers would otherwise not have access 
(Neveu, 2014; Benson, 2014).  
In this study, I argue that there can hardly be one definite conclusion about whether 
narrative news is either good or bad altogether. It is more likely that there are certain 
circumstances that either facilitate or impede a positive contribution of narrative 
features to the quality of media coverage. The overarching research question of this 
study therefore asks for the contribution of narrative news writing to the deliberative 
quality of the mediated public debates in different (national) contexts.  
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To evaluate the actual contribution of narrative news to the quality of news coverage, it 
is necessary to (1) develop a concept to determine the narrativity of news texts, and (2) 
apply a suitable measurement to rate the quality of narrative news. To offer 
explanations for the contribution of narrativity within the news, the study will (3) 
perform a comparative research design, conducting a content analysis of newspaper 
coverage in Brazil, Germany and the United States, while taking the different contexts 
of media systems and journalistic cultures and traditions into account.  
This approach aims at contributing to the discussion about the value of narrative forms 
within journalism and in this case especially within newspaper coverage about climate 
change and climate politics at the UN climate change conferences. Eide and Kunelius 
emphasize the high relevance of the issue of climate change by stating:  
Climate change knows no borders, and is thus a historically unforeseen challenge to 
global governance and regulation. As a global problem calling for coordinate action, 
it is the paradigmatic case to look for to encourage the emergence of transnational or 
global public spheres, i.e. spaces or moments in which networks of communication 
flows enable and force global and national civil society actors to interact with 
representatives of states and international political bodies. (Eide and Kunelius 2010, 
p. 12) 
The climate change conferences, which have generated a lot of media attention over the 
years (Schäfer, Ivanova, & Schmidt, 2013), provide a suitable object of investigation, 
because by enabling the emergence of a global public sphere they allow us to identify 
cultural particularities within the media coverage of one globally accessible event in 
vastly divergent contexts (e.g. Krøvel, 2011; Kunelius & Eide, 2012). This is a 
necessary condition for being able to identify those contexts in which narrative news 
contributes positively or negatively to the mediated debate.   
Obviously, such assessments need some kind of yardstick. For this reason, this study 
engages with thoughts about deliberation theory, which values the wide exchange of 
ideas and opinions of different actors as an important foundation for collective decision 
making. Deliberative democrats argue that the legitimacy of political decisions needs to 
be reached through public discourse on issues that are relevant for society. Such a 
public discourse should meet certain standards, which are expressed in definitions of 
deliberation as “a form of discussion in which an individual or group carefully examines 
a problem and considers proposals for solutions that reflect a variety of perspectives 
with the aim of arriving at a well-reasoned solution.” (Rinke, 2016, p.1). In modern 
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societies, such a communicative process cannot function without the mass media that 
presents the broadest range of ideas and solutions enabling media users to engage in the 
deliberative process (Gastil, 2008). How the news media perform on providing public 
deliberation is a matter of empirical concern.  
For the investigation of the deliberative quality, it also seems quite reasonable to regard 
the mediated debate on climate change. Climate change is a highly political and 
normative issue, especially concerning questions of justice and equity. Besides 
normative considerations, there is a need for concrete political solutions and actions that 
follow from these—though there cannot be only one solution that fits the problem, since 
the causes and effects of climate change are diverse. Therefore, the public debate has to 
be able to disclose a wide range of ideas, enabling a vital competition for the best 
solutions. To what extent narrative news forms about climate change and climate 
politics are able to fulfill these deliberative demands will be the central focus of this 
study.   
Several scholars have already engaged in considerations about the surplus of narrative 
forms of deliberation. Young (2002, p. 7), for example, argues that “[n]arrative […] 
has many important functions in political deliberation; narratives can supply steps in 
arguments, but they can also serve to explain meanings and experiences when groups do 
not share premises sufficiently to proceed with an argument.” Boswell (2013, p. 621) 
adds that “[n]arratives can be important rhetorical devices in deliberation on complex 
and contested issues.” However, deeper theoretical considerations of the understanding 
of narratives and their specific impact on public deliberation, especially within the 
mass-media context and mediated deliberation, are rare. This dissertation wants to deal 
with this gap both theoretically and empirically. It therefore brings both lines of 
thoughts together, aiming at assessing narratives within news coverage against the 
discussion of news quality in times of increasing economic constraints, by reviewing 
their deliberative performance as a measure of quality. Empirical analyses will focus on 
newspaper coverage on climate change as an all-embracing topic with scientific, 
political, social and normative implications, concentrating especially on newspaper 
coverage on the annual UN climate change conferences, which are important periodical 
drivers of global media coverage on climate change (Schäfer, Ivanova, & Schmidt, 
2013). I will apply a quantitative content analysis with a comparative approach for 
investigating the implementation and performance of journalistic narratives in 
newspaper coverage on climate change in three highly involved countries: the USA, 
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Brazil, and Germany. The countries were chosen because they represent different media 
systems and traditions according to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) classification, which I 
will explain in detail in Chapter 5. The US represent the North American liberal model, 
Germany the democratic corporatist model, while Brazil is not part of the original 
classification, since the authors originally concentrated on European and North 
American countries. However, the media system in Brazil was highly influenced by its 
European colonial history and especially by Portuguese and French styles of writing 
(Albuquerque, 2012) to an extend that it shows enough resemblance to Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) polarized pluralist model and represents a good contrast to the other 
countries in the sample. Beyond considerations on their media system, all three 
countries play a distinct role in the political process surrounding climate change: the US 
and Germany are both developed countries, contributing to climate change for decades 
but with different dedication to solving the problem within the guidelines set up by the 
United Nations. Brazil as an emerging country has had less responsibility for climate 
change in the past but is highly affected by it in the present. It also has a great interest in 
connecting climate change measures with its own development aims. These differences 
will be considered when trying to explain similarities and differences in the coverage.     
By and large, I will argue that news narratives are not generally either “good” or “bad” 
but that we need to define standards to evaluate and explain their performance with 
relevant context factors to assess the value of news narratives in a specific media 
environment.  
1.1 Research Questions 
The overall research is aimed towards the role of narrative news within newspaper 
coverage in the current media environment. The work will especially focus on the 
deliberative quality of news narratives within newspaper coverage on climate change in 
Germany, the US, and Brazil. Specific research questions cover different levels of the 
analytic process. On a more descriptive level I ask: 
RQ1a: How and in which topical contexts are narrative elements used in newspaper 
coverage on climate change?  
RQ1b: Which country specific differences can be detected between Germany, the US, 
and Brazil?  
A second set of research questions aims at a normative assessment by asking:  
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RQ2a: What are the contributions of news narratives to the deliberative quality of 
newspaper coverage? 
RQ2b: Are there country specific differences that can be detected between Germany, the 
US and Brazil?  
On the explanatory level, I aim at finding causes (regarding the journalistic cultural, 
professional, political, or media system context) for the dispersion of narrative news and 
its degree of deliberative quality by asking:  
RQ3:  Which factors drive (a) the dispersal and (b) the deliberative quality of news 
narratives in Germany, the US, and Brazil?  
Finally, to reflect on the utility of the empirical approach used to assess deliberative 
quality, the last research question will focus on the meta level and ask:  
RQ4: How useful is it to employ an analytical instrument to measure the deliberative 
qualities of narrative newspaper coverage?  
1.2 Book Outline 
After having introduced the general research interest as well as the research questions 
that this dissertation aims to answer, I will go into detail on the relevant theoretical 
considerations. Chapter 2 covers the theory of journalistic narrations as the central 
concept of this work. This communicative mode will be generally discussed to come to 
a definition that is applicable to the empirical investigations (Ch. 2.1). To further this 
understanding, I will also discuss social functions of news narratives (Ch. 2.2), as well 
as different narrative genres (Ch. 2.3). The scholarly debate on the uses and harms of 
narratives in the news context will be retraced, regarding the critique that is commonly 
brought forward (Ch. 2.4) and the current state of research (Ch.2.5). The chapter will 
close with an excursus on framing as one of the central concepts in communication 
science to clarify the differences between both concepts.  
To assess narrative news writing, this study proposes the application of deliberative 
theory and mediated deliberation, which will be introduced in Chapter 3. I will reflect 
on basic assumptions of the public sphere and public discourse, as well as the role of 
deliberation (Ch. 3.1) and go into detail on deliberative ideals (3.2). Deliberative 
concepts have widely been criticized in academic discussions, which will be sketched 
out in Ch. 3.3. Since public (political) communication in modern democracies is heavily 
dependent on media and since newspaper content is the object of investigation in this 
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study, I will close the chapter by highlighting further considerations on mediated 
deliberation (Ch. 3.4). 
Taking the general theoretical considerations on (mediated) deliberation into account, 
Chapter 4 will define explicit deliberative standards that can be applied to media 
coverage for assessing its quality. In this chapter, it will be especially important to 
reflect on the role of journalists and their contribution to facilitating or inhibiting 
deliberative coverage. For structuring, I will separately look at journalistic 
performances at the input (Ch. 4.1), throughput (Ch. 4.2), and output (Ch. 4.3.) 
dimensions of the public sphere, and come to an interim conclusion (Ch. 4.4) at the end 
of the fourth chapter.  
Chapter 5 will outline the foundations for the comparative analysis of the three 
countries Brazil, Germany, and the US by elaborating on various context factors that 
may influence the use of narrativity in a country’s media coverage as well as the 
deliberative quality of that country’s coverage. With the help of considerations on 
journalism culture (Ch. 5.1), journalism history and especially the history of narrative 
journalism (Ch. 5.2), the media system (Ch. 5.3) and the national political context (Ch. 
5.4), I will hypothesize on when to expect certain types of narrativity and stories but 
will also reflect on when to expect higher or lower deliberative quality of news 
narratives (Ch. 5.5).  
Chapter 6 presents the research design, introduces (the media coverage on) climate 
change and climate politics at the annual United Nations climate change conferences as 
the object of investigation, and justifies its applicability for the comparative analysis 
(Ch. 6.1). It then explains the operationalization of the central theoretical concepts (Ch. 
6.2 – 6.3) as well as the formal characteristics (Ch. 6.4) of my quantitative content 
analysis. Detailed pretest results are offered in Ch. 6.5. 
The results of my research will be presented in three sections in Chapter 7. First, it will 
present the narrative features in all three countries (Ch. 7.1.), distinguishing between the 
degree of narrativity (7.1.1), story types (7.1.2), and narrative roles (7.1.3). The 
deliberative qualities of the coverage in general will be investigated in Ch. 7.2, before 
assessing the deliberative qualities in narrative news in Ch. 7.3. A summary will be 
given in Ch. 7.4. 
The discussion and conclusion section in Chapter 8 will reflect on the results against the 
background of the theoretical considerations and the context knowledge gained in 
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previous chapters to evaluate the hypotheses and further explore circumstances in which 
narrative news may contain more or less deliberative quality. The chapter will draw it 
conclusions by answering the original research questions and pointing out implications 
for further research.  
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2 Journalistic Narratives 
Approaches to analyzing narratives differ mostly in how broadly they understand the 
term. On a very general level, Avraamidou and Osborne (2009, p. 1686) emphasize 
their importance by stressing that lives are told and represented through narratives, even 
arguing that “history is of itself a narrative.” They highlight an important function that 
narratives fulfill: They are used in everyday life as a way of making sense of, as well as 
communicating experiences and events in the world to others (ibid.). McComas and 
Shanahan (1999, p. 36) explain that “humans use narratives to weave together 
fragmented observations to construct meanings and realities.” They also point out that 
social meaning is created through a shared set of symbol systems between a storyteller 
and an audience. Fisher (1984) even introduces the master metaphor “homo narrans” (p. 
6) to express that storytelling is a fundamental form of communication for humans, 
even stating that “humans are essentially storytellers” (p.8). As Barthes (1975) explains 
in his theoretical considerations, narratives are a fundamental mode of human 
communication. According to him, there is an “infinite variety of forms, it is present at 
all times, in all places, in all societies” (p. 237). He lists a few of these possible forms: 
“narrative is present in myth, legend, fables, tales, short stories, epics, history, tragedy, 
drame [suspense drama], comedy, pantomime, paintings […], stained-glass windows, 
movies, local news, conversation” (ibid.). For the sake of this work’s intention, this all-
embracing concept needs to be narrowed down to the explicit context of interest. The 
challenge herein is to carve out the specifications of narratives in (non-fictional) news 
coverage to come to a useful comprehension which is worthwhile to be applied as a 
basis for the empirical investigations, in order to assess the relevancy of news narratives 
within a mediated deliberation process.  
Hence, the following paragraphs aim at presenting a definitional approach which grasps 
the concept of narrative news and is suitable as a foundation for the empirical 
investigation of this study. Narrative news will therefore be regarded according to its 
form (degree of narrativity), to its content (genre) as well as to the narrative roles 
(victim, villain, hero) presented in coverage, which will allow a comprehensive 
characterization of climate change coverage.  
I will also reflect on the relevance of news narratives for the construction and 
perception of reality and point out normative implications by presenting a critique that 
is brought forward against narrative journalism. 
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2.1 Degree of Narrativity 
This work needs to grasp narratives in the news context in order to assess their value for 
the deliberative debate. Therefore, we have to come to an understanding of what 
narratives in the news contexts are in particular and how to identify them. First and 
foremost, news narratives refer to non-fictional storytelling, which is “also 
distinguished from fictional narrative by an ethical recognition that the consequences 
are not invented but real; or at the very least, that they can be tested in some way against 
what we understand to be real” (Greenberg, 2014, p. 518). Following Roeh (1989), 
storytelling is actually the essence of journalism, even if journalists would probably 
spontaneously reject that telling stories is what they do, perhaps because of an 
underlying assumption that storytelling contradicts the common notion of “objectivity” 
(p. 608).  
Scholarly reflections on narratives and storytelling in non-fictional frameworks, such as 
news coverage of events, is nothing uncommon, as it is one possible stylistic form in the 
journalistic repertoire. It is therefore present in the everyday news media context (e.g., 
Berning, 2011; Bird & Dardenne, 1997; Carr, 2009; Duncan, 2012; Dunn, 2003; Ettema 
& Glasser, 1988; Joseph, 2010; Krøvel, 2011; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Shen, 
Ahern, & Baker, 2014; Viehöver, 2010; Wasserman, 2011; Zelizer, 1990; Zerba, 2008). 
However, these works miss one universal definition of what should be understood as 
narratives within the mediated framework. Nevertheless, there are several basic 
characteristics and elements which are constitutive for narratives to be identified as, 
which therefore can be used as a foundation for empirical research (Franzosi, 2010).  
The first set of characteristics concerns formal aspects. Several authors highlight the 
sequential order as constitutive for narratives (e.g., Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007; Fransozi, 
2010; Ellis, 2012; McComas & Shanahan, 1999, Neveu, 2014; Zerba, 2008). A 
definition provided by Hinyard and Kreuter (2007, p. 779) highlights that the form is 
constitutive of narratives, referring to the classical Aristotelian sequential arrangement 
of a story as well as to other important elements: “A narrative is any cohesive and 
coherent story with an identifiable beginning, middle, and end that provides information 
about scene, characters, and conflict; raises unanswered questions or unresolved 
conflict; and provides resolution.” McComas and Shanahan (1999) point out that it is 
the plot that is significant for narratives. It consists of a series of events or actions that 
are meaningfully tied together and involves an exposition period in which a conflict is 
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developed and in which action rises before a moment of crisis. The conflict is a central 
moment of a story; it generates interest for the story and its outcome. McDonald (2014) 
points to the connection between at least one actor and one event through a causal 
spatio–temporal framework as being decisive for narratives (p. 117). Ellis (2012) 
explains that narratives are stories containing events which take place in time. They 
therefore consist of a plan as well as a consistent and coherent main story line that gives 
answers to the W-questions ‘who, what, when, where, and why’. It is important to note 
here that a narrative is “not [a] neutral description or purely about individuals” (p. 99) 
but that it also makes a point on a general situation or question. The sequential ordering 
of events and actions is also a basic element of narratives within the concept of Franzosi 
(2010). However, he emphasizes that “the temporal order […] is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the emergence of a story. The events in the sequence must also 
be meaningful overall (coherence)” (p.15). Zerba (2008) highlights the sequence of 
events as structured within a plot and contrasts this to the traditional inverted pyramid 
style of the classical news story that presents the most important facts first, adding less 
important details and background information afterwards. For Ytreberg (2001, p. 359), 
the term “news story“ is rather confusing in this context of the common journalistic 
writing style, since it is “applied to news that is not obviously narrative in character.” 
However, the typical journalistic writing represents the inverted pyramid style following 
the convention that a news story should present the most important fact first (Dunn, 
2003). The inverted pyramid style in journalistic writing is mostly adhered to for 
efficiency’s sake, because it helps reader to get a quick overview on the events of the 
day (Knobloch, Patzig, Mende, & Hastall, 2004). News values such as “proximity, 
consequence, prominence, timeliness, conflict and so on” (Dunn, 2003, p. 113) as well 
as a focus on a “who, what, where, when, how and why approach to informative news” 
(Johnston & Graham, 2012, p. 522) determine what the journalist perceives as important 
and anticipates what the reader would find most interesting. The equalization of 
efficiency and the inverted pyramid style implicitly suggests that other journalistic 
pieces, that do not fit this pattern but rather follow, for example, the narrative approach, 
are automatically longer. This is not necessarily the case, as Kramer (2000, p. 7) notes: 
“Narrative touches in shorter assignments needn't take more reporting time, just more 
attention - a finer-grained, heads-up apprehension of the events at hand.”  
This sequential order of narratives is what Glaser, Garsoffky and Schwan (2009) 
identify as “dramatization” within their research on narrative-based learning, and it is a 
12 
first important element to distinguish narrative writing from other forms. Following 
these authors, I will use the term “dramatization” to refer to the sequential order of a 
narrative text.  
Events are usually tied to actors that are in some way involved in, responsible for, or 
affected by those events (McDonald, 2014). Or, as Barthes (1975, p. 257) notes, that “it 
may safely be assumed that there is not a single narrative in the world without 
“characters,” or at least without “agents.”” Neveu (2014, p. 537) pursuits a similar 
approach, stating that “journalism is a narrative art” and that “[t]elling news as (true) 
stories also means organising a cast of characters” Franzosi emphasizes: “It is the action 
that defines the event, although without characters there can be no action.” (p.21). 
Glaser, Garsoffky and Schwan (2009) use the term “personalization” to refer to the 
characteristic that a narrative plot is always about agents (mostly humans) causing 
events. To avoid confusion with other concepts of personalization within 
communication studies (for an overview, see, van Aelst, Sheafer, & Stanyer, 2012), I 
will rather use the term “narrative personalization” in the following to refer to agents 
and actors within news stories that are either responsible for or affected by an event. 
Very strong forms of narrative personalization would include telling the story thorough 
the eyes of a character (who might be the author or one of the narrative’s main 
characters), or even from a first-person perspective (Harber and Broersma, 2014; Zerba, 
2008). 
To gain a more complete understanding of events, narratives also disclose actors’ 
motives, reasons for their actions, their emotions, and specific details that do not 
necessarily contribute to the ongoing of the events but help to provide background. 
Harber and Broersma (2014, p. 643) emphasize “the life-like and psychologically 
realistic portrayal of people” as being specifically characteristic for narratives, which is 
not exclusively bound to so-called soft news with a human-interest focus but can also be 
applied to “hard issues like politics or international affairs.” Revealing the emotions of 
the actors of a story is also an important criterion for Glaser, Garsoffky and Schwan 
(2009), who refer to this as “emotionalization”, which is also a widely used term in 
communication studies, but will here be used to refer to the portrayal of actors’ 
emotions and motives.  
Narratives provide further insights about the background of a situation, for example 
through the “portrayal of atmosphere and symbolic details” (Harber and Broersma 
2014, p. 643). By including information that a classical news story would rather spare, 
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narratives are more likely to “connect dots” (Entman, 2010, p. 113), especially in time. 
They can allow the reader to look backwards or even forward. This element of “time” 
for the construction of news narratives also plays a central role in the considerations of 
Neiger and Tenenboim-Weinblatt (2016), who argue that through references to the 
temporal dimension news narratives contribute to the construction of meaning in the 
news context. Since looking backwards and forward in time often entails speculative 
moments about what could have been or what could possibly come, I call this narrative 
feature (also following thoughts of Glaser, Garsoffky and Schwan, 2009) 
“fictionalization”.  
The aspects dramatization, narrative personalization, emotionalization and 
fictionalization are basic features of narrations. I will use these features to identify and 
characterize narrative news texts by using these aspects to determine the degree of 
narrativity. To do so, I understand the narrative concept as rather gradual (Wolf, 2002), 
especially against the background of the diversity of possible formats within 
newspapers (editorial, op-ed, feature, interview, etc.). A single news story does not 
necessarily have to be either a complete narrative or a classical factual news story only. 
Narrative elements can be more or less distinctive within an article and therefore have a 
smaller or greater degree of narrativity, depending on how many of these features are 
present in a text. Articles can have sequential paragraphs presenting the action and 
motives of an actor while overall following the inverted pyramid style, for example.  
In addition, we have to note that the narrative elements presented here are basic 
characteristics to identify narrative texts. As Franzosi (2010) elaborates referring to 
Roland Barthes, narratives have a common structure, or more specifically: 
“distinguishable regularities” behind narrative, behind the “millions of narratives” (p. 
3). He identifies “the sequential ordering of narrative clauses, the story-versus-plot 
distinction of this sequential ordering, and the basic structure of narrative clauses as 
actors and their actions in time and space”. These aspects as necessary elements for a 
full narrative translate into the elements introduced above: the sequential order and 
story form as dramatization, the concentration on actors, their actions and motives as 
narrative personalization and emotion, and the connection of these actions to time and 
space as fictionalization. There are further aspects that can be regarded when 
investigating narratives, such as the role of the narrator (e.g., Avraamidou & Osborne, 
2009; Berning, 2011) or the stylistic ornamentation (Lucaites& Condit, 1985). 
However, aspects like these can be subject to great variation, e.g. the absent versus the 
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omnipresent narrator, or a very plain style of expression versus a more metaphorical use 
of language. Therefore, it is more difficult to express a rule that is comparably distinct, 
for example that a sequential order is a clear hint to identify narratives.  
2.2 Narrative Genre 
When theorizing narrations within the non-fictional media environment, it is it is helpful 
to use genre theory to grasp the specificity of different story types. Roeh (1989) also 
suggests applying theories of modes and genres to news stories to better understand 
processes of meaning production. He argues not to primarily study the facts that 
constitute stories but to rather ask the other way around and engage with the question 
about the “stories [that] constitute what we perceive as facts” (p. 168). He uses a genre 
approach to determine the narrative patterns that guide audiences’ perception and 
understanding significantly.  
However, the term “genre” in the English language is not as distinct or explicit as in 
other languages (e.g., German or French) which makes considerations more complex. 
Lünenborg (2005) notes that various terms, such as genre, mode, form, (display) and 
format, are used in literary, film, media and journalism studies in very different ways. In 
literary studies, one would distinguish between classifications based on formal or 
content criteria. In German, one would refer to formal classifications with the term 
Gattung, while Genre would classify texts according to their content1. Poetry, prose and 
performance, referred to as the natural forms of literature by Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, are the typical examples for the main literary Gattungen (Burdorf, Fasbender, 
Moennighoff, Schweikle, & Schweikle, 2007). In the English language, these forms are 
main literary genres2. A classification of similar texts according to content 
characteristics would, for example, refer to comedy, tragedy, melodrama etc. Applying 
the terminology to journalistic products is possible and, as Lünenborg (2005) shows in 
detail, has also been done in various ways. But what these approaches have in common 
is that they (1) all characterize sorts of texts, (2) describe the function of texts as 
intentional, (3) are based on a certain ensemble of forms even though there is a 
historical variability of formats, (4) refer mostly to newspaper journalism, and (5) are 
often intended to function as an instruction for journalistic practice (p.121–122). 
                                                            
1 Both terms are derived from the Latin word “genus” = kind, sort, class, style 
2 However, the German terms Gattung and Genre are also often used synonymously. According to 
Burdorf et al. (2007) attempts to systematically replace the term Gattung as well as attempts to finally 
define Genre as a concept of Untergattung (=subgenre) failed (p. 275).  
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Lünenborg herself is explicitly interested in the specific journalistic genres of television. 
She distinguishes between three modes of communication: informative, narrative, and 
performative. These modes are expressed in different program forms: forms of showing, 
reporting, narrating, arguing, and playing. These forms can be hybrids from different 
modes, something that becomes more obvious when looking at the next level of genres. 
Forms of reporting, for example, can be accounted to the informative mode alone (e.g., 
classical news, reports, magazines) or can be compositions of the informative as well as 
the narrative mode (e.g., documentary, feature, portrait, reality TV). Genres listed as 
sole forms of narrating within the narrative mode are, for example, moderations, serial 
documentaries or talk shows. As we can see from this, Lünenborg’s (2005) 
classification of genres clearly focuses on forms which certainly could find an 
equivalent in newspaper coverage, e.g., in editorials, comments, features, Q&A 
interviews and many others.   
However, even though it is important to note that the forms that Lünenborg 
characterizes as genres can be hybrids from different modes of communication, which 
supports the assumption that narrativity is a gradual concept (as elaborated above), 
understanding genres merely as texts with similar formal characteristics is not useful for 
this dissertation. I consider other authors who use genre concepts to characterize the 
content of texts to determine the stories that are told. This will be important to identify 
cultural differences and understand how climate change and the social processes 
connected to it are viewed and communicated in different countries.  
For example, according to Roeh (1989), news stories can have different genres such as 
romance, tragedy, comedy and satire, though mass media do not usually show genre 
archetypes, but rather mixed forms. Smith (2005, pp. 23–27) deduces four types of 
narrative genre for his analysis of war coverage. The low-mimetic genre records events 
rather dryly and bureaucratically following a “business-as-usual” logic. Daily political 
events or decisions are presented without emphasizing conflict or emotional drama. The 
tragic genre does the opposite, especially concerning the degree of presented emotions. 
This genre relates to strong emotions of empathy and compassion since it focuses on a 
tragic hero struggling in a hopeless situation through no fault of his or her own. Within 
the romantic genre, there is no such hopelessness. Strong ideals and positive optimism 
lead a hero against high but not insuperable obstacles. Finally, Smith calls the 
apocalyptic genre the strongest of the presented ones. Nothing less than the fundamental 
fight between good and bad is at stake in stories within this genre. 
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Schwarze (2006) identifies three main genres in the discourse on environmental issues: 
comedy, tragedy and melodrama. The comic genre is characterized by an underlying 
attitude that a situation is not as bad as it seems and that there are no serious dangers. If 
there are conflicts, they are settled between individuals, but polarization is usually 
moderate and can be overcome. Impeding problems are accepted, and stories rather deal 
with a way to cope with these. The comic genre therefore fosters “Compromise, charity, 
social unification within a reformed social order” (p. 242). The tragic genre is not 
described precisely but mostly centers on “the bad guy […] within” (p. 243) and the 
individual conflict, whereas, following Schwarze, the melodrama is the recurrent 
rhetorical form of environmental controversies. It is characterized by social and political 
conflicts and a confrontation with external adversaries. Conflicts can occur between 
individuals, or between groups and institutions, organizations or governments while 
there are typical victim, villain and hero actor constellations that can be detected. Strong 
and positive emotional identification is evoked by the presentations of victims and 
heroes. Furthermore, there is an intense polarization and a bipolar positioning of 
characters and forces with fundamentally differing positions or beliefs. Upcoming 
problems are not accepted by the actors, who act against a scapegoat.   
Carr (2009), by focusing on audiences’ perception, proposes the expression of 
“narrative templates” to define certain “organized clusters of elements, or even 
standardized story-structures” (p. 55) which shape narratives. As shared conventions for 
storytelling, narrative templates help audiences understand and guide their expectations 
(ibid., p. 100). If confronted with a story, audiences soon recognize its type because of 
the used templates which “allow[s] them to move into an appropriate mood of 
receptivity and resonance” (Carr, 2009, p. 57).  
These concepts of narrative genre, especially within news coverage, will be central to an 
operationalization of the quantitative content analysis in Chapter 7.1. With the help of 
these considerations, I want to determine the contents of the stories told about climate 
change and climate politics in Brazil, Germany, and the US.  
2.3 Narrative Roles 
To further characterize the stories that are told, I want to stress again the point of 
personalization as decisive for narratives, something which is also emphasized by 
Barthes (1975, p. 257), who notes that “it may safely be assumed that there is not a 
single narrative in the world without “characters,” or at least without “agents.”” Most 
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commonly, such agents within narratives are placed in specific roles that oftentimes 
imply a constellation of actors as either victim, villain or hero (Schwarze, 2006; Smith, 
1997; Higgins & Brush, 2006). According to Higgins and Brush (2006), “heroes and 
victims provide culturally familiar templates and can generate dramatic effect. […] In 
positioning themselves as heroes who can overcome normally insurmountable 
obstacles, subordinated narrators affirm pride and create the motivation and faith they 
need to cope and to organize for change. In positioning themselves as victims caught in 
a web of unavoidable circumstance, subordinated narrators build sympathy among peers 
and create a sense of shared grievance and consciousness (the tinder and flint required 
to ignite social change).” (p. 700)  
Conceptionalizing how news frames are embedded in cultural repertoires, van Gorp 
(2010) focuses on “culturally shared notions with symbolic significance, such as 
stereotypes, values, archetypes, myths, and narratives” (p. 85). Typical archetypes are 
the victim, villain and (tragic) hero. Such archetypes are used to root news frames in 
common cultural themes and help to reproduce cultural values. They are also 
understood as “motifs and characters that help to structure stories” (p. 85). Identifying 
the archetypes used in a news story helps to characterize the story that is actually told. 
Van Gorp (2010) illustrates: “If the archetype of a villain is used, then poverty can be 
viewed as the result of certain individuals who make use of, or abuse, the social welfare 
system to which they do not financially contribute. […] Next, poor people can be 
portrayed as victims of a demanding socioeconomical system. Some succeed in beating 
the system and become heroes when they combat poverty.” (p. 86).  
According to Lule (2001, p.15), archetypes “represent shared values, confirm core 
beliefs, [and] deny other beliefs.” He understands archetypes as “fundamental figures 
and forces, such as heroes, floods, villains, plagues, patriarchs, pariahs, great mothers, 
and tricksters.” The analysis of these figures and forces guides his case studies on the 
connection of myths and news in the New York Times. He argues that, “archetypal 
myths can be found every day within national reports, international correspondence, 
sports columns, human interest features, editorials and obituaries” (p.3) and he 
illustrates this by exemplifying seven master myths that are constructed around the 
archetypes named above.  
To better grasp the stories that are actually told about climate change, I will include the 
analysis of the narrative roles of the victim, villain and hero, which are basic archetypes 
with clear (moral) implications. Franzosi (2010) cites Propp (1968) who wrote: “The 
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names of the dramatis personae change (as well as the attributes of each), but neither 
their actions nor functions change.” (p.21). The use of narrative roles such as the victim, 
villain and hero may also reveal underlying structures and relations, e.g. the position of 
certain actors within a process or their position towards each other. Eide and Kunelius 
(2010) revealed such structures in the media coverage of the climate change conference 
in Copenhagen in 2009. Understanding the victim/ villain/ hero categorization as a 
framing device and as a part of responsibility attributions to certain countries, they 
argue that those roles are used to reduce complexity in the global climate politics 
process. I will also concentrate on these three roles since they seem especially relevant 
for the coverage of climate change and climate politics where countries that are affected 
by climate change may easily be ascribed with the role if the victim because countries 
that are responsible for causing climate change may rather be represented as villains.  
2.4 Social Functions of News Narratives 
From the above mentioned discussion, we know that narration is a fundamental mode of 
human communication which, by constructing events in a certain way, guides the 
perception of these events. In the following paragraph, I will more closely consider the 
implications for the construction and perception of social reality when regarding news 
that is presented in narrative form.  
Narrative elements that are used in news coverage connect current events to social and 
cultural traditions. As already denoted in the general discussion above, these functions 
are sense-making and philosophical, representative and (re-)constituting as well as 
communicative, social and entertaining (Wolf, 2002). Considering this, non-fictional 
narratives in a news environment might especially apply to Carey’s ritual function of 
communication: “A ritual view of communication is directed not toward the extension 
of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of 
importing information but the representation of shared beliefs.” (Carey, 1989, p. 201). 
When embedding current events into traditional patterns of storytelling, the audiences 
are offered to connect to a long-term context (Entman, 2010) which also transports and 
perhaps reinforces certain values and norms (Carr, 2009; Young 1996), for example, 
concerning the understanding of what is to be perceived as good and bad or as right and 
wrong. Roeh (1989, p. 165) also emphasizes: “Storytelling is as old as human history, 
and the impulse to narrate appears to be entirely natural and unproblematic, given that 
narrative is present in all known cultures.” Carr (2009) argues that narratives play a vital 
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role in the construction of the public sphere as a whole because of their uniting function, 
which can create a sense of participating in a collective concerned with social, political 
and environmental issues. Addressing these issues with collective action is dependent 
upon a sense of collectivity which, according to Carr, is supported by shared 
storytelling. This view on the social function of reinforcing the collective is also 
emphasized by Schudson (2012, p. 186–187): “This narrative view of journalism sees 
news as part of a process of producing collective meanings rather than as a process of 
transmitting information. It emphasizes the social rather than the mechanical feature of 
the news process.” However, this should not be understood as a conscious process. 
People who produce news operate within a cultural system and resort to “a reservoir of 
stored cultural meanings” (p.184) with which they add to “a part of culture that 
reproduces aspects of a larger culture” (ibid.).   
Though narratives mostly work through cultural familiarity, they can also enable 
audiences to discover the unknown. “With an effortless trip in a narrative flow” (Neveu, 
2014, p. 536) audiences may get into contact with social worlds and experiences that 
they were not aware of. Narrative elements can foster understanding for others or even 
identification through the disclosure of actors’ motives. The narrative elements that are 
supposed to produce suspense may engage audiences more deeply or persistently by 
raising interest in the outcome of ongoing events (Entman, 2010).  
There are certain epistemological assumptions implied in the idea that audiences may 
discover social worlds different from their own through narratives. First of all, narrative 
journalism breaks with the convention of “objectivity” which traditional Western 
journalism tries to achieve through depersonalization and detached reporting that 
presents all sides of a story (Harbers & Broersma, 2014). According to Johnston and 
Graham (2012, p. 518), narrative journalism combines factual accuracy with fictional 
writing devices “such as character development, complication, detailed description, 
scene setting and construction, and time reconstruction”, which allows the journalist to 
show the world how she or he perceives it. Neveu (2014, p. 538) highlights the special 
combination of objectivity and subjectivity in narrative journalism: “A second feature of 
this journalism is the aim to combine the objectivity, the factuality of the scenes and 
actions, and the greatest attention to the subjective dimension of the experience and 
feelings of the actors of the events.” He further explains that, in order to establish such 
subjectivity in their narrative writing and to gain a better understanding of groups that 
differ in their social order, many journalists borrow tools and techniques of data 
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gathering from social science, for example, ethnographic or sociological methods of 
interviews and observation.  
What becomes obvious is that the dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism 
does not hold in the case of narrative journalism, which challenges the “objectivity 
regime” (Harbers & Broersma, 2014, p. 642) as practiced by conventional news 
journalism.  
2.5 Critique of Narrative Journalism 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of narrative journalism is a topic of heated debate in 
the field of journalism studies. One of the most fundamental skepticisms directed to 
narrative journalism is summarized by Harbers and Broersma (2014, p. 640) in the 
phrase: “What reads like a novel will probably be as truthful as a novel.” Critics imply 
that narrative journalism’s first goal would be to tell a “coherent, compelling and 
engaging story” (ibid.) and therefore treat factual accuracy, truth, and veracity with less 
care.  
Another concern is brought forward by Benson (2014) who questions the deliberative 
value of narrative techniques in news journalism. For him, there is a severe 
contradiction between the personalized narrative and any attempts to add an abstract 
political idea to a story, which would disrupt the storytelling. These thoughts are also 
supported by an earlier study by Ettema and Glasser (1988), who analyzed Pulitzer 
Prize winning news stories and show that these stories oversaw systemic causes of the 
problems that were reported in the stories. They elaborate: “Even in these stories of 
“system-wide problems,” the individual experience is emphasized while the social issue 
is marginalized. Similarly, assessments of what exactly has gone wrong with the system 
are not developed in much detail.” (Ettema & Glasser, 1988, p. 24). Beyond that, they 
criticize an insufficiently complex worldview that reaffirm common-sense concepts of 
innocence and guilt without further scrutinizing individual and institutional 
responsibilities (ibid).  
Other empirical evidence against narrative journalism is presented by Dunn (2003). She 
investigates Australian radio news concluding that narrative elements can indeed catch 
the audience’s attention but at the same time are not appropriate for the presentation of 
hard news, due to their tendency of depoliticizing news through personalization. Issues 
are simplified when individuals are the focus of a news story, which easily results in 
what is called “tabloidization” according to Dunn. Such a decline in quality could 
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especially occur in cases where central news values are ignored within narrative news 
items. At the same time, narratives within hard news tend to express more attitude and 
evaluations of behavior, which, according to Dunn, can especially be problematic if 
narrative elements are contrasted with news that follows the information model rather 
than the narrative model.    
Considering these critical remarks and keeping them in mind is necessary if we want to 
develop standards for narrative journalism in order to have a deliberative surplus. It is 
important to remember that the point of this study is not to come to an overall 
conclusion on narratives in news as being either good or bad and therefore to be held up 
high or dismissed completely, but to define standards that have to be fulfilled in order 
for a piece to be deliberatively valuable.  
2.6 State of Research 
Narratives in the non-fictional context have been observed from different angles. 
Studies have investigated the rise of a) narrative forms in news media contexts looking 
at the amount of narratives (Johnston & Graham, 2012) as well as their content and 
composition (Berning, 2011; McComas & Shanahan, 1999), also about the construction 
of objectivity, subjectivity, and authority (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013; Harbers & Broersma, 
2014; Zelizer, 1990). Another set of studies focuses on b) the audience reception and 
how narratives in news can foster attention and comprehension (Zerba, 2008; Machill, 
Kohler, & Waldhauser, 2007; Baum, 2002) or influence cognitive or affective responses 
(Shen, Ahern, & Baker, 2014). The following paragraph will review some of this 
previous research in preparation for this study’s own empirical approach.   
Scholarly interest in narratives in the news context is often based on the assumption that 
the rise of narrative is connected to an increasing commercialization that is due to 
higher competition and market pressure. Against the backdrop of continuing changes in 
the economic structures in which media companies are embedded, it is a popular 
assumption to hold that narrative news writing helps to keep the readers’ attention and 
is therefore used to an ever-increasing extent. Ytreberg (2001) picks up on the scholarly 
discussion on the rise of narrative forms in television news in the light of economic 
deregulation and intensified competition. He analyzed the news program Dagsrevyen by 
the Norwegian public service broadcaster NRK between the years 1992 and 1994 and 
shows developments that indicate a spread of narrative modes in new modes of 
descriptions. Ytreberg concludes that labeling television news with “narrative” as some 
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“immutable foundational structure” (p.369) without further distinctions is not useful for 
a valid critical engagement in the issue of analyzing news content and the discursive 
landscape with the help of different modes. The latter must be clearly confined to be 
valuable for analytical purposes that aim at carefully tracking down the developments.   
Similar conclusions can be drawn from Johnson and Graham (2012), who contribute to 
the discussion on the rise of narratives due to economic pressure. They investigate this 
hypothesis by conducting a content analysis of two Australian newspapers between 
2007 and 2009, comparing their results to previous studies. Adding interviews with 
newspaper editors and journalists to gain a deeper understanding of ongoing processes, 
they found that narrative writing decreased during their period of investigation and in 
comparison, to the longer time frame. One of the explanations that the authors offer 
contradicts the previous assumption that narrative writing increases with growing 
economic pressure. In fact, during the time of their investigations, the newspapers they 
examined were forced to cut staff, which made them more dependent on wire stories. 
The authors argue that narrative writing needs certain resources for investigation and for 
a thoughtful writing process. Therefore, it is a false conclusion that narrative writing is 
automatically less costly. However, Johnson and Graham indicate that there may be an 
increase of hybrid forms that use wire stories and add, for example, anecdotal elements 
with local references. Nevertheless, their own investigation only distinguishes between 
articles that can be identified either as written in inverted pyramid style, narrative style, 
or as a comment, which impedes a more detailed recording of the developments.  
The conclusions drawn from the studies of Ytreberg (2001) and Johnson and Graham 
(2012) support the theoretical considerations presented above that narrativity in a non-
fictional context should be understood as a gradual concept. There are certainly articles 
at the end poles between a conventional inverted pyramid form on the one side and a 
narrative form on the other, but several nuances in between are lost if the concepts are 
applied in this pure form rather than allowing to include hybrid types.   
It is therefore of significance to carefully define narrative characteristics and elements 
beforehand to look the actual occurrence in the news media context. As Berning (2011) 
shows in her dissertation, narrative categories, such as narrative situation, temporal 
order, narrative space, and characterization, can be applied to non-fictional journalistic 
texts. With a qualitative approach and an application of “narratological codes”, she 
investigates a selection of twenty-five journalistic reportages proving that journalists 
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use a range of literary devices without fictionalizing the reportages. She also 
emphasizes the hybrid character of the genre, reminding the reader in her discussion to 
carefully consider the relationship between journalism and literature in general.    
Another rather gradual approach is applied by Piazza and Haarman (2011), who 
examine American and British TV news that covered the Iraq War. They investigate 
how the element of narrativity is interlaced with that of human interest. Both concepts 
are understood as two poles of a continuum in which there are new items progressing 
from those that are predominantly narrative in nature to those that focus mainly on 
human interest. According to the authors, war narratives are characterized by typical 
narrative elements such as “a stretch of text which contains a beginning, a middle (or 
complicating event) and an end suggesting a resolution and often concluding with an 
evaluative conclusion or coda” (p. 1542). Human-interest reports are defined by their 
focus on the life and experiences of individual soldiers and their families, as well as the 
victims of war. Within the war context, these poles combine with human-interest 
narratives to different degrees. These human-interest narratives are particularly 
characterized by their tendency to display a certain pathos by addressing social values 
and a sense of community through solidarity avowals. Within the destabilizing nature of 
war reporting, according to Piazza and Haarman, war narratives that emphasize human-
interest aspects are powerful tools of stabilization and re-establishing social order. 
Although the conceptual distinction between narratives and human-interest reports is 
not fully clear in this research, the results at least support to carefully examine the 
constitution and application of narratives to assess their quality, particularly because 
certain types of narratives have such a high potential to be used for strategic purposes, 
such as inducing popular support for war.    
There are several other studies which explain how objectivity, subjectivity, and 
authority are created in narrative news. Dunn (2003), for example, argues that a 
narrative form is not appropriate for the news genre since storytelling is associated with 
fiction. Her analysis of Australian radio news supports this by criticizing that especially 
radio news cannot show evidence and is therefore less trustworthy in any case. 
Narrative radio news is therefore rather counterproductive, even though she admits that 
narratives are needed in radio to catch the audiences’ attention.  
The notion that narratives are less trustworthy in the sense of providing “true” 
information probably comes from the idea that narratives are a subjective report of 
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events, while news need to be objective. Ytreberg (2001), referring to Schudson and 
Høyer, points to the parallel rise of the inverted pyramid style in news writing and the 
“news paradigm” of the twentieth-century, that fostered objectivism and the ideal of 
neutral news criteria as a professional ideology in institutionalized journalism. Narrative 
journalism seems to run contrary to this, perhaps because of the fear that it “challenged 
on the grounds of factual accuracy and stretching the truth” and the notion that “what 
reads like a novel will probably be as truthful as a novel.” (Harbers & Broersma, 2014, 
p. 640). In their study, Harbers and Broersma (2014) compare the narrative journalistic 
writing of two journalists from Britain and the Netherlands on the Middle East conflict 
and show that subjectivity is created differently. This affects the persuasiveness of their 
reporting. While one journalist represents an engaged-personal writing type, the other 
represents a personal-ironic type. They are mainly distinguished by their approach of 
disclosing their access to reality and journalistic reporting. The narrative writing of the 
former remains in line with an ethnographic realism, not questioning the journalistic 
routine that aims at reporting “the truth,” while the latter must be seen rather in a 
tradition of cultural phenomenology. This approach works through irony and a 
reflective writing-style that questions the process of positivistic reporting, which aims at 
uncovering an underlying truth. The authors connect this kind of narrative journalism to 
cultural developments that generally challenge the notion of an objective truth in 
traditional journalistic routines.  
Another approach to subjectivity in journalistic narratives is presented by Wahl-
Jorgensen (2013), who investigates subjectivity in Pulitzer-Prize-winning journalistic 
articles. She questions the dichotomy between objectivity/rationality/impartiality on the 
one hand and subjectivity/emotion/partisanship on the other. Objectivity, Wahl-
Jorgensen argues, “has been translated into a set of journalistic practices which, 
exercised as strategic ritual, play a crucial role in protecting journalists from the risks of 
their trade by removing their subjectivity from the stories and hence ensuring that they 
appear impartial, as required by the liberal democratic model of media operation.” (p. 
306). Subjectivity is embedded in journalistic stories by using the emotions of the 
people, on whom the story is about, as a “form of "outsourcing" of emotional labor to 
the subjects of the story.” (p. 306). In her content analysis of 101 Pulitzer-Prize-winning 
news stories she therefore looks for expressions of affect, judgments of individuals and 
groups, as well as appreciation as an evaluation of objects.  
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In an earlier study, Zelizer (1990) had already reconstructed how journalists tried to 
achieve authority in their reporting about the assassination of John F. Kennedy by using 
stylistic devices such as synecdoche (a rhetorical figure that replaces an expression with 
closely related but different wording, often used as “pars-pro-toto” where a part of 
something is used in order to refer to the whole of it), omission (the exclusion of 
information on events or people) and personalization, when telling their stories about 
the events. Personalization is mainly achieved by writing from a first-person 
perspective. This way, journalists foster an impression of an eye-witness report of 
someone who attended the actual event even if they were not actually an eyewitness of 
the assassination.   
From a study presented by Duncan (2012), we can learn what a certain type of 
subjectivity can mean for readers. The author investigated personal narratives of grief in 
five typical news stories in British newspapers that covered interviews with bereaved 
people. On the one side, these stories give voice to the personal experiences and 
subjective perceptions of the subjects. At the same time, Duncan argues that these 
stories should not be misunderstood as “therapy sessions” for the bereaved only, but 
rather that they should be regarded as a contribution to a societal discourse on death in 
general as well. Through the induction of empathy, people may also be able to discover 
how they might feel if something similar would happen to them, which, according to 
Duncan, corresponds to a basic human need.     
Narrative reporting, as we can learn from the studies above, somehow closes the 
distance between an event and the reader by generating a certain degree of involvement 
and by presenting events from a subjective perspective. Truth in this way cannot be 
absolute but is rather constructed and revealed to be as such. To a certain degree, there 
is honesty to admitting that journalistic writing does not represent the ultimate reality. 
But at the same time, it entails a risk, especially when a writer is not able to reflect that 
there might be different points of views beyond his or her own personal perceptions and 
considerations. This point is emphasized by Ettema and Glasser (1988), who analyzed 
Pulitzer-Prize-winning news stories and concluded that even the stories that covered 
wider ranging problems failed to point out a system-wide significance. The focus is on 
the individual experience while systemic causes are not regarded. Instead of a 
sophisticated analysis, stories rather reaffirmed common-sense concepts of innocence 
and guilt.  
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Like this, Krøvel (2011) deplores a limited journalistic repertoire when analyzing the 
news narratives in the coverage on the United Nations climate change conference in 
Bali. He investigates the use of sources, framing, as well as the use of narratives in TV 
news, newspapers and magazines from various parts of the world. Supposing that 
journalists would embed their stories within culture-bound narratives so that audiences 
can easily recognize and understand new information in familiar stories, he specifically 
looks at narrative roles (who is the protagonist, who is the opponent in the negotiations 
at Bali?), what is implicitly and explicitly constructed as a goal and which information 
is made more salient. Krøvel then draws a critical conclusion, stating that similar 
characters are central in all narratives where the US is seen as the “opponent” and small 
and poor countries such as Papua New Guinea are standing up against the only 
remaining superpower. He also criticizes the low variability of sources and the 
nontransparent choice of information presented, which mostly concentrates on who 
would win and who would lose in the negotiations, which results in an unsatisfactory, 
uniform coverage with a low inclusivity of both sources and arguments.  
Another set of studies investigates the reception of narratives and their psychological 
effects. Without going too far into detail,since the reception process is not in the center 
of this study, a short overview should foster our understanding of the peculiarities of 
narrative news stories.  
One of the main assumptions that one finds as a reason for the use of narratives in the 
news context is that they more easily engage people and draw attention to a story. The 
study of Zerba (2008) can account for this assumption by providing evidence that 
narrative news stories arouse more interest for hard news in young people who do not 
frequently read newspapers. Narrative news stories also have a positive influence on the 
understanding, learning, and enjoyment of a story. Zerba emphasizes that the 
undiversified presentation of conventional new stories can easily cause recipients to lose 
interest in the coverage. Another article by Machill, Kohler and Waldhauser (2007) 
argues that people do not understand and remember TV news. The authors conducted an 
experiment which showed that a higher degree of narrativity increases people’s 
comprehension and retention. Confronting politically inattentive people who are 
entertainment seeking rather than information seeking with foreign crisis information in 
soft news, Baum (2002) demonstrates that such audiences, who would otherwise hardly 
be confronted with the topic at all, develop a certain interest in it. Also, in an 
experimental research design, Shen, Ahern and Baker (2014) investigate the impact of 
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different combinations of narratives and frames in news reports on the recipient's issue 
attitudes, empathy, transportation and cognitive responses. By and large, the results of 
the study revealed that narrative news had a greater impact on the recipient's responses 
than informational news, especially regarding the induction of empathetic feelings. This 
applied especially to the test persons who were assigned to narrative news stories that 
regarded the environmental consequences of gas drilling instead of the potential 
economic benefits. The narrative news stories on the environmental consequences also 
had a significantly more enduring effect on people’s attitudes towards the issue, which 
was revealed by a follow-up survey twenty-four hours later (Shen et al., 2014).  
As we have seen, narratives in the news context have been investigated from various 
angles. While there is no automatism between growing economic pressure and the 
increased use of narrative writing in newspaper coverage, there are at least several 
elements of narratives and hybrid forms that can be detected. Those forms seem to add a 
certain degree of subjectivity to the coverage and therefore reveal specific perceptions 
and personal conclusions. For media users, news stories with narrative elements appear 
to be more easily processed. Nevertheless, the question about the quality of narrative 
news writing remains controversial, which might be due to two factors: First, in order to 
determine the quality of something, criteria to measure the quality have to be defined. 
However, the question what is good or bad quality and what kind of coverage is actually 
preferable is not easy to answer. Second, even if quality measures are defined, there 
might not be a definite answer on how good or bad narrative news writing is since it is 
possible that there are differences depending on the context in which the narrative news 
writing is applied. Therefore, one research perspective on narrative news that is still 
underrepresented is a comparative one, which can help us to gain knowledge about 
culturally specific peculiarities and adaptations, as well as about explanations that help 
us to understand what kind of narratives can be expected within a specific context. This 
dissertation aims at contributing to filling this research gap by proposing a comparative 
approach of different countries. The next step, however, will be to engage in the 
question of defining quality, after presenting broader considerations about the preferable 
performance of the public sphere to come to conclusions on what impact narrative news 
writing can make for public communication.   
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3 Deliberation 
After extensive clarification of the concept of narration within the news media 
environment, the following chapter elaborates on theoretical considerations regarding 
mediated deliberation within the public sphere. This chapter will go into detail on basic 
assumptions about public discourse in society, and specifically on deliberation to 
theoretically assess the role of news narratives in public deliberation and, finally, to 
further prepare the empirical investigations in subsequent chapters.  
3.1 Public Sphere and Public Discourse 
Following Peters (2007), public discourse can be understood as a means of cultural self-
understanding that is based on a public culture which is produced and renewed by these 
discourses at the same time. Public culture in this sense must be regarded as a reservoir 
of symbols, meaning, knowledge, and values that are available to and should be 
interesting for a public collective (e.g., within a nation state) (Wessler & Wingert, 
2007). Furthermore, the foundation of the public sphere and the discourses within are 
constructed by public culture. As Wessler and Wingert (2007) explain the term, 
summarizing Peters, a public culture consists of the language of the majority, and of 
familiar visual images, movies, songs, plays, and monuments, commonly used 
narratives, ceremonies, villains and heroes (p.16). These elements of the public culture 
form the basis of communication and understanding. They determine associations and 
basic principles for justifications. As such, they also influence the acceptance of 
decisions and attention for certain events and developments.  
The classic understanding of the public sphere refers to it as a sphere of unconstrained 
public opinion formation and decision-making in a democratic society, a sphere that 
regulates public concerns (Peters, 2007, p. 59). Marcinkowski (2008) defines the term 
as follows:  
The public sphere is an indispensable element of a democratic society and the 
institutional core of democratic decision-making. Every democratic political order is 
essentially based on the idea that citizens participate in collectively binding 
decisions, articulate their interests and opinions openly, listen and evaluate the 
opinions and arguments of others, and, on that basis, make up their minds. The 
public sphere establishes an arena of discussion on public affairs and guarantees that 
all these processes are open to the public. (Marcinkowski, 2008) 
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Beyond political issues of collective concern, debates on general orientation, normative 
principles and values as well as the engagement with a collective past and an assumed 
future are also part of public debates in the public sphere. However, as Peters (2007) 
summarizes Tönnis, public debates are not only supposed to form opinions, but also 
build the basis of motives and contribute to the collective decision-making.  
According to the arena model of the public sphere by Ferree et al. (2002a), which helps 
us to image how the public sphere is constituted, public discourse is held in different 
forums. Every forum has an arena in which individual and collective actors present 
themselves, a gallery from where the active audience can follow the processes in the 
arena, and a backstage area where actors prepare themselves for the arena by planning 
their strategies and collecting ideas. There are different forums in a society, e.g., 
parliaments, courts, party conventions, scientific congresses, and the mass media. What 
is understood as the “public sphere” is the entirety of all these forums. The mass media 
have become a “master forum” (p.10) which is used by all actors of the other forums, 
whether as actors or as audience in the gallery. The mass media forum today is the main 
stage for political competition. However, discourses from the other forums (e.g. sports, 
science, law) are well presented in the mass media forum, although there is a process of 
selection and simplifying. Ferree et al. (2002b) emphasize that this mass media forum 
does not simply present current events, but that it influences society in return. The arena 
of the mass media forum is the stage in which actors formulate their statements and try 
to transport their messages, e.g., for a political project or for an organization they 
represent. Actors usually speak for collective actors (e.g., parties) and therefore always 
represent a part of the audience in the gallery. Journalists have a special role here. On 
the one hand, they are gatekeepers, deciding who is to be quoted and therefore who is to 
be recognized and taken to be important. On the other hand, journalists become actors, 
too, by framing, interpreting and commenting on events. Furthermore, the audience at 
the gallery does not only consist of individuals, because all members of the audience are 
somehow tied to collective identities, so-called “imagined communities” (p. 12), e.g., 
women, workers, environmentalists. Finally, the backstage area of the mass media 
forum plays a special role because this is where collective actors receive organized 
preparation. They are provided with strategic analysis, background material, and 
arguments. Actors without professional support in the backstage area of the mass media 
forum are disadvantaged in the competition of the arena. (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & 
Rucht, 2002, pp. 9–13) 
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This heuristic model helps us to gather an understanding about how the public sphere is 
structured. But we need to go a step further if we want to understand how the actual 
processes within this setting work— especially about how the actual discourse is led, by 
whom, and why. As Ferree et al. (2002b) summarize, there are different theoretical 
assumptions about the actual constitution of the public sphere as well as different 
normative ideals on how the public sphere should function in a liberal, republican, 
deliberative and agonistic tradition of theory. The theories differ in various aspects, e.g., 
regarding the questions of who should be included in the debate, what kinds of 
communicative forms are acceptable, and what is a legitimate outcome of a debate. The 
four theories presented by Ferree et al. would all work as a foundation for a normative 
assessment. Normative assessment in general can help to provide a rationale for 
empirical research as well as a contextual foundation for the analysis (Althaus, 2012), 
which is also highly relevant for this study. While different normative assumptions 
would lead to different conclusions when evaluating the performance of the public 
debate and the media within it, it is important to be aware of the possibilities and limits 
that the application of a particular theory carries with it.   
One of the theoretical strands with a long tradition builds on Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action and is known as deliberative theory. This theory has far reaching 
implications for democratic systems and presents a comprehensive understanding of 
communication in a society from the individual level to the mass media level. By and 
large, it draws a picture of a society that functions by communication between its 
members, who have to make collective decisions for which the exchange of information 
and rational arguments is an important foundation. On principle, everyone who is 
involved in some kind of (political) matter that requires collective action should have 
the chance to engage in the discourse on that issue. The ideas of the deliberative theory 
will be described in more detail in the next section, because they will be important to set 
the normative standards which are used in this work for evaluating the quality of 
narrative news writing. It is important to note at this point, however, that the basic ideas 
of deliberation theory are particularly relevant for a topic like climate change. Since 
climate change is an all-encompassing issue that affects everyone on the planet, one that 
requires collective action to be solved, deliberative theory provides a suitable standard 
for how societies should handle the process. Dealing with climate change requires an 
agreement about its causes and (expected) consequences as well as agreement about all 
possible solutions. While the scientific evidence for climate change is unambiguous, it 
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is nevertheless complex, and this complexity has to be represented adequately in the 
media discourse in order for people to comprehend (and accept) the implications. This 
complexity is increased by the profound questions of justice and responsibility related 
to the great variety of how people’s lives are affected by climate change in different 
parts of the world and within societies. Different perspectives need to be made visible to 
gather a complete picture. It is therefore necessary to display the wide range of aspects 
as completely as possible to grasp the phenomenon. Deliberative theory, as we will see 
in the next sections, provides a rationale in which such an exchange of different 
viewpoints is possible. As a normative theory that aims at finding the balance between 
different interests, it is especially suitable to investigate the climate change debate. The 
ideas of deliberative theory will therefore be used as a measuring stick to evaluate in 
how far narrative elements within news writing can help to approximate the ideal of 
deliberation. As Habermas himself noted, deliberation is a normative scale, because its 
complete implementation cannot be expected. It should be seen as a methodic fiction 
(Gerhards, 1997, p. 8). In my own study on the deliberative quality of narrative news, I 
will therefore not focus primarily on the question of whether or not narrative news 
fulfills deliberative criteria, but rather ask under which circumstances narrative news 
can have a positive impact (in a deliberative sense) on the public debate on climate 
change.  
3.2 Deliberative Ideals 
This paragraph sketches out the basic ideas and ideals of deliberation in order to 
disclose the basic understanding of this theoretical line of argument, which is necessary 
for the intention of this work to evaluate the role of narratives in news coverage against 
this background.  
The classic understanding of public deliberation builds on Habermas, who introduced 
the idea of autonomous actors. Ferree et al. (2002b, p. 301) explain the concept of 
autonomous actors as people who are “free from the burden of making decisions and 
from the constraints of organizational maintenance. This allows them, in contrast to 
other actors, to deliberate more freely; they can more easily take the viewpoint of other 
actors and respect the better arguments.” But what does “to deliberate” mean in this 
context? Gastil (2008, p. xi) introduces a definition of deliberation which holds that 
“people deliberate when they carefully examine a problem and a range of solutions 
through an open, inclusive exchange that incorporates and respects diverse points of 
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view.” This basic principle has further implications for the broader concept of 
deliberative democracy, which Maia (2012, p. 15) summarizes as a form of democracy 
that “secures a central place for reasoned discussion in political life. It involves a 
decision binding on participants, based on concepts of justification through public 
argument and reasoning among equal citizens, which is supposed to generate legitimacy 
through a procedure that leads to the formation of opinion and political will.” Maia 
connects the idea of deliberation to a form of democracy in which political action is the 
result of a communicative process that aims at providing audiences with information 
about possible alternatives and is geared toward the formation of informed opinions.   
To come to conclusions, it is the better argument that needs to prevail over weaker ones 
in the end.  The strength of an argument should not be dependent on the status of the 
speaker who brings the argument up: “For the better argument to be decisive, it should 
not matter who is making the argument. Differences in external status or power among 
speakers should be bracketed - that is, put aside and ignored.” (Ferree et al., 2002a, 
p. 302). When it comes to the style of communication, mutual respect and civility are 
central elements of this tradition, though emotion is not completely excluded either. The 
aim of the process should be the production of a gradual consensus over time. Since 
reaching such a consensus is certainly not easy, if possible at all, a working consensus 
should be a minimum outcome to reach an agreement that society can work with, as 
Ferree and colleagues describe (2002a). 
These ideals translate into certain normative notions about public processes of decision-
making. According to Peters (2007), public debates should be organized following a 
discursive structure. He emphasizes that problem definitions and solutions should be 
found with the help of arguments which have claimed collective acceptance, and which 
are based on common beliefs that were reached without force. It should be possible at 
any moment to level critique just like it should be possible to in turn criticize this 
critique. What should be preserved at any time in the communication process is the 
mutual respect between communication partners. Communicative forms that are based 
on overwhelming (for example, through manipulation or threat) rather than convincing 
the other are not allowed. 
Gastil (2008) summarizes the steps in the deliberation process. Accordingly, 
deliberation should (1) create a solid information base; (2) identify and prioritize the 
key values at stake; (3) identify a broad range of solutions; (4) consider the pros, cons 
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and trade-offs of the solution; (5) enable the group to make the best decision possible. 
These steps of making information transparent, finding solutions, and deciding about 
them, are key societal interests. But, according to Maia (2012), deliberation goes 
beyond this level of transparency. First, participants should be able to engage in rational 
arguments, putting personal preferences aside so as to be open to hearing other 
arguments. At the same time, participants should be able to present clear arguments to 
others as well.  
Who these participants should be is made clear by deliberative theorists, too. Habermas 
emphasizes that popular inclusion is especially necessary when important normative 
questions are at stake. While concrete decisions on political affairs are usually made by 
elites in the political center, societal discourse needs to address the general questions of 
how to organize society. This discourse needs to include actors from the so-called 
periphery— “that is, civil society actors including especially grassroots organizations” 
(Ferree et al., 2002b, p. 216). The role of those actors from the periphery is vital, as 
Ferree and colleagues argue with respect to Habermas, who points to their ability to 
connect autonomous publics and to contribute to discovering relevant issues and 
solutions. And since these actors from the periphery are not primarily responsible for 
the actual decision-making, they should be considered as free and equal. They should 
engage in a free and unforced interaction in which they treat each other with mutual 
respect, speaking truthfully and with justification. Beyond this inclusion of actors, there 
should also be no restrictions of topics and topical contributions.  
Benhabib (1994) emphasizes the value of deliberative processes to the rationality of 
collective decision-making. She also argues that deliberative processes impart 
information: “Deliberation is a procedure for being informed.” (p.32). By introducing 
the arguments to the debate, a certain transparency about the range of ideas and 
opinions is established. This is a necessary foundation for a second step of reaching 
clarity about choices and preferences, which is needed for the process of finding a 
solution. Deliberative processes also impose a certain reflexivity on individual 
preferences and opinions, which means that participants should, first, be able to express 
their points of view, but they also have to anticipate the standpoints of all people who 
are in some way involved (Benhabib, 1994).  
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3.3 Critique of Traditional Deliberative Ideals 
One of the main points of critique of discursive theories constructionist and 
poststructuralist scholars is that they question the possibility of separating the argument 
from the position of power of the speaker. In the tradition of Foucault, they recognize 
discourses as “practices of power diffused outside formal political institutions, making 
use of seemingly neutral categories of knowledge and expertise to control others as well 
as to construct the self as a political actor.” (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 307). Maia (2012) 
summarizes the critique against Habermas’ theory of communicative action as 
abstracted from relations of power, especially in the construct of the ideal speech 
situation. Poststructuralists argue that there cannot be a situation that is free from 
inequalities of social power, since economic dependencies and political domination will 
always prevent participants from being equal speakers: “The key objection is that power 
and ideology domination cannot be resolved through rational dialog.” (Maia, 2012, 
p. 38). Kohn (2000, p. 426) sharpens the argument by stating that “under the guise of 
equality and impartiality, deliberative democracy privileges the communicative 
strategies of elites. By strengthening the conceptual tools of the dominant paradigm, it 
encourages the reproduction of existing hierarchies.”  
A second important critique can be deduced from the statement above. Kohn refers to 
the communicative strategies of elites. Poststructuralist theorists criticize that, according 
to deliberative theory, argument and reason are supposed to be the dominant factors in a 
discourse. This, they argue, excludes marginal members of society. Inclusion is 
therefore one of the main points to which the critics refer. Young (2002, pp. 5–6) 
strengthens this point: “The normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on 
the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision‐making 
processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes.” Writers in this 
tradition share the strong normative value of popular inclusion, emphasizing that 
especially marginalized groups should be included to recognize distinctive standpoints 
(Ferree et al. 2002a, p. 307). The media ought to play a significant role in fulfilling this 
by actively seeking out such perspectives at the grassroots level, rather than 
concentrating only on the centers of power (p.301). To give a voice to those that are 
usually excluded in public debates, constructionist writers value a range of 
communication styles and argue that style is a matter of class (p.313). Therefore, a 
discourse based solely on argument and reason, excluding emotion as well as 
storytelling, hinders certain groups from participating in the debate and from expressing 
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their concerns. Creativity in expressing opinions and standpoints is appreciated rather 
than dismissed in the first place (pp.311–312). Young (2002, p. 6) argues that 
concentrating on the narrow conception of political communication to argument is a too 
“biased or narrow understanding of what being reasonable means.” Focusing on such a 
narrow deliberative style has exclusionary implications and ignores that other forms of 
communication may increase inclusion in the debate (Young, 2002, pp. 6–7). Maia 
(2012) argues that “emotion and other modes of communication are important to 
deliberation and compatible with the Habermasian theory of rationality” (p. 17). She 
examines emotion, rhetoric, greetings, testimony, and storytelling as communicative 
forms that should not be ignored or excluded in discursive situations. Concerning the 
latter, Maia (2012, p. 21—original emphasis) refers to the influential work of Iris 
Young, noting that informal argumentation, narrative, and storytelling “may contribute 
to enlarging the scope of discussion, the number of its participants, and the perspectives 
available to be taken into account in public debates.” Furthermore, storytelling might 
help participants to comprehend other participants’ standpoints and therefore change 
their own way of seeing and understanding problems and possible solutions. Narrative 
is therefore a highly valued mode of communication, because it gives those who are 
silence(d) (because of a lack of expertise or a lack of familiarity with certain discursive 
styles) a possibility to express their own experience since, “all people are experts on 
their own experiential knowledge” (Ferree et al., 2002a, p.313). Including narration into 
the range of communication styles bridges “the lifeworld and the sphere of formal 
politics, undercutting both the separation between these spheres and the power relations 
that produce and maintain that separation.” (p. 313). As Young (2002, p. 7) argues: 
“Narrative, finally, has many important functions in political deliberation; narratives 
can supply steps in arguments, but they can also serve to explain meanings and 
experiences when groups do not share premises sufficiently to proceed with an 
argument.” Though Maia (2012, p. 23) points out the value of storytelling and other 
forms of communication, she still makes an important objection and warns not to stretch 
the concept of deliberation to a “point of rendering it useless” (p. 23), because it would 
then be indistinguishable from other communication forms. The central element of 
reason-giving should not be dismissed and be a part of narration when used within the 
deliberation process. Furthermore:  
[W]hen people are giving testimony or telling their story, the communication should 
implicitly or explicitly appeal to some general concern - whether involving common 
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norms or values (fair distribution of opportunities and resources or equal legal 
treatment) or the value of something that is not universally shared (a particular 
ethical conception, cultural tradition, or religious belief). (Maia, 2012, p. 23) 
The critique might be best summarized under the term of plurality, which applies to the 
plurality of the people who should be included into the process as well as to the 
communicative forms that should be allowed during the debate.  
A third aspect that is criticized with the objection of pluralism is the norm of finding a 
consensus in deliberative theory. Maia (2012) summarizes several authors who state 
that consensus is actually a threat to democracy, because disallowing dissent would 
oppress marginalized groups who do not have the power to voice their arguments in a 
way that can recognized by all other citizens. Beyond that, it is doubted that hegemonic 
groups are willing enough to consider the standpoints of the marginalized groups. Maia 
(2012, pp. 47–48) especially emphasizes the danger of consensus in the mass media 
environment: “There has long been a school of thought asserting that mass 
communication creates powerful pressures that push for consensus for the wrong 
reasons - to serve powerful interests and to lead, in practice, to social conformity.”  
To sum up, the normative ideals imbedded in the idea of the Habermasian ideal speech 
situation suggest that deliberation needs to take place in a setting where all participants 
are free from inner and outer constraints and aim to find the best argument, and 
therefore the best solution, in a consensus, independently from personal interests and 
preferences. Critics argue that there cannot be such a situation as the ideal speech 
situation because power and dependencies are always exerting an influence. Those 
critics show that it is also difficult for less powerful actors and their arguments to join 
the debate in the first place, because barriers are constructed, through requirements 
about a certain type of communication style (restrictions at the input dimension of the 
public sphere). The concentration on the rational argument as ideal, without 
acknowledging that arguments can also be brought forward in different forms of 
communication, contradicts other deliberative ideals such as the freedom from inner and 
outer constraints that is needed for carefully examining arguments, since this is a 
constraint that is set by the situation itself (restrictions on the throughput dimension). 
This implies the danger that the result will equal the preferences and interests of 
powerful actors rather than the public opinion which is based on the best arguments and 
reasons (restrictions on the outcome dimension).  
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Consequently, power differences hinder people from joining deliberative processes, 
which makes power differences in the process itself smaller, since those with less power 
cannot join it in the first place. This does not seem consistent with the original idea of 
deliberation. Instead of imagining the ideal speech situation in a way in which power 
differences are ignored they should explicitly be brought up. Power differences cannot 
be overcome if they are not made visible and opened for critique. Regarding 
differences, various interests and preferences need to be part of the deliberative process, 
but therefore the entrance to the debate must be more accessible, in order to guarantee 
the inclusion of aspects, ideas and people. Common interests need to be built on the 
awareness of different individual interests, recognizing the nature of others (Ellis, 2012, 
p. 99). 
3.4 Mediated Deliberation 
Now that we have seen that deliberation is a process in which individuals and groups 
engage in discussions to carefully weigh options and bring forward and consider 
arguments to find a solution to a problem that requires some kind of (political) action, 
we have to ask how this can work on a larger scale in complex modern societies. For 
this, we need to look at the extended concept of mediated deliberation since “[i]n 
modern democracies, the mass media are the only communicative setting that 
permanently provides public deliberation on such a wide scale.” (Wessler, 2008, p. 1). 
Mediated political communication is an essential pillar of modern democracies; 
communicative processes cannot function without the mass media that presents the 
broadest range of ideas and solutions enabling media users to engage in the deliberative 
process (Gastil, 2008). It is a decisive element of the public sphere in which opinion 
formation, as well as decision-making on the regulation of public concerns takes place 
(Peters, 2007, p. 59). The public debate of modern society therefore to a great extent 
finds takes place in the media, which ensures the connection between “citizens and 
political institutions by involving them in a process by which common problems are 
identified, possible solutions are discussed, ideas are exchanged, decisions are justified, 
and support or opposition is signaled.” (Wessler, Peters, Brüggemann, Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, & Sifft, 2008, p. 2). 
In mediated deliberation, the deliberative ideals sketched out above keep their validity. 
However, the particularities that come along with the mediated process need to be 
specified. According to Bennett et al. (2004), access to the mediated public sphere is of 
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crucial importance and determines who controls and is included or excluded from the 
media. Beyond that, it is the question of recognition that needs special adherence within 
the mass media environment to clarify who is formally identified in and by the media 
(e.g., by name, status) and how much space for expressing themselves and their 
arguments is given to the respective actors. But since it is the exchange of ideas instead 
of the mere proclaiming of them, responsiveness is another crucial point to consider in 
mediated deliberation to determine whether actors engage in dialogue, respond to each 
other, and acknowledge different positions by replying to them.   
What needs to be kept in mind is that the media are not just some free space that needs 
to be filled by whoever comes first. Instead, media institutions operate according to 
certain rules and routines. Media production is restricted by laws as well as economic 
constraints. Mediated debates are shaped by all these circumstances and through “media 
agents” (Maia, 2009, p. 316), who operate with and within certain parameters. For this 
project, attention is given primarily to the work of journalists as influential media agents 
who actively shape the mediated debate. Journalists significantly contribute to the 
construction of meaning by choosing the events and aspects to be covered and the form 
in which they are covered (Ferree et al., 2002b; Brüggemann, 2014). They also shape 
the mediated deliberation process—their selection processes influence how inclusive a 
mediated debate is by selecting the range of speakers, how reflexive opponents are 
presented, or how much reason is demanded to be given by actors in the debate (Ettema, 
2007).  
The idea of mediated deliberation that needs to be constructed by journalists will be a 
central idea for the empirical part of this work in order to investigate whether the 
journalistic use of narratives the media coverage is of any benefit for the deliberation 
process or— to put it differently—to assess how journalistic narratives have to be 
constructed to be beneficial for mediated deliberation. As we have seen in previous 
chapters, there are certain potentials derived from the cultural and social function of 
narratives in our communication processes. The next chapter will explain in a more 
detailed way how narratives need to be constructed to add valuable surplus to the 
mediated deliberation process.    
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4 Defining Standards to Assess the Deliberative Value of News 
Narratives 
The following chapter connects the two concepts of narration and deliberation in an 
attempt to define standards to assess the deliberative value of narrative news. These 
standards will serve as a rating scale for the empirical parts of this work.  
As we have seen above, the arena model by Ferree et al (2002b) describes how the 
public debate connects to the public sphere and the role of the mass media: The mass 
media forum is seen as the stage for political competition. It does not simply present 
current events but influences society in return. Journalists fulfill a special role in the 
whole mass media process: They are gatekeepers, deciding who is to be quoted and 
therefore who is to be recognized as important. Beyond that, journalists become actors, 
too, by framing, interpreting and commenting on events (Brüggemann, 2014). Many 
deliberative aspects of a debate are therefore highly dependent on the journalistic 
performance, when it comes to constructing events displayed in the media. To 
systematically assess journalistic performance in the public sphere, I will draw on the 
concept of Gerhards and Neidhardt (1990), who define the public sphere as an 
intermediary system with important political functions on the input, throughput and 
output level, which will guide further considerations on the role of journalistically 
produced narratives in the mediated public sphere and their implications for deliberation 
within such a mediated context. However, although it is of course an individual 
journalist who is ultimately responsible for writing a story, this journalist does not act in 
a vacuum but is embedded in cultural, historical, political and organizational contexts 
that also shape his or her work. Chapter 5 will explore these factors in detail, which 
might explain journalistic performance when it comes to the deliberative quality of their 
coverage and especially of narratives within that coverage. In this chapter, it will be first 
of all important to sketch out which deliberative qualities news narrative should fulfill 
in different dimensions.   
4.1 Input 
The input dimension of the public sphere refers to the process of information 
gathering—asking for the openness of a public sphere vis-à-vis its environments, which 
also comprises access of both issues and people to the public debate (Gerhards & 
Neidhardt, 1990). From a normative deliberative standpoint, popular inclusion of people 
as well as of a wide range topics, ideas and arguments is an important function that the 
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input dimension has to fulfill (Ferree et al., 2002b) in order to achieve legitimacy for 
democratic decisions (Maia, 2012; Young 2002). The question “Who deliberates?” 
(Page, 1996), referring to the actors included in the deliberative process, is especially 
central in the communication context of deliberation processes of the mass public 
which—as characterized by Chambers (2009)— “will often be asymmetrical, highly 
mediated, and distorted by the structural inequalities in society.” (p. 339). This can 
easily result in the restricted access of marginalized, less powerful or less trained actors 
and therefore can turn into a legitimacy problem for deliberative democracy (ibid.).  
On the input dimension of the public sphere it is necessary to have equal chances for a 
wide range of socially relevant topics in order to become visible and therefore a 
possible issue to the further debate (Wessler, 2008, p. 3). The deliberative ideal of 
popular inclusion is also applied to mass media communication and a requirement for 
mediated deliberation which, according to a summary by Rinke (2016) “should include 
voices from all corners of society (“multiperspectivalness”)”. However, the media 
context with its organizational and economic constraints is far away from fulfilling the 
requirements of an ideal speech situation. Still, making the range of relevant issues 
transparent to the audience is fundamental to enable audiences to state their preferences. 
Critics fear that deliberative processes cannot guarantee such a wide inclusion of actors 
and issues because they are in general exclusive to many people that are not part of the 
mainstream society and their ideas (Ferree et al., 2002a). It is argued that it is not 
possible to separate an argument from the position of power of the speaker introducing 
the argument into the debate. People enter the debate with diverse and unequal 
preconditions. The broadest and most commonly applied distinction between actor types 
is that “between speakers from the political center (including representatives of formal-
institutional politics) and the political periphery (including representatives of civil 
society)” (Rinke, 2016).  
From what we have learned about the nature and potential of narratives in previous 
chapters, I argue that they can be a useful journalistic tool to meet the demand of 
increasing popular inclusion within media coverage. Narratives seem particularly 
suitable for including perspectives besides the ones from the political power center. As 
Maia (2012, p. 22) states: “Storytelling is an important tool allowing underprivileged 
people to politicize their situation and facilitating consciousness-raising.” In the 
analytical process of deliberation, Gastil (2008) recognizes the discussion of personal 
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and emotional experiences as a part of the first step in the deliberation process in which 
a solid information base is created. These experiences are part of the information that is 
required to take different sides into account, so narratives may be useful to add to this 
requirement, allowing potential ideas and interest to become part of the range of ideas in 
the debate. Journalists can use narrative forms in the media to give voice to actors from 
the periphery and thus increase the inclusion of marginalized groups and their stories 
and experiences. Narrative characteristics, such as the display of emotions or the 
narrative personalization, offer tools to integrate aspects that would rather be of 
secondary interest if guided by hard facts only. Media would obviously need to play an 
important role in finding these easily overlooked stories that might not have classic 
news value but are still valuable for the sake of widening the amount of voices heard in 
the debate, also revealing how groups and people are affected by decisions made in the 
political center or the political/economical system. The use of narrative roles may also 
be a valuable possibility to situate actors in a debate—assumed, of course, that they are 
not used for simplification or stereotyping but rather for illustrating, for example, 
severity of certain circumstances. However, to serve as a valuable contribution to a 
debate, journalists need to clearly draw the connection between the overall issue and the 
use of narratives: Who says what, in which position, and why is it necessary to include 
the specific perception in order to build a necessary information base for further debate 
and future decision-making? These are questions that should be answered for narratives 
to have a clear deliberative surplus when they are used by journalists.  
Beyond that, also keeping Gastil (2008, p. 50) in mind, who states that “[i]t should be 
clear though that in modern societies the political process could not function without the 
mass media that presents the broadest range of ideas and solutions […] enabling 
recipients to engage in the deliberative process and learn about how other people would 
address problems,” we can consider narratives in the mediated context especially 
valuable for achieving the last part mentioned in this quotation and engaging people in 
the problems of others. Narratives could therefore be used by journalists as a more low-
threshold form of communication when introducing a new thought, a different view of 
life, or even a challenging idea by tying it to a specific story. We know from studies of 
small-group deliberation that people are more likely to engage with an argument that is 
conflicting with their own opinion when it is told in a narrative (Polletta & Lee, 2006; 
Black, 2008; Ryfe, 2006). Narratives, therefore, foster openness to new and conflicting 
interpretations, something which is needed to achieve transparency. There is no research 
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on this mechanism in mediated deliberation, though Avraamidou and Osborne (2009) 
present results from research which found that narratives in science education arouse 
interest in new topics. This would at least give some evidence to the assumption that 
narratives can also create openness to new arguments in mediated deliberation and 
therefore widen the range of ideas and arguments that can be taken into consideration.  
On the other hand, one can also think of possible dangers that narratives on the input 
dimension of the mediated public debate might have for deliberative ideals. First of all, 
narratives are, of course, not exclusively a communicative form of life world actors but 
also a powerful instrument for political elites or business actors, such as lobbyists and 
PR professionals, to use for strategic communication in their purposes rather than for a 
general public interest. Their claims might get a disproportionate amount of attention 
and therefore marginalize other perspectives (Boswell, 2013). Beyond that, mostly 
negatively evaluated developments in media such as sensationalism may also be 
reinforced using narratives. If journalists pick out the unique case not because of a new 
idea or an overlooked actor with a standpoint that needs to be considered but rather 
concentrate the attention on a spectacular individual case, they risk the suppression of 
less spectacular stories. Also, the phenomenon commonly discussed as personalization 
can easily be a problem where narrative forms influence the deliberation process 
negatively. As explained above, narratives in news are characterized by actors and their 
involvement in certain events as well as their reactions, motivations, and emotions. 
This, of course, can easily lead to a concentration on individuals alone, neglecting their 
actual message and possible contribution to the debate, something that journalists 
should avoid in the production process.  
4.2 Throughput 
On the throughput dimension of the public sphere, arguments and ideas that were 
brought into the debate are further processed and synthesized, aiming at public opinion 
formation (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990). How this is done is a crucial question to the 
analysis of deliberation (Wessler, 2008, p. 4). Following Gastil (2008), deliberation 
should ideally identify and prioritize the key values at stake, identify a broad range of 
solutions, consider the pros, cons and trade-offs of the solutions, and enable the group to 
make the best decision possible. These steps require full transparency about the range of 
ideas and opinions as a necessary foundation for a second step of reaching clarity about 
choices and preferences during the process of finding solutions.  
43 
Comprehensibility is especially essential for establishing such transparency. Gastil and 
Black (2007) even highlight that people have “the right to comprehend what others are 
saying” (p.3). Comprehensibility of the arguments in a debate therefore is a necessary 
condition for the opinion-building and solution-finding process. Careful examination of 
arguments to find the best solution is only possible if all claims are understood. The use 
of narratives as a journalistic tool could be one instrument to promote the 
comprehensibility of complex issues to make the actual argument accessible to 
consideration. Using a sequential order (narrative characteristic of dramatization) rather 
than the inverted pyramid style can help to understand the course of events. Explaining 
complex scientific issues in combination with anecdotes, for example (narrative 
characteristic of fictionalization), may help to increase comprehensibility. However, 
trying to break down complex subjects might also risk oversimplification, for example, 
if narratives use one-sided representations of stereotypes or binary descriptions of good 
and bad (Boswell, 2013. “Reductive simplicity” (p. 632) within the deliberative process, 
this is especially problematic if narratives fail to still transport an argument that 
contributes to the debate as a whole.  
Argument and reason are central to understanding the deliberative ideal. Peters (2007) 
explains the discursive structure that public debates should follow, by emphasizing that 
problem definitions and solutions should be found with the help of arguments which 
claim collective acceptance, and which are based on common beliefs that were reached 
without force.  
Ellis (2012) highlights that understanding reason-giving as central to a deliberative 
argument is connected to reciprocity which “is a core principle of democracy and 
deliberation. Very simply, it holds that participants in a conflict owe one another 
justifications and explanations for their respective positions and any mutually binding 
policies they enact.” (p. 154). To have a real exchange and to find a commonly accepted 
solution, it is not only necessary that arguments are heard, but they also need to be 
replied to and evaluated in a mutual process in which justifications can and should 
always be demanded again. Actors in the deliberative setting, mediated or not, need to 
be responsive to each other to avoid mere pronouncements of opinions. According to 
Ettema (2007), it is a journalistic responsibility to demand reason and justification from 
media-external actors. Arguments need to be related to each other, especially if they are 
opposing one another. To really weight alternatives, they should be recognizable as 
such.  
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Including narrative into the range of communication styles bridges “the life world and 
the sphere of formal politics, undercutting both the separation between these spheres 
and the power relations that produce and maintain that separation.” The argument here 
is that narratives can in fact help to achieve deliberative ideals. But this can only be the 
case if it does not lead to a deadlock that would not allow critical reflection. Reasons 
and arguments within journalistic narratives need to be open for critical debate to be 
valuable for deliberative purposes. This can only be accomplished if reasons that have 
their origin in personal experiences are reflected against the circumstances and 
background they have occurred in (Young, 1996). This would also involve a clear 
positioning of the argument within the debate and an active tie to or confrontation with 
other arguments, also to clarify the relevance and scope of the argument. Meeting such 
a demand is not necessarily easy for people who are affected by certain circumstances 
(Higgins & Brush, 2006). It would therefore be a central task of journalists to make 
such connections when using narrative forms in news coverage, in order to assure 
reciprocity and therefore the processing of the debate (Bennett et al., 2004; Ettema, 
2007).  
Another narrative category that is relevant for the throughput dimension is the narrative 
genre. Stories can obviously be told in various ways, e.g., either as comedy, melodrama 
or tragedy. The genre of a story influences its role in a debate. Some genres may be 
more suitable to keep a debate going by offering more possibilities to connect an answer 
to. However, a variety of different genres used for news coverage of one topic (e.g., 
climate change) is probably most valuable from a deliberative perspective, since a 
certain degree of alternation offers different perspectives and interpretations. For 
journalists, it may be a challenge, and require creativity, as well as flexibility, to try to 
tell stories from a variety of angles; but if successful, the use of a variety of genres 
avoids uniformity in coverage, which probably keeps audiences more engaged in an 
ongoing debate. 
When it comes to the style of communication with which the deliberative discourse is 
supposed to be introduced when trying to find the best argument, mutual respect and 
civility are at the center of the discursive tradition, though emotion is not completely 
excluded (Ferree et al., 2002a). As Ellis (2012, p. 6) emphasizes, civility and respect do 
not simply mean being nice in contact with other(s) but also include “an acceptance of 
the contestatory process, including a willingness to engage on an argumentative level, 
as well as attitudes such as ‘agreeing to disagree’ and ‘tolerance.’” Civility contributes 
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to creating an atmosphere of mutual respect that is necessary in the process of conflict 
resolution. The role of narratives for civility can be regarded ambivalently. Certainly, 
displaying emotions and personal experiences can also in a media context evoke 
empathy and understanding, but at the same time it can be destructive, for example, if 
they are offending or assaulting to others (Boswell, 2013). Especially in the mass media 
context, there are certain long-term developments that might add negatively in 
connection to narrative and deliberation. Under the keyword of tabloidization, one can 
summarize several trends in which narratives also play a role such as in personalization 
or sensationalism, which is rather conceived of as being a threat to deliberation. If 
entertainment is the main purpose, rather than a contribution to information and debate, 
narratives would probably rather distract from the issues at hand. However, the 
entertainment factor of narrative also increases the attention of audiences for a certain 
topic, which is important especially for long-term issues like climate change (Spoel, 
Goforth, Cheu, & Pearson, 2008). Nevertheless, for narratives to have a positive impact 
in the mediated debate it is important that the ideal of civility and openness that goes 
hand in hand with argument and reason-giving should never be dismissed or forgotten.  
4.3 Output 
The outcome dimension of the public sphere refers to the consequences following 
public opinion formation and the implementation of solutions that were found after a 
careful weighing of the arguments (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990). The classical aim of 
the discursive process is the production of a gradual consensus over time. Reaching 
such a consensus is certainly not easy, if possible at all; a working consensus should be 
a minimum outcome to reach an agreement that society can work with (Ferree et al., 
2002b). If the working consensus or political decisions resulting from it is related to 
majority rule, legitimacy of such a rule can only be gained if the process that led to the 
decision incorporated all argumentative perspectives (Ellis, 2012).    
Wessler (2008) also dismisses the narrow conception of consensus being the desired 
outcome of deliberation. He argues that consensus is highly unlikely in large-scale 
mediated public forums, especially because of their “triadic (and competitive) nature”, 
(p.4) referring to the idea that actors in the mediated debate are not aiming at a mutual 
understanding or at convincing their opponents. They rather reach for the attention of 
the audience, trying to affect them in their opinion formation by engaging in the 
discussion “between speakers” but “in front of an audience” (ibid.). Wessler therefore 
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suggests “reasoned dissent” to be a valued outcome of deliberation, referring to Peters 
(2005, p. 108), who states that: “A lively discursive public sphere would first of all 
appear to multiply questions and uncertainties and increase dissidence.”  
Why the idea of reasoned dissent as a normative ideal, especially in a mediated 
deliberative context, is more useful than the original concept of consensus can also be 
understood following Ellis (2012). He acknowledges that, of course, deliberation always 
requires reflection of one’s own preferences to change attitudes, even if that is not easy 
or self-evident because “[p]eople are surely caught up in their cultural and political 
discourses, but they are not trapped” (p. 23). Demanding consensus can still build up 
high barriers in a communicative process. Reasoned dissent that increases the 
perspectives and clarifies aspects in the debate, which would allow a base for common 
action, is therefore highly desirable as the outcome of public deliberation (Peters, 2005, 
p. 108). Beyond that, especially narratives can produce acceptance of difference in the 
sense that narratives enable role-taking and “help to transform ways of seeing problems 
and their possible solutions” (Maia, 2012, pp. 21–22). Black (2008), for example, shows 
that narratives in a deliberative setting encourage people to take other perspectives, 
allowing participants to understand and respect experiences of other participants and 
therefore help to manage differences in a setting of divergent argumentation. Boswell 
(2013) states: “Finally, the ambiguous nature of narrative may ultimately lead to 
compromise on contentious issues, with commitment to a common narrative allowing 
actors in a deliberative system with widely diverging opinions to come together under a 
common banner” and refers to the idea of “incompletely theorized agreements” of Cass 
Sunstein (p. 632). 
However, narratives classically consist of a beginning, middle and an end. Journalistic 
narratives can contain these elements to certain degrees, but especially the end can 
differ, mostly according to the genre in which a story is told. A comic story would 
probably end positively with a suggested solution for a given conflict. This can also be a 
promising proposal for a solution without the actual conflict being fixed right away. A 
melodrama or social/political conflict narrative could have an open ending with either 
no conflict solution in sight or with an unresolved conflict. For a deliberative 
perspective, the latter can probably leave more openness for the ongoing debate. 
However, proposals for conflicts should also be open to criticism. Nevertheless, the 
outcome of a narrative, and with the genre of the news story, certainly depends on real-
world events— if climate change negotiations reach an agreement with goals that are 
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difficult to attain, a news story written in an apocalyptic genre type is probably more 
unlikely. It is still in the journalistic responsibility to reveal possible solution proposals, 
however, or to display why a certain conflict is not yet resolved to enable people to 
determine the current state of progress of the debate.  
4.4 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter regarded the role of narrative in the mediated deliberative process and 
argued that narrative news coverage can contribute positively to achieving the 
normative ideals of deliberative theory if it fulfills certain standards. Table 1 
summarizes which narrative qualities might fulfill which deliberative functions under 
conditions that journalists would have to assure in their coverage. 
Table 1 Narrative qualities and deliberative functions on the input, throughput and output level of mediated public 
deliberation 
Public Sphere 
Dimension  
Narrative Qualities Deliberative Function Journalistic Role 
In
pu
t 
- Narrative 
characteristics 
(dramatization, 
emotionalization 
etc.) allow a low-
threshold form of 
communication, 
also including 
personal 
experience and 
emotion 
- Inclusion of actors, 
their particular 
topics, and ideas 
(giving voice to 
actors from the 
power periphery)  
- Detecting voices 
and ideas that 
would otherwise 
not be heard  
- Tie stories to the 
issue at stake 
(display placement, 
scope and 
relevance in the 
debate) 
- Narrative 
personalization and 
narrative roles 
(hero, victim, 
villain) 
- Identification of 
actors, their status/ 
social position, 
values, and 
motivation  
- Identify roles 
without serving 
stereotypes to 
avoid simplification  
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 
- Increasing 
comprehensibility 
by integrating 
complex issues in 
more easily 
understandable 
story structure 
(dramatization) or 
add details and 
anecdotes for 
better illustration 
(fictionalization)  
- Transparency on 
issues 
- Further inclusion 
throughout the 
process 
- Break down 
complex issues to 
fit story structure 
- Find suitable details 
and anecdotes to 
illustrate and 
explain 
- Avoid 
oversimplification 
- Accessibility of 
different 
worldviews and 
- Contrasting 
alternatives in the 
process of finding 
- Include opposing 
arguments  
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standpoints solutions  
- Include (personal) 
experiences as 
reason for beliefs 
and standpoints 
 
- Form of justification  
- Responsiveness  
- Demand reason-
giving and 
justification 
- Rational 
questioning of the 
systematic 
circumstances in 
which experience 
occurred  
- Transport a general 
point relevant to 
the debate 
- Variety of narrative 
genres 
- Offering diverse 
approaches and 
interpretations to a 
topic 
- Operate with 
variety and avoid 
uniformity  
- Displaying emotion 
and personal 
reason to enable 
mutual 
understanding and 
role-taking 
- Civility - Avoid 
tabloidization and 
assaulting others 
Ou
tp
ut
 
- Enabling 
understanding 
through role-taking 
- Reasoned dissent  - Manage differences 
and conflicting 
stories 
- Outcome display: 
conflict solutions 
(proposals)  
- Transparency over 
decisions and 
outcomes 
- Reveal outcomes 
and proposals  
- Avoid early closure  
 
Deliberative ideals face all kinds of boundaries in the mediated public sphere. Non-
fictional narratives might help to approximate these ideals, when embedded in news 
coverage, to a certain extent. The role of the journalistic production process is central to 
considering deliberative qualities of such narratives. The journalistic aspect of this 
process needs to be emphasized, since journalists first gather and then tell the stories. 
Therefore, in narratives in the news coverage that add positively to the mediated 
deliberation, journalists would need to include such actors and ideas with fewer chances 
of representation, making their values and claims accessible and comprehensible. The 
fact that narratives are a communicative form that is deeply embedded in human 
communication and that is easy to use and understand in the deliberative context 
enables people to participate and therefore increases the norm of inclusion. Especially 
by allowing personal experiences to become part of the range of ideas and arguments, a 
higher transparency of the range of possibly considered aspects may be achieved. This 
enables reflective communication and reciprocity, by allowing audiences to easily 
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engage with the respective argument. For the sake of weighing the possibilities at stake, 
however, it is also necessary to show alternatives and contrast opposing arguments. 
Narratives also have the potential to build up connections between participants by 
enabling role-taking. This can set barriers for uncivil behavior which usually is 
counterproductive to finding solutions. Beyond that, journalists can enable a reasoned 
dissent through narrations by fostering acceptance of differences, allowing role-taking 
and understanding of other perspectives. Nevertheless, an indispensable standard to be 
assessed positively that journalistic narrations transport a general argument, which is 
open to critical debate and reviews a circumstance in which it evolved, even if it is 
retrieved from personal experience for narrations.  
It is not possible to test and review all of these aspects in the empirical analysis of this 
study. Instead, I will focus on one element in each dimension that will be central for the 
analysis to come: the inclusion of actors and ideas at the input dimension, the display 
of opposing ideas at the throughput dimension and the solution and outcome 
orientation at the outcome dimension. These are very basic elements for deliberation. If 
they are fulfilled in narrative news, it might be worthwhile to engage in future in-depth 
studies of the more sophisticated elements. The next chapter will give more detailed 
descriptions of the contexts that shape journalistic production settings in order to be able 
to assess the circumstances under which news narratives can actually fulfill these 
standards.  
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5 Cultural and Systemic Contexts for Comparing Brazil, Germany, 
and the US 
After having further conceptualized what requirements journalistic narratives should 
fulfill to support deliberative values in the mediated debate, this chapter elaborates on 
context effects and factors that may influence the actual constitution of narratives within 
media coverage. This dissertation follows an international comparative approach to find 
answers to questions such as under which circumstances will narratives positively fulfill 
deliberative criteria. For reasons mentioned by Hallin and Mancini (2012), a 
comparative approach seems suitable for this undertaking: Comparative analysis helps 
us to detect aspects that we would not detect otherwise and limits ethnocentrism. It also 
fosters sensitivity for variation among countries and cultures as well as for similarities 
which can contribute to the formation and refinement of our theoretical and conceptual 
apparatus. Beyond that, comparative analysis allows for the testing of hypotheses and 
therefore allows a certain amount of causal inference, which is also an important aim of 
the empirical part of this work. However, this study is a small-N design, since it will 
only regard the three cases Brazil, Germany, and the USA. Therefore, it is hardly 
possible to engage in a strictly variable-oriented design when it comes to finding 
explanations for the use of narrative writing in non-fictional news coverage, as well as 
for their deliberative qualities. Instead, the approach will be case-oriented, in so far as I 
will try to provide detailed context information on the three investigated countries 
which will help to better understand the constitution of each country’s media coverage 
with regard to narrative characteristics and deliberative qualities.  
From Shoemaker and Reese (1996 and 2014) we know that different forces shape media 
content and that they have to be considered carefully within an analytical framework 
which treats content as a dependent variable and sorts out a number of clearly defined 
independent variables that shape “the messages that constitute the symbolic 
environment” (p.1). They propose a model that is formally known as the Hierarchical 
Influence Model or shorter Hierarchy of Influences, which consists of five levels of 
analysis that are expected to shape media content: (1) the individual level (individual 
characteristics of the communicator), (2) the routine level (organizational constraints in 
which the individual operates), (3) the organizational level (overarching concepts that 
shape routines, e.g., the organizational structures and policies), (4) the social institutions 
level (the structure of media organizations as social institutions), and (5) the social 
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system level (national and cultural context, ideological forces and systemic patterns) 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 2014, p. 7-9).  
These levels will not be adopted one-to-one to the analysis, although I will follow the 
logic of regarding different levels of influence on the media content. I will rather choose 
certain aspects that seem especially promising and theoretically interesting to explain 
the occurrence of news narratives and their deliberative performance. I will mainly 
focus on the latter three levels by closely studying certain variables and categories on 
the cultural and historical level of journalism, the media system level, and the national–
political context level.  
This chapter aims to provide a range of context information that will help to finally 
come to a set of hypotheses that connect journalistic professional and cultural aspects to 
the prevalence of journalistic narratives and their deliberative performance. The first 
part of this chapter (section 5.1) will remark on journalism culture, and especially on the 
relationship between a professional culture and the broader (national) culture, which 
need to be considered jointly when regarding the role of narratives within journalistic 
work. The history of narrative journalism will be examined in section 5.2 of this 
chapter, to trace its developments and to elaborate on various cultural and historical 
influences. Furthermore, the chapter will review classical criteria for international 
comparative analysis, also trying to characterize the countries of interest Brazil, 
Germany, and the USA according to these criteria in section 5.3. Lastly, I will review 
each country’s position in the climate change process and regard the role climate change 
plays for each country and its acting at the climate change conferences (section 5.4) 
5.1 Journalism Culture Context 
“Journalism does not develop in a vacuum” (Mancini, 2008, p. 149). Unlike many other 
professions, Mancini argues, the development of journalism is closely connected to the 
social and political reality in which it is rooted. To describe the variety of shapes of 
journalistic systems, the term “journalism cultures” is frequently used. It includes the 
journalistic practices, professional standards, and ethical aspects that have taken on 
distinct characteristics in different countries over time (Hahn, Schröder, & Dietrich, 
2008, p. 7; Zelizer, 2010). However, Mancini points out that journalism culture should 
not only account for journalism as a profession but should also be linked to a country’s 
more general culture and especially its political culture (Mancini, 2008, p. 149). 
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Schudson (2012) strengthens the argument that the development of journalism culture 
and professional practices accompany each other:  
News is produced by people who operate, often unwittingly, within a cultural 
system, a reservoir of stored cultural meanings. It follows conventions of sourcing - 
who is a legitimate source, speaker, or conveyer of information to a journalist. It 
lives by unspoken preconceptions about the audience - less a matter of who the 
audience actually may be than a projection by journalists of their own social worlds. 
News as a form of culture incorporates assumptions about what matters, what makes 
sense, what time and place we live in, and what range of considerations we should 
take seriously. (Schudson, 2012, p. 184)  
At the same time, globalization is irreversible, and the media, more than being affected 
by it, are a driving force in the process. Reese (2008) talks of a global news arena that 
has developed, in which journalists now need to navigate and to which they must adapt. 
Technological developments have contributed to a convergence: “In these settings, 
operating with the same equipment, access, and need for instantaneous transmission, 
technology has unified news routines even across organizations operating out of widely 
different national contexts” (Reese, 2008, p. 245). These changes certainly also have an 
impact on journalism’s role in societies and they are the object of scientific debate. 
Here, the nation-state usually serves as the reference point for (comparative) 
observations, which builds on the assumption that journalistic cultures comprise all 
adjustments that journalists and media producers make (and have historically made) to 
the social and political system they operate in (Prinzing, 2008). However, this practice 
of using the nation-state as a primary reference is also contested. Hepp (2008) argues 
that the classical international comparative approach that follows this assumption 
should be replaced by a transcultural approach to overcome the imagination of cultural 
and social processes as being contained within national borders. To meet the complexity 
of globalization and the connectivity of media communication today, deterritorialization 
that produces cultural densifications across borders needs to be considered. Hanitzsch 
(2007) points out that there are similarities in the journalistic orientation and practices 
that become manifest in a universal and cosmopolitan journalism culture that is 
characterized by diffusion and interdependences on a transnational level. Nevertheless, 
differences in the journalistic subcultures, according to Hanitzsch, can be detected on 
three fronts: on the macro level of national journalism cultures, on the meso level of 
journalistic organizational cultures, and on the micro level of professional milieus. For 
their large-scale comparative research on journalism cultures under the title “Worlds of 
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Journalism”3 Hanitzsch and colleagues (2011) propose a framework that consists of 
three dimensions: (1) journalistic roles, (2) epistemologies, and (3) ethical ideologies. 
Each of these dimensions further consists of sub-dimensions with certain characteristics 
which are defined as poles that allow a location of empirical values in between. For 
their pilot study, the researchers carried out interviews with 2100 journalists from more 
than 400 news organizations in 21 countries. All three countries investigated in this 
study, Brazil, Germany and the US, were included in the extensive analysis of 
Hanitzsch et al. (2011), which provides an informative basis on the journalism culture in 
the three countries. 
The dimension of journalistic roles is divided into three sub-dimensions: (1) 
interventionism, (2) power distance, and (3) market orientation. Interventionism refers 
to the question of whether journalists pursue a mission in a manner that is involved and 
socially committed or whether they are uninvolved and neutral. Hanitzsch et al. (2011) 
state that interventionism is generally not a characteristic of Western journalism but 
rather of journalism in transitional or emerging countries. This is also reflected when we 
compare the US, Germany, and Brazil. In Brazil, advocating for social change and 
supporting policies that bring about prosperity is more important for journalists than it is 
in the US and Germany. 
The subdimension of power distance refers to journalists’ position towards loci of 
power. The two poles of this dimension reach from the concepts of the “Fourth Estate” 
to journalists as loyal partners of the powerful. In Germany and the US, being a 
detached observer and acting as a watchdog for governments as well as business elites 
is an important characteristic of journalism culture, while in Brazil it is also important to 
be a watchdog of the government, but not of business elites. 
The sub-dimension of market orientation looks at whether media serve the public 
interest and address audiences mainly as citizens, or whether they serve the market 
interests that address audiences as costumers. When we compare the countries, it seems 
least important for Brazilian journalists to create news that attracts the widest possible 
audiences, while Germany and the US do not differ much. In Germany, it seems more 
important to journalists to provide interesting information, but it is almost equally 
important in all countries to provide political information. In this category of market 
                                                            
3see http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/  
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orientation, Brazil is much closer to the US and Germany than too many other 
developing or transitional countries in the study.  
The dimension of epistemologies is divided into two sub-dimensions. Objectivism 
refers to a philosophical or absolute sense of objectivity. The two poles of this 
dimension lie between the assumption that there is an objective existing truth and that 
facts can and should be clearly separated from opinion, and the notion that there is no 
objective reality and that every representation of the world needs interpretation. 
Journalists around the world agree with the idea that personal beliefs should not 
influence their reporting. Directly comparing the three countries shows that this element 
is most important for Brazilian journalists and least important (but obviously still 
important) for American journalists. At the same time, it is most important for German 
journalists to remain strictly impartial, while this is slightly less important for Brazilian 
and American journalists, who also agree much more on the idea that events and issues 
need analysis. Empiricism, as the other sub-dimension of the epistemologies, is 
concerned with the question of how truth is justified—whether through empirical 
justification (observation, evidence, or measurement) or analytical justification (reason, 
ideas, values, and analysis). For this sub-dimension, one difference is the most striking. 
While German and American journalists stay away from information that cannot be 
verified, this notion is less important for Brazilian journalists, although for all three 
countries it is almost equally important to make claims only if they are verified by 
evidence and reliable sources.   
The third dimension, “ethical ideologies”, consists of two sub-dimensions as well. 
Relativism refers to personal moral philosophies and whether people stick to universal 
values in all situations or whether values are dependent on the situational context. The 
second sub-dimension is “idealism” and refers to the consequences of reasoning in 
ethical dilemmas and the question of whether the end justifies the means in the work of 
journalists. The two poles of this sub-dimension comprise the highly idealistic mean 
orientation and the less idealistic goal orientation. At the dimension of ethical 
ideologies, it is remarkable that journalists in all three countries maintain very similar 
attitudes. They all disapprove contextual and situational ethics and would accept 
harmful consequences of reporting for a greater good. Table 2 summarizes the 
information on journalism cultures according to Hanitzsch and colleagues (2011):   
Table 2 Summary: Journalism Cultures according to Hanitzsch et al. (2011) 
Dimension Sub-dimension USA Germany Brazil 
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Roles Interventionism Low 
interventionism 
Low 
interventionism 
Advocating 
for social 
change and 
supporting 
policies that 
bring about 
prosperity is 
more 
important 
Power Distance Detached 
observer and 
watchdog of 
political elites 
and business 
elites 
Detached 
observer and 
watchdog of 
political elites 
and business 
elites 
Watchdog of 
political 
elites but 
less 
important to 
monitor 
business 
elites 
Market 
Orientation 
Small differences between countries, but 
attracting widest possible audience least 
important in Brazil; providing interesting 
information more important in Germany 
Equally important to provide political information 
Epistemologies Objectivism Remaining 
impartial and 
not letting 
personal beliefs 
influence 
reporting of 
high relevance 
Most important 
to remain 
strictly 
impartial, less 
agreement that 
events and 
issues need 
analysis 
Most 
important 
that personal 
beliefs 
should not 
influence 
their 
reporting 
Empiricism Staying away 
from 
information that 
cannot be 
verified 
Staying away 
from 
information that 
cannot be 
verified 
Staying 
away from 
information 
that cannot 
be verified 
less relevant 
Ethical 
Ideologies 
Relativism& 
Idealism 
Small differences between countries: all 
disapprove contextual and situational ethics and 
would accept harmful consequences of reporting 
for a greater good 
 
Hanitzsch (2011) also uses this data to assign roles for journalism to each country. 
There are four distinct roles: the detached watchdog (as a detached observer who 
articulates a skeptical and critical attitude towards the government and business elites), 
the populist disseminator (who has a high audience orientation and is most likely to aim 
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at providing audiences with interesting information), the critical change agent (with 
critical attitude towards the government and business elites but driven by an 
interventionist impetus of advocating social change), and the opportunist facilitator (as 
constructive partners of the government in the process of economic development and 
political transformation). It is remarkable that Germany has the highest share of 
journalists who would count as “detached observer”, with 69 percent. This role is only 
slightly less often present in the US, with a share of 63 percent. Both countries only 
have four percent of opportunist facilitators. While the populist disseminator is slightly 
more often present in Germany than in the US (17 compared to 11 percent), it is the 
other way around with the social change agent (21 percent in the US, 10 percent in 
Germany). In Brazil, all four roles are more evenly distributed, with the detached 
watchdog having a share of 28 percent, the populist disseminator of 26 percent, the 
social change agent of 27 percent, and the opportunist facilitator of 20 percent. Brazilian 
journalism culture is therefore the least distinct or clearly defined of the three. The 
following sections, which deal with the history of journalism in all three countries, will 
delve further into the reasons behind these differences.  
5.2 Historical Context of Narrative Journalism 
“A large part of the explanation of the present lies in the past. We are what we are 
because we were what we were. Thus, the sociology of journalism cannot be severed 
from the history of journalism.” (Schudson, 2012, p. 57). For a better understanding of 
the cases that are investigated in this study it is necessary to add further contextual 
knowledge about the history of journalism in general and in each country in particular 
and, as far as possible, especially about journalistic traditions and narrative practices. 
The section therefore aims at locating the significance of the narrative forms within 
journalism in order to find explanations for the shapes of narrative elements in today’s 
journalism. I will begin with a short paragraph on the news paradigm of the twentieth 
century first, and then retracing the specific developments and journalistic traditions in 
each of the three countries separately, especially focusing on the role of narrative lines 
of traditions.  
5.2.1 News Paradigm of the Twentieth Century 
Journalism has always been under development—its shape depends on temporal and 
spatial circumstances, and societal as well as infrastructural context factors (Nerone, 
2008a). Technical developments set certain frames for journalistic performance, but 
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societies also define limits and boundaries, by holding expectations about what role 
journalism should fulfill and what it should provide. For example, the today still far-
reaching notion of the press as a Fourth Estate originated in the late eighteenth century 
and contributed to the stepwise institutionalization of the press as a mediator within 
society between the political sphere and the sphere of the people (Hampton, 2012). The 
idea of the press as a Fourth Estate entails several implications concerning the place and 
role of the press in society, but less direct implications on the form, at least at first sight. 
The notion of the Fourth Estate is closely connected to the concepts of modern 
democracy and its legislative, executive and judiciary institutions that spread in Europe 
following the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In this sense, the 
Fourth Estate has been understood as a “counterbalance to these powers, a watchdog 
guarding the public interest, and providing a forum for public debate” (Thussu, 2008). 
Originally applied to newspapers, the idea has been extended to broadcast media and 
eventually to the internet (Hampton, 2012). To fulfill the Fourth Estate ideal, the notion 
of an objective journalism that follows neutral news criteria as a professional ideology 
for journalism became the dominant “news paradigm” of the twentieth century 
(Ytreberg, 2001, p. 358). In how far this also applies to the countries studied in this 
project (and to what degrees) will be addressed in the following subsection.  
However, there are other trends that emerged over time, that set boundaries to the 
Fourth Estate ideal. Hampton (2012) points to commercialization as a significant 
development against which one has to reflect the ideal critically:  
Yet if the press barons and corporate media have at times demonstrated a credible 
financial and political independence of government and have, on occasion, gone so 
far as to undermine corrupt or anti-democratic government policies, radical critics 
none the less remain skeptical about commercial media’s inability to perform a 
consistent “Fourth Estate” role as […] a government “watchdog” […]. On the one 
hand, commercialization has its limits as a basis for journalistic independence; on 
the other hand, and not unrelated, twentieth century democratic governments have 
shown themselves quite capable of using commercial media for their own political 
ends. (Hampton 2012, p. 6) 
To understand the role of different developments and influences in each specific case 
and to find hints that help to explain the use of narrative elements within the news 
coverage today, the next section will go into further detail by sketching out the history 
and journalistic traditions in the US, Germany, and Brazil. 
58 
5.2.2 Country-Specific Developments 
5.2.2.1 USA 
“Objectivity” is the keyword that is probably most associated with American 
journalism. Kaplan (2012, p. 25) calls it the “professional code of studied impartiality 
and rigorous factuality [that] has been celebrated as American journalism's proudest, if 
most difficult to sustain, achievement” (p. 25). What is indicated with the term 
“achievement” is that this journalistic ideal has historically not always been a given. 
Hackett (2008) underlines that “objectivity is neither universal nor timeless. It has 
emerged in specific historical, political and cultural contexts.” In the case of American 
journalism, the rise of objectivity s typically understood as originating in the nineteenth 
century. According to Schudson (2012), American newspapers at their very beginning 
during colonial times were products of printers who would first and foremost identify as 
businessmen and not as journalists. Early newspapers were short, weekly journals that 
contained local advertising, gossip, European political and economic news (taken 
directly from London newspapers), but very little local political news. These printers 
did not reach out to collect information, they rather “printed what came to them” (p. 
65). They were eager not to take sides or get too political in order not to harm their 
businesses. It was during the conflict with Great Britain after 1765 when “politics 
entered the press” (p. 66) and papers started taking sides with the political causes of the 
colonies. For Schudson, this marks the beginning of a long era of American newspapers 
being “the mouthpiece of political parties and factions” (p.66). With the rise of mass 
parties in the 1830s, a partisan press also flourished and persisted as “the dominant ethic 
of US journalism throughout the nineteenth century” (Kaplan, 2012, p. 28).  
Several different developments contributed to changing conditions after the American 
Civil War. The emergence of new technologies such as photography and the telegraph 
brought along new forms of organizations as did, for example, wire services that 
promoted the appearance of the inverted pyramid communication style, with which the 
most important information was transmitted first (Hackett, 2008). Newspapers grew 
rapidly, becoming large, profitable, industrialized businesses with advertisement as an 
increasingly important source of income (Schudson, 2012). Partisanship now seemed be 
standing in the way of newspaper owners to reach wide audiences and attract advertisers 
to make profit. Organizational changes as well as the incentive to reach out for new 
audiences entailed changes at the content level: “Crowd-pleasing features such as 
simpler language, larger headlines, and more lavish illustrations helped to extend 
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readership to immigrants and others whose knowledge of written English was limited.” 
(Schudson, 2012, p. 72).  
According to Schudson (2008), the renunciation of partisanship was also promoted by a 
wider transformation of American political culture in the late nineteenth century. 
During the Progressive Era, liberal reformers. began to push for considerable reforms of 
the voting system, in an attempt to fight corruption. They also criticized party loyalty: 
“At the same time, newspapers became more willing to take an independent stance. By 
1890, a quarter of daily newspapers in northern states, where the reform movement was 
most advanced, claimed independence of party.” (Schudson, 2008, p. 30). With the 
decline of party dependence, journalists were able to develop an independent culture 
and a set of professional practices. Schudson (2008) dates the emergence of the 
interview as a typical journalistic practice back to his period. Before, reporters would 
talk to official sources but not refer to them in their articles. But from the 1880s on, “the 
interview [became] a well-accepted and institutionalized "media event", an occasion 
created by journalists from which they could then craft a story” (p. 32). At the start of 
the twentieth century, the modern newspaper was born from both professionalization 
and commercialization. Even though some editors retained their partisanship, reporters 
focused on making stories, including competing voices, authorities and genres, instead 
of on promoting parties. Newspapers became businesses in towering downtown 
buildings and they amassed a vastly growing readership (ibid.).  
The new circumstances made publishers think of new strategies to gain a greater 
readership. These strategies had lasting consequences for the development of journalism 
in general and for a literary journalism specifically. William T. Stead, publisher of the 
Pall Mall Gazette, called for a “New Journalism” in his article “The Future of 
Journalism” in 1886. As a publisher, he wanted to promote sensation, campaigning, 
social engagement and investigation in order to meet “the real needs of the people.” 
(cited from Haas, 2004, p. 43). John Pulitzer, who had bought the New York World in 
1882, also developed a popular strategy that included human-interest stories, 
sensationalism, illustration, stunts, and ‘manufactured news’, a simple style and 
partisanship for policies of social reforms (ibid.).  
Both Stead and Pulitzer are important trailblazers of a journalistic movement in the 
middle of the twentieth century, which is referred to as “New Journalism”, indicating to 
a group of young journalists around the leading figure of Tom Wolfe in New York. 
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Other well-known representatives such as Norman Mailer, Gay Talese, Joan Didion, 
Hunter Thompson, George Plimpton, Truman Capote, and Michael Herr also shaped the 
“new journalism” as a style of literary reportage in the 1960s (Pauly, 2008). This group 
had its roots in the “muckrakers” movement that promoted investigative journalism 
around the turn of the century, but also in the early literary journalism of Mark Twain 
and Charles Dickens (Haas, 2004). What the representatives of the New Journalism of 
the 1960s had in common with the early writers of literary journalism is that they 
presented journalistic investigated facts and events with literary stylistic devices. 
However, only the New Journalism movement was recognizable as such since they 
identified as a group and had an own concept to which they collectively referred (ibid.). 
Pauly (2008) points out the basic characteristics of this movement by stating:  
The term “new journalism” thus marks a turning point in the history of journalism: 
an influential moment of self-criticism and an acknowledgement of the cultural 
contradictions of objective news. What the new journalism bequeathed was not only 
a different way of telling stories, but also a commercially compelling strategy for 
making a living as a journalist in a rapidly changing media market. (Pauly, 2008) 
Very generally, the New Journalism movement understood itself as counter concept to 
the dominant information journalism and its strong faith in objectivity. The writing of 
the New Journalism was therefore mainly characterized by a combination of the 
classical report with literary and narrative techniques, such as dramatization, 
complemented with an extensive work of inquiry, an especially pronounced author 
profile as well as open subjectivity (Pörksen, 2004, p. 19; Haas, 2004, p. 45). Tom 
Wolfe, who had not invented the New Journalism but had made sure that its 
representatives were recognized as a group by publicly declaring their objectives (Haas, 
2004, p. 49), defined the concept as “journalism that would read like a novel,” or, 
elsewhere, like a “short story” (Hartsock, 2011, p. 24). Referring directly to Wolfe, 
Haas (2004, p. 48) summarizes the specific use of literary elements that found its way 
into their writing, besides subjectivity, interpretation and extensive investigations: (1) 
dramatization and scenic composition, (2) presenting entire dialogues as they were 
recorded or remembered instead of single citations that are taken out of their context, 
(3) changing perspectives, (4) detailed descriptions of habitus, status, gestures, facial 
expressions and behavior to better understand people and their actions as well as 
American society or subcultures. Their procedures aim at conveying relations between 
facts rather than presenting isolated details to (re)construct different versions of a 
perceived reality.  
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The appearance of the New Journalism movement has to be seen in the light of the time 
in which it emerged. Important changes in American society in the 1960s, linked to 
students’ protests, a general protest culture, and the Hippie movement, were decisive 
factors for the New Journalism to develop such a strong opposition to the conventional 
journalism at that time (Haas, 2004). Based on their experiences with the media 
coverage on the Vietnam War, the New Journalists accused conventional journalism 
and its ideal of objectivity of facilitating strategic actors like the state and businesses to 
easily communicate their interests. It is one of the great achievements of the New 
Journalists that they provoked a debate on journalistic standards and assumptions on 
quality, on journalistic practices and credibility. However, the New Journalism was first 
of all a movement that certainly had its influences but did not develop a new 
mainstream journalism.  
More recent developments see a rise of narrative-driven journalism in the mainstream 
media due mostly to economic developments and increasing commercialization. Benson 
(2009) argues that in the US “personalized ‘dramatic narrative’ has become a dominant 
journalistic form” (p. 405) with severe consequences for example for pluralism and 
diversity, as he shows in a study in which he compares American and French coverage 
on immigration. Especially front-page articles in the US media tend to present rather 
long stories that lack “multiperspectivalness”. 
5.2.2.2 Germany 
In how far different historic developments and contexts shape the history of journalism 
and journalistic traditions can be seen when we contrast American and German press 
history. As we will see below, German journalistic history and tradition is marked by 
developments and changes that shaped different periods in which especially narrative 
and artistic elements play specific roles. From the bard who orally presented news to the 
ordinary people, to the poetic political writer who tried to cover delicate issues behind 
prosaic forms, to the leftist representatives of the “Neue Sachlichkeit”—narrative 
elements are deeply rooted in the German journalism history.  
Baumert (2013) distinguishes four main stages in the history of German journalism: (1) 
a pre-journalistic period, (2) a period of a corresponding journalism, (3) a writers’ 
period, and (4) an editorial period. The pre-journalistic period dates to the Middle Ages 
and is, at first, mostly characterized by a baronial information flow through private 
agents. During the time of the Protestant Reformation and as a consequence of Martin 
Luther’s bible translations, people’s literacy increased, as did the general interest for 
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political and societal issues. However, according to Baumert (2013), the spoken word 
remained the major way of distributing information. Traveling journalists (p. 75) 
presented their news in a poetic and easily comprehensible way. Despite the 
phenomenon that the information content was generally of lower significance than the 
artistic performance, those traveling poets were highly relevant for the public access to 
news and information.  
During the period of corresponding journalism, the first newspaper-like publications 
developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, which printed the information in the 
order in which it was received.  
At the end of the seventeenth century, post and printing services further developed 
independently from each other and printers primarily became publishers for papers. 
Further professionalization progressed especially in the bigger cities, where so-called 
“bulletins” collected and printed news from different sources. Baumert (2013) identifies 
the writers of these bulletins as the first representatives of the journalistic profession.  
What follows, according to Baumert (2013), is the period of the writers. Roß (2004) 
calls it literarization (German: “Literarisierung”) of the press. Because both cities as 
well as the level of education of their inhabitants were constantly growing, the interest 
in political and literary issues was also increasing. At the end of the eighteenth and the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, papers and magazines spread further, due to 
advanced print and distribution techniques, but also due to basic societal changes after 
the French Revolution and its consequences for the political and cultural life of 
Germany. The political, societal and cultural spheres did not operate separately from 
each other anymore—and journalism and literature further approached one another, 
with the result that writers became more involved in journalistic work, contributing 
descriptions and commentaries of current developments and events (Roß, 2004). Further 
developments follow a similar pattern to that described above in the paragraph 
concerning the American press history. As a mass product in a capitalist system, 
newspapers had to reach the broadest possible audiences to be attractive for advertisers. 
Newspapers became bigger businesses, internal differentiation got stricter, and people 
producing content became more professionalized in the sense that they specialized in 
the journalistic profession instead of performing it as a secondary means of income. The 
telegraph fostered a development through which news became the quick and undistorted 
distribution of information on events that had just happened, which became a leading 
maxim for the journalism practice (ibid, p. 86). This understanding of news was 
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attended by further alienation of literature and journalism at that time (ibid.) and 
introduced the period of editorial journalism (Baumert, 2014). 
The second half of the nineteenth century was further characterized by the rise of party 
movements that delivered content for news but also developed their own publishing 
structures (Baumert, 2014). The rise of a conservative, liberal, center and social 
democratic press was highly relevant until the turn of the century, when party press 
reached saturation (Stöber, 2014). Afterwards, and especially in the Weimar Republic, 
ideological orientation kept its relevance despite the simultaneously growing economic 
pressures to reach broad audiences that developed hand in hand with the new ideals of 
objectivity and quick and disengaged news. There were especially a few writers from 
the left who distrusted the—in their eyes—bourgeois journalism in which objectivity 
was seen as the professional standard for the capitalist media (Hartsock, 2011). By 
introducing the literary period of “Neue Sachlichkeit” (English “New 
Objectivity”),writers such as Egon Erwin Kisch reconnected journalism and literature: 
“Unlike the concept of journalistic "objectivity" as it took shape in the United States at 
the same time, the German version emphasized first-person witness as the only kind of 
journalism that could make a claim to epistemological integrity.”(Hartsock, 2011, 
p. 29). Finding their ways mainly into the feuilleton where news and entertainment were 
the least strictly separated, the authors again pushed for a variety of shapes and forms: 
“highly polemical broadsides, art criticism, or meditative essays, or they could be 
physiologies and sketches, narrative and descriptive in model disposition, fictional and 
nonfictional, and often accompanied by illustrations.” (ibid, p. 30) 
Traditionally, as the explanations above have demonstrated, the separation between 
facts and opinion had not been as strict in the German journalistic tradition as it was in 
the Anglo-American context. During all periods, we see the influence of the literary 
sphere on journalism. However, after the Second World War, the United States and 
Great Britain attached a high importance to establishing the ideal of separation of facts 
and opinion when rebuilding the German press system (Stöber, 2014, p. 187).  
5.2.2.3 Brazil 
The history of journalism in Brazil is marked by several turning points and raptures 
with long-lasting effects on its journalistic culture and practices. As Herscovitz (2004) 
summarizes other authors, explaining that in the nineteenth century, French liberal ideas 
had great influence on the cultural life in Brazil: “French cultural missions visited the 
country attending invitations by the Portuguese royal family established in the colony. 
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French immigrants controlled all kinds of businesses, including major newspapers, 
while the elite sent its children to French schools.” (Herscovitz, 2004, p. 74). A 
“French” style of writing, which is characterized as being “less objective, passionate, 
favoring a partisan interpretation of facts, marked by a literary and a political flavor” 
(ibid. p. 72), also dominated Brazilian newspaper writing until the first decades of the 
twentieth century. During the First World War, the connection between Brazil and 
Europe gradually loosened and the country turned towards the United States due to 
economic and political interests. A flow of cultural products increased, and Brazilians 
became more aware of American film, music and literature (ibid. p. 74). During the 
1940s, a few Brazilian journalists established direct contact with the US media system 
and journalism culture through a program that was launched by the office director of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller, who sponsored excursions 
for Brazilian journalists to the US. After their return to Brazil, many of these journalists 
tried to adapt journalistic norms and practices that they had familiarized themselves 
with in the US. According to Albuquerque and Roxo da Silva (2009), this is seen as an 
important point in Brazilian journalism history. The story of a group of journalists who 
worked at a newspaper called Diário Carioca turned into a mythical narrative about 
Brazilian journalism. It is said that the group, which was led by editor Pompeu de 
Sousa, reformed Brazilian journalism by publishing a so-called “Stylebook” that was 
supposed to foster a modernization process according to the American role model. Even 
though changes in journalistic practice were not as dramatic as some would recall in 
retrospective (Albuquerque & Roxo da Silva, 2009) one central element of the reform 
had a certain influence on newsroom routines: the implementation of the so-called 
“copy desk”, which was supposed to ideologically streamline reporters. Albuquerque 
and Gagliardi (2011, p. 85) describe that the purpose of the copy desk was “to shape 
news texts to the requirements of an industrial rhythm of news making, and to 
disseminate the modern, American-based model of journalism among Brazilian 
journalists. By doing so, the copy desk worked as an instrument for reducing 
journalists’ autonomy in their daily work.”  
A further adaptation of American journalistic norms occurred in the following years and 
was fostered by a period during which conservative editors would mainly hire leftist and 
communist writers at their news media outlets. Albuquerque and Roxa da Silva (2009) 
explain that, after a long period in which the communist party was forbidden, party 
members developed strategies to organize themselves and communicate in a 
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hierarchical way that was based on discipline and loyalty. Beyond that, communists 
pursued to spread their ideology from within societal institutions—such as media. 
Conservative editors valued the discipline and hierarchical structures these journalists 
brought into the newsroom while they could refer to the journalistic norm of objectivity 
to find a common base of working with each other. These communist journalists were 
so valuable for the editors that the latter even tried to protect people in their newsrooms 
occasionally at the beginning of the military dictatorship in the 1960s. However, at 
some point from the 1970s onwards, publishers were no longer interested in holding up 
the arrangement. According to Albuquerque and Roxa da Silva (2009), newspapers 
changed rapidly as a result. Market pressure and business-orientated management as 
well as political pressure and a law that made a college degree an obligatory 
requirement for journalists to work as such, let the costs of tolerating communist 
influence in their newspapers increasingly surpass the benefits for publishers. 
During these different periods of Brazilian journalism, a certain professionalization 
occurred due to the orientation towards the American journalistic norms. However, 
Albuquerque and Roxa da Siva (2009) conclude that although the American model 
certainly had a significant influence on the modernization of Brazilian journalism, there 
was not a mere adoption but rather an adaptation that befitted Brazilian culture and 
society. The bottom line is that the orientation towards the American model more 
intensively was concerned with the marked-orientation rather than the content norms of 
the model (Herscovitz, 2004). Even though there used to be and still is an open 
commitment to objectivity, for example, (Mellado, Moreira, Lagos, & Hernandez, 
2012) it has been “often a formal gesture more than a matter of true belief” 
(Albuquerque & Roxo da Silva, 2009, p. 379). According to Albuquerque and Roxa da 
Silva (2009) this is also expressed in modern Brazilian journalism that privileges 
narrative aspects rather than news-gathering and reporting techniques.  
5.3 Media System Context 
Media are, according to Beck (2012), open, dynamic, interdependent and differentiated 
systems. They are closely intertwined with other systems, such as the economic system 
and the political system. The specific constitution of the media system within society 
sets certain boundaries in which journalists operate. Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
engage in a few more considerations to gain a deeper understanding of the cases in this 
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study and to find explanations for the use and deliberative impact of narratives in the 
mediated discourse. 
The three cases—Brazil, the US, and Germany—were originally chosen for this 
analysis because they represent important democracies in their respective world regions 
that all formally allow freedom of the press and of opinions. This is assumed to be a 
crucial premise for an open media discourse in which the access to topics, ideas and 
voices is not inhibited by formal obstacles. Therefore, democracy is a basic requirement 
for deliberation and, normatively, deliberation should enhance democracy (Ellis, 2012). 
However, it is important to note that the basic democratic rights of freedom of opinion 
and freedom of the press are not equally enforced in all three countries. According to 
the report on press freedom 2015 by Freedom House4, the media systems of Germany 
and the US— ranking 22ndand 31st in the global rating— are regarded as “free”, while 
Brazil, ranked90this only labeled “partly free,” In how far press freedom is restricted by 
legal practice will be shown in the course of this chapter.  
Besides the democratic basic order as one crucial similarity for the comparative analysis 
of this work, all three countries’ economic systems also follow a capitalistic order in 
which media are mostly privately owned. Sectors regulated by public law are more or 
less strongly developed. There is no media that is directly owned and controlled by the 
state. Besides having a similar economic order, media markets in the three countries 
differ in their actual constitution, which will be further explored in what follows.    
To more systematically compare the media systems of our three countries and in order 
to gain a better understanding of the contexts in which this analysis tries to characterize 
certain media coverage, I will draw on the ideas of Hallin and Mancini (2004), who 
propose certain categories with which media systems can be compared5. In their 
influential book “Comparing media systems”, Hallin and Mancini argue that “common 
historical roots shape the development of both media and political systems and are 
                                                            
4See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2015#.VtWhR9CXo9I(Retrieved 
March 2, 2016) 
5 Hallin and Mancini concentrated on countries from Europe and North America which was often 
criticized for Western centrism. In “Comparing media systems beyond the western world” from 2012 
they react on the critique by stating that the original model could only be a starting point from which 
further reaching analysis can start of. Several authors follow their invitation by trying to apply their 
categories, criticize them and propose more suitable approaches (see for example Voltmer (2012), 
Hadland (2012), Roudakova (2012); Albuquerque (2012)). Those will be kept in mind in the following 
paragraphs, though this work is not about the detailed comparison of media systems. It rather aims at 
pointing to such characteristics within the respective media system that seem relevant for the constitution 
of media coverage with respect to their narrative and deliberative qualities.     
67 
crucial to understanding the relation between the two” (p. 46). They propose four 
categories along which Western and North American media systems can be compared: 
(1) the development of media markets and especially the mass circulation press, (2) 
political parallelism, (3) the development of journalistic professionalism, and (4) the 
degree and nature of state interventions in the media system. Each of these dimensions 
consists of further categories which I will not describe in detail, because I will 
concentrate on the dimensions that are particularly relevant for generating further 
understanding of the three cases. 
When it comes to media markets and especially to the development of the press, Hallin 
and Mancini distinguish Southern Europe from Northern Europe and North America. 
The latter two developed an early press system in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century while the former did not. This had far-reaching consequences until today. Not 
only in quantity but also in quality, the press markets of these regions differ 
significantly. Circulation rates are much higher in Northern Europe as well as in North 
America, where newspapers are directed to a mass audience. In Southern Europe, 
newspapers address a small political elite of an urban and well-educated part of society 
and therefore have much lower circulation rates. The daily newspaper circulation rates 
in the three countries of this study vary to a great extent. According to a statistic by The 
Economist (2013)6 on the daily newspaper sales counting the copies sold per 1,000 
inhabitants, Brazil shows a rate of 61, the USA of 166, and Germany of 255. With such 
a low sales rate, Brazil has even less daily newspaper sales than the Southern European 
countries to which Hallin and Mancini refer7.Albuquerque (2012) underscores that 
Brazils press market is poorly developed compared to European countries. The media 
system is significantly television-centered (97 percent of all households have television 
according to d’Essen, 2010) and a small number of newspapers address only an elite 
readership. Also, the Brazilian media market is highly concentrated. A few big 
companies, often owned by politicians and their families (d’Essen, 2010), own large 
parts of the media landscape. In spite of legal restrictions for the formation of 
monopolies, the enforcement of such laws has been weak since the military dictatorship 
                                                            
6 The Economist. (2013). Daily newspaper circulation in selected countries worldwide in 2012. In Statista 
- The Statistics Portal. Retrieved July 21, 2015, from 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/259731/newspaper-circulation-worldwide/. (Retrieved March 2, 2016) 
7 According to the website http://www.pressreference.com/, the two countries that were given as 
examples for low circulation rates in Europe by Hallin and Mancini, Portugal and Greece, even have 
higher circulation rates than Brazil, with Portugal reaching 84 sales per 1000 inhabitants, and Greece 
having 78 sales per 1000 inhabitants (Retrieved March 2, 2016) 
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(Amaral & Guimarães, 1994). Today, the Globo network represents the dominant 
monopoly (Porto, 2007). It is not specialized in one medium but rather overarches 
several media types: “It is a mass media complex involving sub-monopolies, one of 
which is moving toward a complete monopoly of all branches of the cultural industry.” 
(Amaral & Guimarães, 1994, p. 29).  
The German press market is well-developed, since there are several regional 
subscription-based newspapers with local editions and several newspapers with national 
circulation (Wilke, 2008). However, processes of economic and editorial concentration 
have steadily developed over time (Beck, 2012). According to Röper (2014), ten big 
publishing groups are responsible for 60 percent of all newspaper sales. Beyond that, 
digital concentration–the combination of different media types online and offline under 
the roof of one company–is also increasing (Beck, 2012). Overall sales rates for 
newspapers and advertising have nevertheless been decreasing in Germany for several 
years now (Röper, 2014). The US face a similar development. Circulation rates reached 
a peak in 1985 and have been declining ever since (Stevenson, Scott, & Shaw, 2008). 
The American press market consists of daily papers that are small and oriented towards 
local communities, and there are three daily newspapers that are distributed nationally 
(ibid.). According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), during the early development of the 
press in the US it was technically impossible to distribute papers on a nationwide scale, 
which facilitated a local newspaper culture and most often resulted in a local single 
monopoly newspaper with a catchall audience.  
The dimension of “political parallelism” refers in general to “the degree to which the 
structure of the media system paralleled that of the party system” (Hallin & Mancini, 
2012, p. 27) and encompasses certain indicators such as the organizational connection 
between media and political parties as well as other relevant institutions or 
organizations in society (e.g., trade unions, churches, etc.), the partisanship of media 
audiences, the journalistic role orientations and practices and internal vs. external 
pluralism. For questions of inclusivity of the mediated discourse, it is quite relevant if a 
media system is generally characterized by low or high political parallelism. If media 
institutions are tied to a specific societal group or organization one can expect that 
representatives of such a group will have good chances to be heard in media coverage. 
Beyond that, where identifiable political camps exist and are reflected in the media 
landscape, an oppositional camp will probably have good chances to be represented, 
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too, even if it is mainly for the purpose of demarcation or rebuttal (which would be a 
special form of responsivity).   
Characterizing Brazil according to its degree of political parallelism seems challenging. 
Political parties in the presidential system of Brazil play a limited role, because the 
party system is highly fragmented and inefficient when it comes to the representation of 
common good interests (Vaz de Melo, & Xia, 2015).  Therefore, more general political 
tendencies in media content, organizational connections, partisanship of the audience, 
and journalistic role orientation have to be considered for an in-depth analysis (Hallin 
and Mancini, 2004; Albuquerque, 2012). For this work, it is important to note that, after 
the military dictatorship, media organizations tried to distance themselves from political 
groups and to increase internal pluralism (Albuquerque, 2012). By adapting a market-
driven catch-all attitude, Brazilian media organizations also represent their own voices 
in the debates rather than the voices of particular political groups (ibid.). However, the 
Brazilian media system is highly concentrated and according to d’Essen “a big part of 
Brazil’s politicians owned media companies” (p. 84).  
Germany is assigned to the democratic corporatist model of Hallin and Mancini (2014) 
which is marked by “segmented pluralism” on the dimension of parallelism. It has a 
long tradition of media (like parties) being rooted in political and cultural sub-
communities. Though the direct party press does not play a relevant role in Germany 
anymore today (Beck, 2012), especially the nationwide distributed quality papers reflect 
certain ideological tendencies from left leaning (Frankfurter Rundschau, TAZ, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung) to conservative (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt).  
In the US, such an assignment of newspapers to “distinct locations on the political 
spectrum or distinct partisan sympathies” makes little sense, according to Hallin and 
Mancini. Political parallelism is low, though, and many newspapers take a stand on 
their editorial pages but “these carry over only to a limited extent to news reporting” 
(ibid.). Classically, the American media would rather be attributed with the 
characteristic of “internal pluralism,” meaning that each individual media outlet 
expresses a diversity of viewpoints (Benson, 2009). However, as Benson (2009) can 
prove, this often-assumed internal pluralism is largely under pressure in the US and 
cannot be taken for granted.  
I want to highlight the sub-dimension of journalistic role perceptions as an important 
category within Hallin and Mancini’s dimension of political parallelism, since it is the 
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subcategory that most directly influences journalistic writing and therefore is 
particularly important to assess narrative writing styles and deliberative qualities in 
climate change coverage. 
These kinds of differences in journalistic cultures are associated with differences in 
writing style and other journalistic practices, with colorful or erudite commentary 
favored in some systems while a telegraphic informational style is favored in others; 
commentary rigidly segregated from news in some countries, and mixed more freely 
in others. (Hallin & Mancini, 2012, p. 29) 
This sub-dimension links journalism culture and media systems closely together. A 
detailed operationalization of journalistic role perceptions and their empirical 
occurrences has already been presented in section 5.1.  The section specifically pointed 
out that Germany and the US are mostly dominated by a detached-observer role 
perception, whereas the diversity between different journalistic roles is bigger in Brazil. 
This ambiguity in role perception might have consequences for the production of news 
coverage, e.g. for the variety of writing styles or the overall deliberative quality.   
The dimension of professionalism has three sub-dimensions or indicators that may be 
useful to consider when trying to determine the relationship between narratives and 
deliberation. The first sub-dimension is the one of “autonomy” that applies to the “corps 
of journalism as a whole” (p. 35) rather than to any individual journalist. Autonomy 
refers to the control over the journalistic working process and to whether journalists are 
free to make their own decisions or are required to follow instructions, e.g., those 
dictated by owners or editors. A second indicator of professionalization named by the 
authors refers to “distinct professional norms,” as the existence of shared norms within 
the profession that defines and confines the profession. For journalism, these norms 
usually encompass ethical rules (e.g., for the handling of sources or the separation of 
facts and commentary) as well as practical routines (e.g., the orientation towards news 
values as guiding decisions). The third sub-dimension of professionalization is “public 
service orientation” and refers to the notion of an ethic of serving the public interest. 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) contrast journalistic professionalism with the concept of 
instrumentalization, which means “control of the media by outside actors—parties, 
politicians, social groups or movements, or economic actors seeking political 
influence—who use them to intervene in the world of politics” (p. 37). The authors 
emphasize that their notion of instrumentalization specifically refers to political rather 
than to commercial instrumentalization. To take both forms into account when thinking 
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about the relationship between narration and deliberation can still be fruitful, especially 
considering the idea that narratives may well be used by powerful actors for strategic 
purposes (politically and commercially). Where instrumentalization is likely, one should 
have a close look at narratives in the news media and their deliberative quality, as one 
could expect that narratives in such an environment rather lack deliberative qualities.  
In the case of Brazil, Mancini and Papathanassopoulos (2002) conclude that it is the 
regional media, especially broadcasting and radio, that is often owned by local oligarchs 
who use their political control for own purposes. This is the result of a long tradition in 
which “presidents [have used] the distribution of radio and television licenses as a form 
of political patronage” (Matos, 2011, pp. 186–187). Though the major national 
newspapers from Rio de Janeiro and São Paolo are more independent, they also often 
are influenced by personal feuds or friendships between owners and political leaders 
(Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002). Nevertheless, the Brazilian media market is 
marked by a strong trend of commercialization on the one side, while the Brazilian 
journalism—as explained above—orientates itself on an American model of unbiased 
reporting and a Fourth Estate understanding of the role of the media (Albuquerque, 
2005).  
In Germany, as in other representatives of the Democratic Corporatist model, 
journalistic autonomy is generally given. Hallin and Mancini (2004) report a study that 
asked journalists in a survey how much pressure they feel from senior managers and 
editors. Only a very few journalists expressed that they feel a great degree of this kind 
of pressure on their work. However, it is one of the functions of newspaper to exercise 
“ideological guidance,” which the nationally distributed newspapers attempt by 
representing certain tendencies in the left–right spectrum. Therefore, the internal 
pluralism within one newspaper is a slightly more restricted.  
Professionalism has strong roots in the North Atlantic/ Liberal Model—of which the 
United States conform most to the ideal type (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Due to 
changes in the American political culture of the late nineteenth century, during which 
partisan politics abated while the “emphasis of neutral expertise” (p. 220) was growing, 
the journalistic ideal of “objective” reporting of journalists with a large degree of 
autonomy from outside actors developed. However, as Hallin and Mancini also note, 
this type of professionalism is eroding due to increasing efforts of actors, for example of 
business interests or the church, to influence editorial decision-making. Growing 
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economic pressure and increasing commercialization also restricts journalists perceived 
autonomy in the US today, as a survey study by Beam, Weaver, and Brownlee (2009) 
indicates.  
Hallin and Mancini (2004) further suggest examining the role of the state as another 
analytical dimension for classifying media systems. State interventions can differ 
according to their extent as well as to their form (p. 41). The existence of public service 
broadcasting is one of the most important forms of state intervention. Media subsidies 
for privately owned media companies are another example. Beyond that, it is especially 
the regulatory framework at the legal level that indicates the degree of state 
interventions. Legal regulations can encompass laws of free speech and laws for 
journalists’ professional secrecy, laws for regulating media concentration and 
ownership or political communication (e.g., during campaigns) as well as the access to 
government information (Hallin and Mancini, 2004 p. 43–44). Voltmer (2012) adds that 
beyond the degree and nature of state interventions the means, objectives and 
instruments need to be regarded separately (p.228). She argues that it makes a 
difference whether state interventions aim at ensuring a certain quality of media content 
or whether states try to directly control the media for their purposes. Brüggemann and 
colleagues (2014) note that the indicators of state interventions named by Hallin and 
Mancini differ to such an extent that they can hardly be combined into one index. They 
suggest making a conceptual distinction between public broadcasting, press subsidies 
and media ownership regulation. They prove that these indicators cannot be combined 
into one index by checking the internal consistency and must therefore be seen as 
having their own dimensions. In addition, I would remark that regulations which ensure 
the formal freedom of the press should also be considered, especially when analyzing 
non-Western systems.  
In Brazil, the state has never been an owner of media organizations; however, state 
subsidies, especially for newspapers, played an important role due to the small 
readership (Albuquerque, 2012). Even though press freedom is guaranteed in the 
Brazilian constitution, the state interferes with restrictive censorship as well as judicial 
actions against journalists (Matos, 2011). Attempts to install public service broadcasting 
are marked by a history of failures (ibid.) 
In Germany, there is strong public service broadcasting with a clear mission for 
information and education (Beck, 2012). Beyond that, state intervention is less 
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common. There are only indirect subsidies for the press, e.g., a low value-added tax and 
reduced postal rates.  
In countries that fit into the Liberal Model, the role of the state in the media system is 
by definition limited, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004), keeping up the 
capitalistic order and ensuring the legal infrastructure for privately owned businesses. 
Public service broadcasting is much less relevant than commercial broadcasting (ibid.).  
Table 3 Summary of media system characteristics (according to Hallin and Mancini’s, 2004, media system 
dimensions) 
 USA Germany Brazil 
Media Market Mostly locally 
distributed 
newspapers 
(newspaper 
circulation: 166 
sold copies per 
1.000 inhabitants) 
Well-developed 
press market (255 
sold copies per 
1.000 inhabitants 
but decreasing), 
critical economic 
and editorial 
concentration 
Poorly developed 
press market (61 
sold copies per 
1.000 inhabitants), 
television-centered 
media market, 
newspapers address 
elite readership, 
high market 
concentration) 
Political 
Parallelism 
Low political 
parallelism and 
internal pluralism 
(under pressure 
today)  
Segmented 
pluralism: long 
party press 
tradition, 
ideological 
tendencies still 
represented today  
After the military 
dictatorship: media 
organizations 
distanced 
themselves from 
political groups and 
increased internal 
pluralism; market 
driven catch-all 
attitude 
Journalistic 
Professionalism 
Objective reporting 
with high autonomy 
as important 
tradition but 
increasing 
tendencies of 
influence from 
outside and 
increasing 
commercialization 
restrict journalistic 
autonomy 
High autonomy 
but need to follow 
ideological base 
(especially in 
newspapers)  
Owners of regional 
media use political 
influence (low 
autonomy), strong 
trend of 
commercialization 
State 
Interventionism 
State provides 
capitalistic order 
and ensuring the 
Strong public 
service 
broadcasting, 
State subsidies for 
newspapers, 
restrictive 
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legal infrastructure 
for privately owned 
businesses 
indirect subsidies 
for the press 
censorship and 
judicial actions 
against journalists 
 
National Political Context 
The political system of a country shapes the legal framework of a media system and 
these political structures are to some extent reflected in that media system and the 
contents it produces. Therefore, it is important to consider the national political context, 
as it influences public political communication (Kriesi, 2003), as well as news 
communication in particular (Ferree et al. 2002b). For this study, which investigates the 
inclusiveness of voices and ideas, conflictive arguments and solution orientation in 
narrative news, in the following I will try to briefly highlight factors in the political 
context that could facilitate or hinder these deliberative qualities. As a basic distinction 
for political contexts, Hallin and Mancini (2012) emphasize individual and organized 
pluralism. In systems that are characterized by organized pluralism, strong 
institutionalized social groups represent segments of society and their interests in the 
public debate and in the process of policymaking, where they may also be formally 
integrated. Where organized social groups are formally integrated into the political 
process, we speak of “corporatism”. The opposite idea is the concept of “liberalism,” 
which is characterized by systems with individualized pluralism in which such 
organized groups are less relevant and individual citizens represent their special 
interests in relation to governing institutions. This truly is an important category for 
assessing the chances of different actors to be presented in the media debate. 
Albuquerque suggests adding the category “system of government” to the original 
categories of Hallin and Mancini (2004). Especially when investigating countries 
outside Europe and North America, Albuquerque argues, it would be useful to take the 
distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems into account (in the original 
study, only the US were a presidential system), since the latter is essentially a Third 
World phenomenon. Beyond the system of government, I will try to briefly characterize 
the general political culture as well as the role of civil society, as it seems important for 
questions of popular inclusion as well as for the acceptance of conflicting arguments.  
A good example of how to connect the general political system, political culture, and 
deliberative qualities is provided by Rinke (2013), who gives some first hints about 
relevant factors for predicting deliberative qualities. Rinke uses the overall constitution 
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of a country’s political structure to predict the deliberative quality of justification in 
broadcasting news in Germany, the US, and Russia. Rinke, drawing on considerations 
about political systems by Lijphart (2012) and Merkel (2004). With his study, Rinke 
shows the overlapping influences of political context and organizational context factors. 
His considerations also help to further understand characteristics of the American and 
German systems as a majoritarian and a consensus democracy. For my own study, as I 
include Brazil into the comparison, it is important to highlight aspects in which the 
Brazilian case deviates in various ways.   
In the sample of this study, Brazil and the US technically belong to majoritarian systems 
with presidential rule. However, there is one significant difference between both 
systems concerning their party systems. Brazil has a highly fragmented multi-party 
system (Vaz de Melo, Pedro O. S. & Xia, 2015) whose proportional electoral system is 
likely to produce a two-digit number of parties represented in the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies (Mainwaring, 1991). This is a significant difference from the US 
with its two-party system and majoritarian electoral system. In Brazil, it is very unlikely 
that the president’s party also holds the majority of seats in the parliament (Mainwaring, 
1999). To be able to govern the country, Brazilian presidents include several parties in 
their cabinets, forming government coalitions to gain support for their political agendas 
(Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000). At the same time, parties only play a marginal role in 
the legislative realm, and the highly personalized electoral system produces autonomous 
representatives who do not feel particularly obligated to their parties (Albarracín, 2016). 
These are also important differences to the German system as a consensus system as 
well as to the US system as a majoritarian system. While the multiparty system 
resembles the German system, the German party system nevertheless is overall more 
institutionalized, more influential in the legislative process, and more stable than the 
Brazilian one. This already shows that it is difficult to easily apply Lijphart’s (2012) 
classification on the Brazilian case.  
The Brazilian democracy is still young. After gaining its independence in 1822, Brazil 
suffered through several military and authoritarian regimes throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. It established a republican democracy in 1988 (Marques de 
Melo, José, 2008). The transition towards the democratic system processed “gradually 
and unevenly” with significant failings from which the country still suffers (Friedman & 
Hochstetler, 2002). According to Albuquerque (2013), Brazil is an example of a 
competitive and unstable political culture, with its weak and fragmented party system 
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that is highly polarized at the elite level. The unstable constitution also affects the 
relationship between media and politics which Albuquerque (2013, p. 752) 
characterizes as missing a clear line in supporting government or opposition: “Instead, 
the most important media organizations often claim to be the true representatives of 
public opinion and use this claim to vindicate their right to play a leading role vis-a-vis 
the political institutions.” 
Brazil’s society is marked by high levels of inequality (Nederveen Pieterse & Cardoso, 
2013). Having experienced a history of slavery during which plantation owners 
possessed vast amounts of property, it still has an economic structure that concentrates 
the wealth within the hands of a few (ibid.). Poverty, inequality, and social exclusion 
(e.g., of the landless, indigenous, and people of color) are therefore important issues for 
the Brazilian civil society (Scherer-Warren, 2013). In its unstable democratic 
environment, Brazil’s civil society experienced “progress and regression” (Friedman 
& Hochstetler, 2002, p. 26). During the final years of the military dictatorship, civil 
society slowly emerged, demanding citizen rights and democracy and trying to 
overcome the long-lasting tradition of clientelism and patrimonial politics (Wampler & 
Avritzer, 2004). After the Constitutional Assembly of 1988, organized interests were 
even more able to progressively influence legislative politics (Boschi, 2016). Market-
oriented reforms in the following years also strengthened private lobbying structures, 
but at the same time allowed to define norms for private-state relationships, which let 
corporatism develop (ibid.).  
One of the central demands from the Workers Party (PT) when it was first elected to 
parliament was the constitution of popular councils to which civil society organizations 
were invited to take part in policymaking and budget planning (Friedman and 
Hochstetler, 2002). The creation of such forums was one of the prioritized actions after 
the election of Lula da Silva (Boschi, 2016). This form of institutionalized participation 
persists in several municipalities, and civil society organizations play a vital role in it 
(Friedman and Hochstetler, 2002). Beyond such institutionalized participation, non-
governmental organizations have also become an important mobilizing structure for 
civil society in Brazil (ibid.). Furthermore, trade unions have gained influence during 
the last years (Boschi, 2016). Against this background, the current state-society 
relations in Brazil are reminiscent of the democratic corporatism that is more typical for 
consensus democracies than for majoritarian democracies (Lijphart, 2012).  
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It is important to reiterate that the events investigated in this study are not bound to the 
national level. Especially during climate change conferences, the initial position of 
journalists from around the world is quite similar. Differences in the countries’ political 
orders may carry less weight than during more typical routines of reporting. During the 
conferences, all journalists are confronted with strong non-governmental organizations 
and civil society voices that seek representation, so that it is possibly more a question of 
habituation to include such voices into the news. The context knowledge about the 
political systems gained in this section should nevertheless be helpful when trying to 
assess deliberative characteristics of each country in the next section, which is 
concerned with bringing together the background information on journalism culture and 
tradition, media systems, and political systems in order to arrive at hypotheses for the 
empirical analysis.  
5.4 (Political) Climate Change Context 
Lastly, it is worthwhile to regard the countries’ roles within the global climate change 
process for gaining comprehensive background knowledge about the three countries in 
this study to find explanations for the actual constitution of the media coverage on 
climate change,. 
For Brazil, much is at stake today. The country faces the impacts of climate change to a 
growing degree, which can also be gleaned from the development of its ranking on the 
scale of the Global Climate Risk Index (Kreft et al., 2016), which calculates the 
vulnerability of countries to climate change. In the twenty-years period from 1995 to 
2014, Brazil on average occupied rank 82 on this. Compared to the two other countries 
in the sample, this indicates a low risk (with Germany ranked 18th and the US ranked 
25th). However, during the last years, the risk seems to increase, as Brazil has moved up 
the risk ladder to rank 36 in 2013 and rank 21 in 2014.  
At the same time, balancing climate change and economic development has long been 
difficult for Brazil. Especially preserving the Amazonas rain forest for the sake of 
fighting global climate change conflicts with the country’s economic purposes. In 2005, 
the Brazilian government reported that one-fifth of the Amazon rain forest has been 
cleared by deforestation (d’Essen, 2010). Since then, an effort has been made to restrict 
illegal logging. Still, the country has not joined the UN REDD-program (United Nations 
Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries), but in 2007, Brazil had submitted a proposal to 
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the UNFCCC fora voluntary mechanism to compensate developing countries that 
demonstrate reductions in deforestation rates, which was later implemented nationally 
with the launch of the Amazon Fund in 2008, which is financially supported by other 
countries, such as Norway and Germany (The REDD Countries Database, 2010).  
Together with the group of so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China), Brazil represents the position that climate change is mostly the responsibility of 
the developed world, which is why it would be unfair to restrict economic development 
for the emerging and developing countries before they are able to reach a standard of 
living like fully industrialized countries. The group therefore demands financial 
responsibility to be taken by the developed countries and helping developing countries 
adapt to climate change with their technical assistance. This has produced a lot of 
controversy during the last years’ conferences, leading to harsh confrontations of the 
different interests (Hochstetler, & Milkoreit, 2015; Xi, 2011; Rong, 2010).  
Along with these efforts to promote the interests of the developing/ emerging countries 
there is a highly professionalized COP communication. Adolphsen (2014) investigated 
PR strategies of NGOs and several country delegations at COP15 in Cancun and found 
out that especially Brazil had applied an exceptionally visible PR mix, supported by two 
PR firms, which aimed at a comprehensive public outreach and the demonstration 
leadership with messaging reflecting an ambitious agenda.  
Climate change is still a contested issue in the US. The coal and gas lobby promotes 
initiatives that are supposed to spread uncertainty about the reliability of climate science 
in public discourse (e.g., Boykoff ,2012; Russel, 2010). Even though the US signed the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1998 under the Clinton Administration, the protocoll has never been 
ratified by the US senate and therefore did not achieve a binding status. President 
Barack Obama started his terms in office with ambitious climate change goals, the US 
joined the Paris Agreement in 2015. However, after President Donald Trump began his 
term in 2017, he soon announced the US withdrawal from the agreement, causing 
worldwide indignation. Meanwhile, in the ranking of the Global Climate Risk Index, the 
US steadily climbs upwards. Especially the monetary losses due to climate change 
related events are exceptionally high in the US. In 2015, the US occupied rank 1 in the 
category “Sum of losses in US$ in purchasing power parity (PPP)” (Kreft et al., 2016). 
This apparent urgency stands in a strong contrast to the dominant role that climate 
skeptics play in the US society. When it comes to summit communication during the 
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last years, the US seemed to pursue a rather agitated approach. Even though global 
interest in the actions of the US has been high (Do they ratify Kyoto? Do they sign a 
new treaty? Under what conditions?), communication at the conferences was rather low 
level, or as Adolphsen (2014) classified it for the Cancun conference, they pursue a 
traditional quiet media work, focusing on formal media briefings and informal media 
contacts with a low-key outreach work on-site at the country pavilion and no particular 
strategic objective or message.  
Germany has a longer ecological tradition and played a formative role in pushing the 
idea of the “Energiewende”. In the 1970s, social movements formed around issues of 
environmental protection and anti-nuclear power, resulting in the formation of the 
Green Party which pushed environmental issues in the political public debates and 
demanded the immediate end of the use of nuclear energy after their first election into 
the German national parliament. During their first government involvement with the 
Social Democratic Party in 1998 under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the nuclear power 
phase out was declared along with a range of other measures such as a law for the 
promotion of renewable energies (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG). In 2010, during 
the second term in office by Chancellor Angela Merkel, the phase out from the phase 
out was declared, but after the catastrophe in Fukushima less than a year later, the 
German parliament agreed on the ultimate termination of nuclear power. The necessary 
switch to renewable energies is hardly contested under democratic parties in Germany 
today, although the pace and concrete measures are still up for constant discussion. 
During the last years, the German role at climate change conferences therefore varied 
according to the government in charge. There have especially been situations where 
Ministers of Economics impeded the work of Ministers for Environment (e.g. Philip 
Röslers rejection of the increase of EU emission reduction goals in Doha 20128, or 
Sigmar Gabriel’s refusing to give his approval to a climate protection plan of the 
Ministry for the Environment in 20169), which shows that balancing economic and 
ecological interests is not a matter of course in Germany either. By and large, Germany 
gradually lost its image as pioneer in questions of implementing renewable energies, 
                                                            
8 https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/vor-der-klimakonferenz-roeslers-blockade-ist-
absurd/7433716-2.html 
9 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/gabriel-verweigert-klimaschutzplan-die-zustimmung-
14519466.html 
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due to the lack of ambition to set and follow high standards10. During the conferences, 
Germany pursued a rather traditional communication approach, too, that is less actively 
outreaching (Adolphsen, 2014). Being a member of the EU, the summit communication 
of Germany cannot be regarded separately, but the EU also discovered that leadership is 
hard to claim in a situation between strong veto powers such as the US and China. 
Bäckstrand and Elgström (2013) argue that the EU had to redefined its role after the 
failure of Copenhagen and it has tried to act more of a mediator in the years afterwards, 
becoming a “‘leadiator’, a leader-cum-mediator”, as the authors express it.  
5.5 Hypotheses 
After having provided context information about journalistic traditions, the political 
system, as well as the media system, and the respective role in the climate change 
process of the three countries of interest, it is possible to further specify some of the 
original research questions that guide the analysis, by adding hypotheses to detect 
directional relations. First, from journalistic traditions as well as different systemic 
contexts, we can be sure to expect different levels of narrativity as well as different 
levels of deliberative quality in the three countries. The basic assumption for the 
empirical analysis certainly is that narrative journalism is not automatically of high 
deliberative quality but that certain circumstances such as the journalistic tradition, role 
perception and political and economic factors will make narrative news more or less 
likely to facilitate deliberative quality.  
From what we have learned about journalistic tradition and professionalism I would 
expect the US to have the lowest degree of narrativity in coverage since the idea of 
“objective” reporting remains strong in the US, even though commercialization and 
economic pressure foster developments in which narrative forms find their way into the 
coverage more and more (e.g., Benson, 2009), followed by Germany which has a more 
vital narrative tradition (especially on the political left) but is also oriented towards the 
Western model of journalism which was especially promoted after 1945. That the ideal 
exerts influence also becomes obvious when looking at journalistic roles in which the 
“detached observer” is most dominant (and even more common than in the US). I would 
then expect the highest degree of narrativity in the Brazilian coverage, since the 
attempts to enforce the American model of journalism resulted in mixed forms (and a 
                                                            
10 http://www.handelsblatt.com/my/meinung/kommentare/klimakonferenz-gastgeber-deutschland-vom-
vorreiter-zum-schmuddelkind/20589068.html?ticket=ST-2261828-0AzDf7GPn9Bx4fdPCaa1-ap1 
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greater diversity of journalistic role perceptions) that still hold on to traditional narrative 
journalism. Beyond that, the Brazilian press market generally is much weaker, and 
broadcasting dominates the media landscape, which could also have an impact on 
newspapers if they try to orient themselves towards reporting forms that resemble the 
more sequential style of television, for example.  
H1: The US coverage will display the lowest degree of narrativity, followed by 
Germany and Brazil. 
It is difficult to make precise predictions on the content of the stories that may be told 
about climate change in the news coverage. I would expect story types to emerge that 
are more neutral and unexcited in the US and Germany, first of all because this would 
resemble the ‘objectivity’ criterion of the Western journalism model but also because 
both countries, as developed countries, are less dependent on the outcome of the climate 
change conferences than Brazil, which is an emerging country that is heavily affected 
by climate change and less able to help itself in light of its development status. 
Dominant stories in Germany and the US probably highlight the political normality as 
sort of habituation rather than the urgency of the cause.    
H2: Dominant stories told in the coverage resemble the political role of a country 
within climate change and climate politics processes.  
I would also expect that narrative roles that are used and assigned to actors are very 
closely connected to the cultural or political context of a country, as well as the political 
situation of a country or even its position in the negotiations at the conferences. It 
probably reflects a certain country centrism when cultural resonance is constructed 
through these roles by using actors that are well known to a particular audience, 
somehow reflecting the own country’s role in the global political structures.  
H3: The use of narrative roles in news reporting reflect a country’s position and 
relations to other actors in the political processes.  
Before trying to predict the relationship between narrative elements and deliberative 
qualities, I try to come to some conclusions about what to expect at the deliberative 
level in general in the three countries. Concerning the inclusiveness of debates, the level 
of corporatism can affect the inclusion of actors in the public debates, as was shown by 
Ferree et al. (2002b). Since the interest group system of majoritarian democracies is 
characterized more by a “competitive and uncoordinated pluralism of independent 
groups in contrast with the coordinated and compromise-oriented system of corporatism 
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that is typical for the consensus model” (Lijphart 2012, p. 171) the representation of this 
pluralism in the public debate more likely occurs in the US than in Germany (Ferree, 
Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002b). I would expect similar trends in this study in the 
US and Germany when it comes to inclusion of actors in general and actors from the 
political periphery in particular. 
In addition, the German newspapers follow ideological lines more explicitly than the 
newspapers in Brazil or the US, which can  also result in a more restricted internal 
pluralism when it comes to the representation of actors. To assess the Brazilian case is 
nevertheless rather difficult. Since it resembles Germany’s multiparty system and its 
tendencies of democratic corporatism, one could expect both cases to be somehow 
similar at the level of inclusion. But since the party system is less institutionalized, more 
fragmented, and less stable in Brazil, the degree of coordination might still be lower, 
resulting in a stronger tendency of civil society actors to seek direct media 
representation. At the same time, Brazilian media tend to distance themselves from 
political interests of any kind and rather present their own voice (or a perceived voice of 
the people), which could also lead to a more restricted actor inclusiveness. I would also 
expect that the idea of inclusion functions very similarly. The more different actors are 
represented, the more different ideas find their way into the coverage. But again, the 
Brazilian case is more difficult to assess, especially since the practice of censorship by 
the state is still a problem that can also lead to self-censorship by journalists, which 
could result in a smaller spectrum of ideas presented in the coverage. 
Concerning the number of opposing arguments, different influences may be expected. I 
would expect the highest amount of opposing arguments in the US, on the one hand 
because the tendency to report on “two sides of an issue” is deeply rooted in the US 
journalistic tradition, but also because the polarized political sphere is more vitally 
represented in the media debate there. I would expect a lower number of opposing 
arguments in Germany, since the consensus on climate change is generally higher, the 
tendency to depict different sides of a story less pronounced, and the corporatist system 
probably tends to less contestation. In Brazil, at first sight, one would probably expect a 
similar tendency as in Germany. Not much contestation around the issue of climate 
change due to the urgency that it has for the country, in combination with a corporatist 
system, will probably result in a medium level of directly opposing arguments. 
However, since parties are rather weak and the president rather strong in Brazil (while 
parties are strong in Germany, where I would expect opposing arguments especially 
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from the parliamentary opposition), one could also presume that there are less opposing 
arguments in the debate. We have also learned about the Brazilian media that there is a 
tendency of representing themselves as the true advocates of public opinion, which 
could also result in less opposing arguments.  
Lastly, concerning the outcome orientation, there are few clues that would support an 
argumentation for or against more or less outcome orientation in a country. To a certain 
degree, the displayed outcome orientation is surely dependent on the actual outcome of 
political decisions during the COPs. However, these decisions might be interpreted 
differently according to a political evaluation, whether or not they will be fitting to 
solve the problem.  In this sense, the displayed outcome orientation in the media 
coverage, and whether conflicts are perceived as being fixed or not, will probably vary 
with COP outcomes that are in favor of the disadvantage of a country.  
Predicting the relationship between narrative elements and deliberative qualities needs 
some further consideration, since several context variables have to be taken into 
account. First of all and very generally, I would not expect that there is a relationship 
between narrativity and the deliberative qualities across countries, for example in the 
sense that narrative news texts are in general more inclusive towards actors or ideas or 
express more or less opposing arguments. Instead, I expect the difference between 
narrative and non-narrative coverage to be smaller when the deliberative quality is 
higher in the coverage of one country, so that the deliberative qualities do not differ 
significantly between narrative and non-narrative news texts. In an environment with a 
generally higher deliberative quality, it might be less common to include alternative 
forms of writing to introduce alternative actors and ideas when the inclusion of a wide 
range of actors and ideas is an ideal.  
H4: The higher the general level of deliberative quality of the news coverage in a 
country, the smaller the difference in deliberativeness between articles with a lower and 
higher degree of narrativity.  
I would expect the US to have a generally high level of inclusion of civil society actors, 
as was, for example, already investigated by Ferree et al. (2002b), who showed that the 
American debate on abortion was more inclusive than the German debate, especially 
because it was more willing to cover civil society and ordinary citizens. Therefore, I 
would not expect that this high level is much influenced by the difference of higher or 
lower degrees of narrativity. Beyond that, the American journalism model favors 
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representations that include different sides of a story; therefore, I would also expect that 
the number of idea elements is generally higher and that especially the number of 
opposing arguments within one article is higher than in Germany and Brazil and also 
less influenced by narrative writing. In these two countries, I would expect that the 
difference in the deliberative quality between narrative writing and non-narrative 
writing is higher. While especially inclusivity of actors from the periphery seems to be 
connected to the political system, and since Germany and Brazil are both multi-party 
systems, their levels of inclusiveness in general are probably lower than in the US, since 
the organized pluralism of multi-party systems canalize interests which are brought 
forward by representatives. However, narrativity might have a bigger influence on the 
inclusivity if the assumption is right that alternative actors and ideas are more likely to 
be included in narrative news writing. If this argument, that alternative views are more 
easily included in narrative forms of news writing, is transferred to the aspect of the 
outcome orientation, then I would expect a higher diversity of evaluations of the 
outcome in narrative writing than in non-narrative writing.  
As elaborated above, I expect the general level of narrativity to be especially high in 
Brazil. The question that will need special attention in the following is whether or not 
this has consequences for the difference of deliberative quality between coverage with 
high or low degrees of narrativity. If narrative writing is more likely to be the norm than 
the exception, the likelyhood that alternative ideas, actors, and outcome interpretations 
find their way into news coverage through narrative writing might also be smaller. 
Beyond regarding deliberative qualities in different degrees of narrativity, I will also try 
to assess the quality of different stories that are told in the news coverage. As stated 
above, I expect certain dominant story types in each country. The question is whether 
these dominant story types are of more or less deliberative quality than less dominant or 
even alternative story types. In the cases of Germany and the US, where I expect rather 
unexcited stories that emphasize the recurrence of the events as dominant story types, 
the focus is probably put more on the political center and the progress of the 
negotiations with a limited number of ideas discussed at a certain point. In these two 
cases, I would expect higher levels of deliberative quality, especially actor inclusivity, 
and a wider range of ideas in story types that are less common. Those might also be 
used to display alternative views to the dominant narrative. In Brazil, again, this is more 
difficult to predict. Here it may be that the most dominant story type is also the one with 
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the highest level of deliberative quality, if it reflects the urgent situation for Brazil and 
the full range of aspects of the issue.  
H5: In Germany and the US, dominant story types have a lower deliberative quality 
compared to less common/ alternative story types, while in Brazil the most dominant 
story type is expected to be the one with higher deliberative quality.  
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6 Research Design 
The challenge of this project is to analyze narrative elements and structures in non-
fictional newspaper coverage from a quantitative and comparative perspective. This 
undertaking needs detailed elaboration since it is rather uncommon.  
The dissertation project was embedded in a wider research project titled “Sustainable 
media events? Production and discursive effects of staged global political media events 
in the area of climate change.” Aiming at investigating the production of global staged 
media events such as the UN climate change conferences and their impact on national 
media debates in different countries, the project consisted of two main parts: on the one 
hand, production structures were observed right at the scene, and journalists and 
communication professionals from NGOs and country delegations were interviewed 
onsite, at the climate change conferences in Cancún (Mexico) in 2010, Doha (Qatar) in 
2012, Warsaw (Poland) in 2013 and Paris (France) in 2015; on the other side, the media 
coverage in different countries was analyzed with a quantitative comparative content 
analysis to ultimately connect production structures and national media debates.  
For the media sample, nationally distributed and widely-read daily newspapers were 
selected from Brazil (Folha de São Paulo, O Globo)11, Germany (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)12, and the United States of America (The New York 
Times, The Washington Post)13. The project focused on daily print newspapers as 
quality opinion-leading papers that devoted constant attention to the topic of climate 
                                                            
11 According to data from 2013 the two Brazilian newspapers of this sample Folha de S. Paulo and O 
Globo have an average paid circulation of 294,811 copies for the former and 267,542 for the latter. Folha 
de S. Paulo is therefore the second most sold newspaper, O Globo the third after the tabloid newspaper 
Super Notícia with an average paid circulation of 302,472 (Associação Nacional de Jornais. (n.d.). 
Leading newspapers in Brazil in 2013, by average paid circulation. In Statista - The Statistics Portal. 
(Retrieved July 21, 2015), from http://www.statista.com/statistics/261629/leading-newspapers-in-brazil-
by-circulation/.) 
12 According to recent data conducted by the Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung und Verbreitung 
von Werbeträgern e.V. (IVW), the Süddeutsche Zeitung has a daily print circulation of 382,000 (second 
highest circulation in Germany). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has a daily print circulation of 253,000 
copies (third highest circulation in Germany), for more information see: IVW. (2016). Verkaufte Auflage 
der überregionalen Tageszeitungen in Deutschland im 1. Quartal 2016. In Statista - Das Statistik-Portal. 
Von http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/73448/umfrage/auflage-der-ueberregionalen-
tageszeitungen/  (Retrieved June 27, 2016) 
13 According to its own indications, the New York Times currently has a daily print circulation of 
590,000. Digital-only subscriptions add another 1.2 million to the overall circulation rate 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/business/media/new-york-times-co-q1-earnings.html). According 
to data from 2014, the Washington Post has a daily overall circulation (print and online) of about 400.000 
copies (http://www.statista.com/statistics/193818/average-paid-circulation-of-the-washington-post/). Both 
newspapers are within the top 10 of the most widely read newspapers in the USA 
(http://auditedmedia.com/news/blog/top-25-us-newspapers-for-march-2013.aspx). (Retrieved June 27, 
2016) 
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change during the climate change conferences. These newspapers are widely read by 
political and business elites as well as by journalists in their respective countries. Since 
the form and structure of a daily newspaper is quite consistent across countries, cross-
national comparability of media content largely undiluted by differences in medium-
specific forms of presentation could also be ensured. The project purposely focuses on 
daily newspapers, although there are other print media which, at first sight, seem more 
suitable for analyzing narrativity in current-affairs news writing. For example, weekly 
newspapers such as ‘Die Zeit’ or news magazines such as ‘Der Spiegel’ in Germany 
publish investigative articles which deviate much more from the conventional news 
writing style and use more diverse styles for their reporting. However, in the end, 
several factors spoke for the choice of daily newspapers. First, this research tries to 
contribute to a discussion about news quality in times of economic pressure and 
declining circulation due to a growing competition in the overall media landscape and 
especially of web-based content. Narrative news within the traditional news context is 
viewed ambiguously in this development. In order to contribute to further clarification 
about the role of narrative news writing in a conventional news environment, it seemed 
logical to concentrate on daily newspapers. The chosen newspapers are also more easily 
comparable. They have a similar status and relevance in the public discourse of the 
countries, which is more difficult to assess for news magazines and weekly newspapers. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of this project, weekly newspapers and magazines were 
also collected, to include their coverage into the analysis (Stern, Der Spiegel, and Die 
Zeit for Germany, Epoca and Veja for Brazil as well as Newsweek, Time Magazine, 
and The Week for the US). However, it soon turned out that the daily newspapers of the 
three countries devote similar amounts of their coverage on the issues of climate change 
and climate politics during the annual climate change conferences, which are the object 
of investigation in this study, and therefore provided a comparable and sufficient data 
base for the investigation. The coverage of the weekly newspapers and magazines was 
far less extensive and did not provide an adequate amount of coverage that would 
produce meaningful results within a quantitative content analysis.  
The sampling periods comprised November 22 to December 19, 2010 for the climate 
change conference in Cancún, Mexico (COP 16), November 28 to December 14, 2011 
for Durban, South Africa (COP 17), November 19 to December 4, 2012 for Doha, Qatar 
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(COP 18), and 4 November to 30 November 2013 for Warsaw, Poland (COP 19)14. The 
complete media sample contained 900 articles15. The main unit of analysis is the single 
article, which was coded for formal categories and for narrative characteristics16.  
Three dimensions were the focus of the quantitative content analysis: the textual 
framing, the visual framing, and the narrative structures17. The complete coding scheme 
with reliability test values for all variables and in-country comparison was described in 
detail in Wozniak, Lück and Wessler (2014). The original idea to investigate narratives 
was driven by the hypothesis that through narrative elements newsmakers would 
construct cultural resonance and bind the transnational events of climate change and the 
climate change conferences to national audiences. This thought is further elaborated and 
empirically investigated in Lück, Wessler and Wozniak (2016). Since this dissertation 
focuses on the specific nature of narrative news coverage in different countries and the 
deliberative quality of such news, the following section will go into detail on the 
operationalization of the relevant concepts.  
6.1 The Case: Climate Change (Conferences) 
The case to which this study of deliberative qualities in narrative news coverage is 
applied has (at least) two sides: a scientific and a political one. Climate change is, first 
                                                            
14 For digitally available newspapers, the following search string was used: (climate change OR global 
warming OR Durban OR Doha OR greenhouse effect OR Kyoto Protocol OR Climate summit OR 
Climate conference OR Climate talks OR Climate politics OR Climate science). Non-digital paper 
editions were scanned manually by looking for articles that featured any of the search words in their 
headlines or lead paragraphs. 
15 This sample therefore has to be considered as an event-based full sample rather than a random sample. 
This has certain implications for the analyses of this study, especially with regard to significance testing. 
There is a debate about the meaningfulness of significance testing when a full sample could be conducted 
instead of a random sample (e.g., Behnke, 2005; Broscheid & Geschwend, 2005). Strictly speaking, there 
is no inference on a general population which could be drawn, and it therefore would not be meaningful 
to report statistical significance that expresses the probability of an event in the sample to also occur 
beyond that sample. However, Behnke (2005), argues that even full samples can somehow be seen as 
random samples of all possible realities that were likely to happen in the first place. If one wants to make 
claims about causal mechanisms in that one reality (which has occurred in a particular time and space), 
asking whether the observed events occurred more frequently than random, statistical significance tests 
can offer additional information that go beyond the mere description. This is, however, a different 
interpretation than the original notion of significance testing that aims at clarifying whether an event is 
likely to occur in the basic population. Values for the significance of effects in full samples therefore need 
a careful interpretation about whether the observed effect is likely to be more than a coincidence. In the 
result section of this study, I will therefore report significance tests as a support for interpreting effects 
and their relevance, especially when rather causal mechanisms are assumed. However, in many cases, the 
actual effect sizes and numerical differences (e.g., in the means of values) are more meaningful, which is 
why I will mainly concentrate on interpreting those.           
16 Narrative elements were not coded for interview articles that were published in a question-and-answer 
style. Therefore, the narrative sample only includes n=870 articles.  
17The complete codebook is available at http://climate.uni-mannheim.de/ 
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of all, a highly complex and abstract scientific phenomenon and what Cox (2006, p. 
170) calls an “unobtrusive event […] remote from one's personal experience.” Even 
though the world has experienced more extreme weather events over the last years, the 
actual rise of the average earth temperature that is made responsible for those events 
cannot be directly perceived by individuals. The connection between the rising CO2 
level, rising temperatures, and growing numbers of extreme weather events has to be 
evaluated by scientific and political experts. Climate change can be measured, e.g., 
regarding the amount of rainfall or glacial melting. But how this data is interpreted is 
not only a scientific issue but also a social process during which knowledge is produced 
communicatively, which in turn serves as a foundation for perception and (political) 
action.  
Climate change is a problem of global historical scale and it is also a highly political 
and normative issue, especially when it comes to questions of justice and equity, since 
those who have a large responsibility for causing climate change (e.g., energy-intensive 
industries in the Western developed countries) are not as much affected as the Global 
South, where it is much harder to adapt to climate change. Those who are directly 
involved in the struggles against the effects of climate change have less power to 
enforce action against it. Besides normative considerations, there is also a need for 
concrete political solutions and actions that follow from them—though there cannot be 
only one solution that fits the problem, since the causes and effects of climate change 
are diverse. The Climate Change Conference (Conferences of the Parties – COPs) held 
annually under the auspices of the United Nations Frame Convention of Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) has become an important institution and the global platform on 
which the debates on all these aspects take place, visible for the global community. 
Kunelius and Eide (2012) emphasize the relevance of the conferences and point to the 
role that they can play for journalism research:  
The summits have become an intensive (and exceptional) example of a global 
mediatized political event where an enormous amount of knowledge production, 
economic lobbying, civic activism, and bargaining gravitate around potentially 
consequential political decision making. The summits force different kinds of actors 
and forms of knowledge into a compressed time–space, providing an opportunity for 
researching climate-change politics and claims of social and political theory in 
general—and climate journalism in particular. (Kunelius& Eide, 2012, p. 267–268) 
Hence, the COPs are exceptional examples for international political events in several 
ways that make a good case for the undertaking of this study which will focus on 
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narrativity and deliberation in the newspaper coverage about these conferences. Since 
the conferences exhibit a unique combination of different event features (Lück, 
Wozniak, & Wessler, 2015), they shape the circumstances under which actors operate 
onsite in specific ways that need to be taken into account. They are, first of all, a forum 
for political negotiations that do not exclude civil society actors as much as many other 
international summits. Therefore, the events are also always an important date in the 
year for popular mobilization of civil society and non-governmental organizations from 
the global environmental movement. The conferences also serve as specialized 
conventions in which stakeholders and experts present themselves and exchange 
knowledge. Consequently, a broad range of different viewpoint brought into the debate 
by a great variety of different actors would possibly be also included into the mediated 
debate. For the purpose of this study, the context of these globally accessible events 
offers a good case and allows to identify general features of news coverage as well as 
cultural particularities in divergent contexts (e.g., Krøvel, 2011; Kunelius & Eide, 2012) 
in order to identify mechanisms and find explanations for a certain combination of the 
use of narratives and their deliberative qualities.  
Climate change, the conferences, and their media coverage have been investigated 
before in empirical research. Eide and Kunelius (2010), for example, concentrated on 
the conferences in Bali (2007) and Copenhagen (2009). They point out that the 
communicative focus during these conferences was mainly on climate politics instead of 
climate change itself. Gunster (2011) even calls the conferences “a political drama”.  
For the COP 15 in Copenhagen, Kunelius and Eide (2010) analyzed which actors were 
quoted in the news coverage. Their sample comprised eighteen countries from which 
they included two newspapers respectively. Across all countries, actors from national 
political systems where represented the most with 38 percent of the quotes, followed by 
civil society actors (28 percent), science experts (14 percent) and actors from the 
transnational political system (10 percent) and business actors (5 percent). These 
numbers give an overview about the types of actors involved in the process, although 
countries differ from these mean values a lot, as the authors also show.  In the course of 
their framing analysis, the authors also regarded the attribution of responsibilities to 
different actors, using victim, villain and hero ascription. Across countries, they identify 
a “shift of blame” from the Bali to the Copenhagen conference. While the US were 
assigned the villain role in Bali, many countries blamed China for the weak outcome of 
the conference. When it comes to the victim perspective, Eide und Kunelius identify a 
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clear North-South distinction. Coverage in developed countries tended to “blame the 
victims” by shifting the blame for the failure from the hosts (Denmark) to the G77 
countries along with China. Coverage in countries from the Global South, on the other 
hand, expressed more solidarity with those countries who spoke on behalf of the G77 
group. When looking at the role of the assigned hero, the authors identify strong trends 
of domestication, since there are several cases (China, US, Germany and South Africa 
are named as examples) that show how countries’ political leaders are depicted as 
leading figures in central roles for the negotiations. While understanding the ascription 
of the roles as a framing device, these results by Eide and Kunelius nevertheless give 
some hints on the extent to which the perspective on central actors differs between 
countries, producing specific narratives about the conference. 
Krøvel (2011), however, took a closer look at the narratives in news coverage on the 
Bali conference and identified a great uniformity in its global media coverage. His 
qualitative study included print and TV coverage from North and South America, 
Africa, Asia and Europe and focused on framing, and especially on how the roles of the 
“protagonists” and “opponents” were constructed in the coverage. He concludes that the 
journalistic repertoire when it comes to the narratives that appear in the coverage is 
relatively limited. He points to one major narrative that sees the US as an opponent and 
that sees “small and relatively poor country standing up to the only remaining 
superpower” (p. 96). The dominant narrative about the Bali COP according to Krøvel 
therefore is a classical win vs. lose narrative which is problematic for the author because 
“by focusing on who is winning, the communication systematically makes important 
information on the consequences of climate change invisible” (p. 100). These results by 
Krøvel (2011) as well as Eide and Kunelius (2010) demonstrate that an engagement in 
the analysis of the narratives told about the conferences can reveal power structures as 
well as national and inter-/transnational tendencies in the perspectives chosen for the 
reporting. However, it also demonstrates that narratives can differ depending on the 
COP and the events taking place at the conference. It is therefore important to note 
again, that COP 15 in Copenhagen was a particularly significant event in the history of 
UN climate change conferences: “COP15, held in Copenhagen in 2009, was supposed 
to see an agreement on a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to span the 
period from 2013 to 2020. This agreement failed to materialize, and the extremely high 
expectations raised in the run-up to COP15 crumbled.” (Wessler, Lück & Wozniak, 
2017). The following COPs in Cancun (COP16), Durban (COP17), Doha (COP18), 
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Warsaw (COP19) and Lima (COP20) were therefore perceived as so called “transitional 
COPs”, which were accompanied by lower expectations and a return to questions, for 
example, on how a new binding treaty can be reached at all or how reliable 
measurement of the impact of climate change measures could be installed to the general 
satisfaction of all parties. The COPs 16 to 19 finally let to COP21 in Paris and the 
achievement of the “Paris Agreement”: 
The “Paris Agreement” for the first time specifies binding reduction targets for all 
countries based on “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs). 
Governments worldwide have agreed to the aim of keeping the global temperature 
increase to well below 2 degrees Celsius, preferably to 1.5 degrees, as compared to 
pre-industrial times. (Wessler, Lück & Wozniak, 2017) 
The study at hand will concentrate on the analysis of the transitional COPs from Cancun 
to Warsaw. This brings the advantage of a higher comparability since none of these 
conferences were out of the ordinary in ways that the Copenhagen and Paris conferences 
were. Though they are exceptional events overall, the conferences of this study 
represent a period of routine and should therefore also reveal routine mechanisms in the 
production of media coverage and messages. Within the overarching project that this 
dissertation partakes in, we could already gain some insights about the media coverage 
on these conferences. For example, analyzing the framing of text and images in 
newspaper articles from Brazil, Germany, India, South Africa, and the United States, we 
identified four overarching multimodal frames (using a subset of photo-illustrated 
articles (n = 432) as well as the entire conference coverage (n = 1,311)): global warming 
victims, civil society demands, political negotiations, and sustainable energy frames. 
We could also show that the distribution of these global frames across the five countries 
is relatively similar. A comparison of frames emerging from the national subsets further 
reveals a strong element of cross-national frame convergence (Wessler, Wozniak, 
Hofer, & Lück, 2016). In the actor study that conducted interviews at the conferences, 
we also gained deep insights into how media message production between the different 
actors at the conferences proceeds. What we call “co-production” refers to the process 
of close contact between journalists and communication professionals from NGOs and 
delegations. However, we could reveal relevant differences in the relationships, for 
example, according to the professional background of the journalists (the media they 
work for or the beat) or regarding the focus journalists lay on the contact to actors from 
their national context (Lück, Wozniak, & Wessler, 2015; Lück, Wessler, Wozniak, and 
Maia, 2018).  
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This dissertation aims at adding to the picture and the understanding of the 
communicative processes of the climate change conferences. By closely looking at the 
three countries Brazil, Germany and the US in particular, I hope to offer more 
comprehensive insights into how the events induce media coverage in national contexts 
and what kind of similarities and differences can be identified and why.   
6.2 Narrative Concepts 
There are a few studies (Viehöver, 2011), 2012; Schwarze, 2006; Smith, 2012; Krøvel, 
2011; Spoel, Goforth, Cheu, & Pearson, 2008) that have investigated narratives of 
climate change. These are an important foundation for the implementation of 
quantitative measures of narrativity in the coding scheme. Ultimately, narration was 
measured on three dimensions: (a) the degree of narrativity, which consisted of an 
index from main narrative characteristics of a news story; (b) the story type, based on 
ideas about the narrative genres in which stories can be written; and (c) the presence of 
agents assuming specific narrative roles. All narrative variables were coded on the 
article level.  
Degree of narrativity 
Measuring the degree of narrativity helps to differentiate narrative news stories from 
conventional news stories. Narrativity in this sense is understood as a rather formal 
concept based on certain characteristics that are important for narratives. Glaser, 
Garsoffky, and Schwan (2009) introduce four main narrative characteristics that will 
also be basic elements for measuring the degree of narrativity in this study: (1) 
dramatization, referring to the traditional story structure with a beginning, middle, and 
end, in which at the beginning of the story the protagonists attempt to redress an 
imbalance; these attempts lead to complications, setbacks, crises, and ultimately to 
success or failure; (2) emotionalization, referring to the presentation of information in 
an emotional way; (3) personalization, meaning that narratives are always about agents, 
mostly humans, causing events; and (4) fictionalization, referring to the inclusion of 
fictional content (to varying degrees). 
To develop appropriate categories for a quantitative content analysis, some of these 
narrative characteristics had to be translated into reliably observable variables in order 
to measure the degree of narrativity. Emotionalization was therefore redefined as 
“emotion” and its presence was coded when the emotion of an actor is explicitly 
referred to in the news story. Personalization was renamed into “narrative 
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personalization” to avoid confusion with the established understanding of the concept 
of personalization in political communication studies (for an overview, see, van Aelst, 
Sheafer, & Stanyer, 2012). To fulfill the characteristic of narrative personalization the 
story needs to focus on agents (either individual, collective, or institutional actors) who 
either cause events or are affected by circumstances caused by other agents, systems, or 
nature. Acting or reacting agents must play a central role in the story. Their actions are 
essential for the story to be told in the first place, i.e., the actions are the decisive 
elements for the plot. The four final variables dramatization, emotion, narrative 
personalization, and fictionalization can be coded as present or not present in an article. 
All four variables were added to an index that is supposed to indicate the degree of 
narrativity. The more of these characteristics are enclosed in an article, the higher the 
article’s degree of narrativity. The index therefore has a range from ‘0 = no narrative 
characteristics (i.e. very low degree of narrativity)’ to ‘4 = all four narrative 
characteristics (i.e. very high degree of narrativity)’.  
Story Types 
Besides the formal characterization that measures the degree of narrativity I am also 
going to describe narratives used in non-fictional news coverage according to their 
content. Which stories are actually told about climate change and climate politics? The 
operationalization is orientated towards the concept of “genre clues” as described by 
Smith (2012) and Schwarze (2006). As described in more detail in section 2.3, both 
introduce specific genre catalogues, with which they characterize environmental stories. 
My own operationalization uses elements from these genre catalogues but does not aim 
at measuring the narrative genre holistically, but rather through the use of three distinct 
variables that correspond to certain genre properties: “overall theme”, “tone”, and 
“(expected) outcome.” In the operationalization of this study, the main characteristics of 
the genres named by Smith (2012) and Schwarze (2006) are translated into parameter 
values of the “overall theme” variable. The low mimetic genre corresponds to the 
variable value “everyday business”, the tragic/tragedy genre to “failure after struggle”, 
the romantic/comedy genre to “triumph over adversity”, the apocalyptic genre to 
“struggle over destiny of planet or civilization” and the genre melodrama to 
“(social/political) conflict”. 
Determining a story’s genre through the “tone of a story” is done by measuring the 
eponymous variable in which coders have to ascribe one of five different tones as being 
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dominant in a story: (1) fatalistic, (2) optimistic, (3) unexcited/neutral, (4) passionate, 
and (5) pessimistic. These tones also correspond to the narrative genres. A fatalistic tone 
would be a genre clue for the apocalyptic genre, the optimistic tone would be either for 
the comedy or the melodrama, the unexcited/neutral tone for the low mimetic genre, a 
passionate tone for the comedy or the melodrama, and the pessimistic tone for the 
tragedy.  
Finally, “(expected) outcome” is measured by coding whether a story's conflict is 
(expected to be) fixed or not (expected to be) fixed. Additionally, coders can ascribe the 
value “no conceivable outcome” to an article's story. Although this does not correspond 
to one of the genres, the pretests showed that some stories in articles do not involve a 
problem or conflict that needs a resolution but rather resemble a note on an event 
without actual conflict. 
Since news coverage is diverse, I would not expect to find the original genres in their 
pure forms only. Coding the three categories independently from each other allows to 
find country-specific mixtures and to characterize the stories that are told in more detail.  
Narrative Roles  
As we have seen, acting and reacting actors are fundamental for stories to be told. As a 
last narrative category, which is also supposed to shed more light on the stories that are 
actually told, character specifications are regarded more closely, with the aim of 
identifying classical narrative roles in the story: “victim”, “villain”, and “hero”. These 
roles were explicitly mentioned by Schwarze (2006) in combination with the 
melodrama genre. However, other genres can be characterized by such actor 
constellations too. It is, for example, necessary for the romantic or comedy genre—
marked by a triumph over adversity—to have a hero who solves the problem or ends the 
conflict. Every narrative role can be identified once in every news story and can be 
coded as present or not present. If a role was identified to be present, coders had to 
decide whether the particular role is assumed by an individual, collective, or 
institutional actor. The name or designation of the actor is also recorded in order to find 
out to whom in particular journalists would ascribe such roles. Finally, the type of 
action in which the narrative character engages is coded, since action is one of the 
fundamental characteristics of narrations. 
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6.3 Deliberative Concepts 
To assess the deliberative qualities of the news coverage, four main indicators will be in 
the center of the analysis: the inclusiveness of actors (and in particular of actors of the 
political periphery in comparison to actors from the political power center), the 
inclusiveness of ideas, the direct contrasting of opposing ideas within articles, and the 
outcome orientation. These are certainly not the only deliberative criteria. Others, such 
as dialogic form, justification of opinions, rebuttal of arguments from others, and 
civility and respect in the debate, are also core elements for the deliberative theory. 
However, since this project is one of the first attempts to assess the deliberative quality 
of news narratives in particular, I concentrate on the most basic deliberative elements. 
The concepts of narrativity and deliberation are both complex, and for reasons of clarity 
and practical manageability I will try to convey some basic ideas about the interrelation 
of both concepts. If it turns out to be feasible to apply these basic measures of 
deliberative quality, future research should go more into detail on more sophisticated 
deliberative qualities.   
Inclusiveness of actors 
To assess one of the main deliberative criteria, the inclusiveness of actors in the debate 
– understood as the process of giving voice to a variety of different actors (or actor 
types) - every direct and indirect statement made by a recognizable actor in the news 
coverage was coded. All in all, this statement data consisted of n = 4,002 cases. For 
each of these statements the name, the type (whether individual or collective), the 
origin, and the affiliation of the actor was coded. The latter distinguished between 
political actors from the national and international level (also international and 
transnational organizations and institutions), business actors, scientists, NGOs and NGO 
activists, journalists (also the author of an article), intellectuals, other celebrities, and 
ordinary citizens without further affiliation. To rate the level of inclusiveness of actors, 
it will be especially important to regard the share of statements made by actors from the 
so-called political periphery (representatives of civil society), compared to actors from 
the political center (representatives of formal-institutional politics).  
Inclusiveness of ideas 
The inclusiveness of ideas is supposed to rate the variety and diversity of different ideas 
about climate change as they appear in the coverage. As it is a basic principle of 
deliberation that participants in the debate should be able to consider all perspectives 
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and arguments, it is important that transparency about the range of different ideas is 
created in the first place.  
At the statement level, idea elements that were somehow concerned with the debate on 
climate change and climate politics were coded for their presence. Based on Entman’s 
(1993) differentiation of framing categories, idea elements were coded on three 
dimensions: problem definition (here: consequences of climate change, such as 
increases in temperature, melting ice/glaciers, etc.), identification of causes (e.g., 
greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation), and treatment recommendations (remedies, 
such as clean energy, financial assistance to disadvantaged countries etc.).18 Each of 
these categories consisted of multiple elements that could have been mentioned in an 
actor statement or not. Solutions could also be endorsed or rejected, which was coded as 
well. The idea elements were later aggregated on the article level by using dummy 
variables (0 = frame element absent in article, 1 = frame element present in article) so 
that they could be combined with the narrative data in the analysis. 
Opposing ideas 
In order to investigate the occurrence of truly competing arguments I look at directly 
opposing idea elements. Of course, ideas within an article can be competing even if they 
are not directly opposing one another. In the mediated competition for attention, an 
actor utters a statement that is concerned with a certain aspect, e.g., entails a certain 
interpretation of events or an idea for a solution, and another actor expresses his or her 
views without directly referring to the first or even knowing about the utterance of the 
first actor. In mediated discourse, journalists put these statements together to depict the 
two sides—and these sides do not necessarily have to be exclusive to one another. It is 
difficult to reconstruct whether an argument was meant to be an alternative to another 
argument in the respective case. However, in the list of idea elements that were coded 
for this study, there are arguments that directly oppose each other. If these appear 
together in an article, it is clear that the article contained truly opposing sides. At the 
dimension of consequences, these are the two arguments of whether climate change 
brings economic benefits or harms. At the dimension of causes, it is the question 
whether climate change is caused by natural processes or by the (human) use of fossil 
energy. Lastly, every solution could be coded as either mentioned or even endorsed or 
                                                            
18 The original codebook also contained the category “moral evaluation” which was supposed to record 
whether an actor explicitly denied or acknowledged climate change. Empirically, such statements could 
hardly be found in the coverage, which is why this category will not play a further role in the analysis.  
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rejected. The articles in which solutions are mentioned, endorsed, or rejected are also 
counted to contain opposing idea elements. 
Outcome orientation 
This category is a mixture of variables that have already played a role above. There are 
two main variables that need to be taken into account when assessing the outcome 
orientation. First, the outcome variable distinguishes whether there is any outcome 
displayed in the article (or no conceivable outcome at all) or whether a conflict actually 
exists and has been fixed (or anticipated to be fixed) or is not fixed (or anticipated not to 
be fixed).  
The other indicator of the outcome orientation is the inclusion of idea elements on the 
dimensions of solutions, which is also regarded explicitly in the analysis of the outcome 
orientation since it hints at attempts from actors to constructively solve the problems.  
6.4 Formal Categories 
A handful of formal categories were coded at the article level to identify and 
characterize the articles in the sample. These categories included the country, the 
medium, the title of the article, the climate change conference during which the article 
was published, the length of the article (number of words) as well as its date. Each 
article was given an article ID that allowed connecting actor statements and articles later 
in the process.  
6.5 Pretesting 
To test the instrument for the empirical analysis, a comprehensive pretest was 
conducted with all coders. In the process of pretesting, the codebook was continuously 
improved by group discussions and clarification decisions of the research team.   
The codebook was tested for intercoder reliability on the basis of newspaper articles 
about the UN climate change conferences in Durban (COP17) and Doha (COP18) that 
appeared in the complete sample of the project’s material of German, Indian, South 
African, and US newspapers (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine, The Times 
of India, The Hindu, Daily Sun, The Star, The New York Times, and The Washington 
Post).To select the pretest material from these newspapers, 50 randomly sampled issues 
from the coverage of COP17 were chosen first, which contained 53 news items on the 
topic. Additionally, 27 articles from the coverage of COP18 were sampled to ensure that 
20 news items could be pretested for each of the four countries and to ensure some 
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variety in the sampling base. Article-level measures were pretested on the resulting 80 
items19. Finally, 205 actor-statements, which were nested in the 80 original news items, 
were pretested for the statement variables that mainly contained the different idea 
elements. Six coders participated in coding the various subsets of the material. Since the 
coding team only included one Portuguese-speaking coder, the Brazilian media material 
was not part of the pretest. However, the Brazilian coder participated in coding the 
English material so that his intercoder reliability could also be ensured.  
In the Appendix, a detailed summary reports the average percent agreement, Brennan 
and Prediger’s kappa (1981) as well as Krippendorff's alpha (2004) for the statement 
and narration variables20. The statement variables achieved at least a .70level with either 
kappa or alpha, as appropriate. Intercoder reliability is slightly lower for the narrative 
variables but generally satisfactory when regarded across all countries. However, a 
detailed country-specific evaluation showed that the values in the US sample material 
are clearly lower, with the two variables ‘emotion’ and ‘fictionalization’ not reaching a 
level of at least .5 in either Brennan and Prediger’s kappa or Krippendorff’s alpha. This 
underscores the challenge that a comparative analysis of something as culturally 
specific as narratives implies. Narrative elements in news texts of the US turned out to 
be especially difficult to detect. This may be due to the fact that both US newspapers 
featured quite fact-based news discourse, replete with technical details and specialized 
background information, but few overt narrative features. The good values of the 
German subsample are certainly also influenced by the coder’s familiarity with the 
language and the nature of the news coverage. However, since the undertaking of 
comparatively and quantitatively analyzing narratives in the news is quite innovative 
and still exploratory, the values were accepted after another intensive discussion and 
clarification with the coding team before starting with the main coding process.    
                                                            
19 Four items turned out to be stand-alone visuals that contained only minimal text in the caption. 
Therefore, 76 textual articles were pretested for the narrative variables. 
20 Brennan and Prediger’s kappa corrects for chance agreement between coders by subtracting from raw 
agreement a chance agreement term based on the number of available categories. Krippendorff’s alpha 
employs a covariance-based correction for chance (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) and is particularly 
sensitive to coder disagreement in rare categories (Krippendorff, 2011, p. 103), which is not the case for 
Brennan & Prediger’s kappa. Many of the variables concern content elements that occur relatively rarely. 
Both measures have a range from –1 to 1, with scores above 0 representing a success of the coder 
training. 
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7 Results 
The forthcoming result section is threefold. The first part (section 8.1) deals with 
narrative features and their constitution in the three countries Brazil, Germany, and the 
US. Afterwards, the general deliberative characteristics of the coverage of the three 
countries will be sketched out (section 8.2). The third part (section 8.3) investigates 
deliberative qualities of narrative news articles and compares their occurrence between 
the countries. Within these sections, I will gradually respond to the hypotheses and 
research questions.  
7.1 Narrative Features 
This first section will go into detail on the narrative features that are of interest for this 
study: the degree of narrativity (section 7.1.1), the story types used in the coverage 
(section 7.1.2) and the narrative roles that are ascribed to actors in the coverage (section 
7.1.3). This will serve to give answers to the first set of research questions which asked 
how and in which topical and formal contexts narrative elements are used in the 
coverage of climate change and which country differences can be detected.  
7.1.1 Degree of Narrativity 
A first analysis looks at the degree of narrativity in the coverage. A narrativity index 
was calculated of the sum of the four narrative elements „dramatization“ (referring to a 
structure that is more sequential rather than similar to the inverted pyramid style), 
“emotion” (referring to occasions where emotions are explicitly expressed in the text), 
“narrative personalization” (referring to actors that cause actions or are affected by the 
actions of others), and “fictionalization” (referring to anecdotal or speculative details 
added to the text). Therefore, an article with an index value of zero does not contain any 
of the basic narrative features; an article with an index value of four w indicates that all 
four narrative elements are present. While the former would therefore represent one 
pole of the gradual concept of narrativity with the lowest degree, the latter would 
represent articles with the highest degree of narrativity.  
To better illustrate the difference between articles with a higher and lower degree of 
narrativity, the appendix provides four examples. Two articles from a German 
newspaper and two articles from a US newspaper contrast articles scoring 0 (i.e. having 
no narrative elements) with articles scoring 4 (i.e. containing all four narrative 
elements) at the additive narrativity index. The article “Der sichtbare Wandel” 
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(Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 29, 2012) is an example of coverage with a low 
degree of narrativity. It covers the report on extreme weather events during the first 10 
months of 2012 presented by the World Meteorological Organization during the climate 
change conference in Durban. The article presents the scientific findings and gives some 
examples of affected countries. It is fact-oriented and written in a conventional way that 
starts with the main information (‘The first 10 months of the year 2012 were marked by 
extreme weather, as the World Meteorological Organization detected.’), adding further 
detailed information afterwards. Another example of low narrativity is presented in the 
article “Chinese set terms for climate deal by 2020” (Washington Post, December 5, 
2011). This article represents a typical example of a set of articles that present updates 
from the ongoing conferences during which parties disclose their positions. In this case, 
it refers to the Chinese negotiators who made a move towards an agreement by setting 
their terms which needed to be fulfilled. The article presents the Chinese side, quoting 
several statements from Chinese negotiators as well as reactions and assessments from 
other delegations and organizations. The article “Allein gegen den Rest der Welt“ 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 13, 2010) is a good example of the fact that narrative 
news articles do not necessarily have to be long to fulfill the narrative criteria. The 
article focuses on the Bolivian UN ambassador Pablo Solón who ‘fights against the rest 
of the world’ and therefore fulfills the narrative element of narrative personalization. 
His actions and reactions trigger the article. He criticizes the negotiations, engages in a 
battle of words with Patricia Espinosa, the conference president, faces a lot of resistance 
and is even abandoned by allies. His frustration and his feeling of being right is 
explicitly mentioned, fulfilling the criterion of emotion. The text is written in a plot-like 
form rather than in the inverted pyramid style which points to the criterion of 
dramatization. The element of fictionalization is found in one of the indirect quotations 
of the protagonist, who fears that an agreement as discussed at that point in the 
negotiations would lead to a much higher rise of the earth’s temperature than hoped for.  
A different kind of article, which was also published during a climate change 
conference, relating rather to the climate change issue itself than to the negotiations, is 
another example of articles with a high degree of narrativity. The article “Following in 
the carbon footprint of Thanksgiving's first diners” (Washington Post, November 12, 
2013) looks into the past to the first Thanksgiving dinner between Native Americans 
and European settlers. The author writes from a first-person perspective, comparing the 
carbon footprint of a contemporary Thanksgiving dinner with this very first dinner, 
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drawing connections to the consequences of contemporary lifestyle for global warming 
and climate change. Narrative personalization is expressed in sentences like 
“Seventeenth-century farmers grew food, ate food and used those calories to grow more 
food,” in which people’s actions are portrayed. Such short anecdotes also fulfill the 
criterion of fictionalization. The form is not typical for a conventional news article but 
rather plot-like. This feature is already introduced with the first sentence of the article: 
“It's easy to romanticize the 1621 coming-together of the Wampanoag tribe with the 
struggling European settlers, which many people now view as the original 
Thanksgiving,” fulfilling the criterion of dramatization. Nevertheless, the article is on 
the whole fact-based and presents detailed information about contemporary food 
production and its consequences for the environment and climate, but the author also 
expresses his gratitude (fulfilling the criterion of emotion) for the modern lifestyle he 
can live and calls for a higher awareness of the finite nature of available resources. 
These four articles mark the two ends of the poles between conventional news stories 
and narrative news stories. There is a lot of diversity in between. Articles that clearly 
follow the inverted pyramid style can still have paragraphs that focus on actors and their 
actions, fulfilling narrative personalization but not dramatization. The display of 
emotions, e.g., from a political actor during negotiations, can be included in an article 
that otherwise would not fulfill any other narrative characteristics. Possible 
combinations have a wide range in the news context, and the additive index of 
narrativity helps to shed light on the overall narrativity of news coverage in different 
(country) contexts. 
Table 4 illustrates the share of articles with a particular degree of narrativity. Across all 
articles in the sample, about one fifth can be classified as having a high degree of 
narrativity with an index value of 3 or 4. The first country differences also become 
visible. The share of articles with a higher degree of narrativity is highest in Brazil (28.8 
percent of the articles), followed by Germany (14.9 percent of the articles) and the US 
(12.4 percent of the articles). On the other end of the narrativity scale, Germany has the 
highest share of articles (25.6 percent) that contain none of the narrative characteristics 
(index value of 0), followed by the US (20.7) and Brazil (18.2).  
Table 4 Share of articles with particular degree of narrativity 
  Degree of Narrativity 
Country  0 1 2 3 4 all 
Brazil n % 
58 
18.2 
83 
26.0 
86 
27.0 
75 
23.5 
17 
5.3 
319 
100 
103 
Germany n % 
93 
25.6 
118 
32.5 
98 
28.0 
42 
11.6 
12 
3.3 
363 
100 
US n % 
39 
20.7 
79 
42.0 
47 
25.0 
18 
9.6 
5 
2.7 
188 
100 
All 
countries 
n 
% 
190 
21.8 
280 
32.2 
231 
26.6 
135 
15.5 
34 
3.9 
870 
100 
 
Expressed in means, this table would translate in an overall average of 1.47 narrative 
characteristics per article across all countries. Comparing the means for the narrativity 
index of the three countries, one finds significant differences (F(2,868) = 12.45; 
p<.001), with Brazil having the highest degree of narrativity (M=1.72, SD=1.17), 
followed by Germany (M=1.34; SD=1.08) and the US with the lowest degree of 
narrativity (M=1.31, SD=.99). This seems plausible with respect to journalistic cultures. 
Brazilian journalism has long been influenced by the French writing style, which 
traditionally features essayistic and literary elements (Herscovitz, 2004; Umbricht 
& Esser, 2014). Even under the increasing influence of US journalism ideals during the 
twentieth century, Brazilian journalism developed its very own style and culture that 
connects the different traditions of essayistic storytelling and detached observation with 
a peculiar relationship to political power and interventionism: 
Although the American model had a significant influence on the modernization of 
Brazilian journalism, it was not a case of simple, direct adoption. Journalists 
adapted it to the particular characteristics of Brazilian society and culture. Adhesion 
to the values of American journalism has been often a formal gesture more than a 
matter of true belief. (Albuquerque & Roxo da Silva, M. A., 2009, p. 379) 
Germany and the US do not differ to the same extent to each other as they do to Brazil. 
Although Germany has a strong tradition of literary writing, it is also very likely that it 
converges towards the Anglo-American ideal of a rather detached fact-oriented 
journalism style. The first hypothesis expected the US to have the lowest degree of 
narrativity, Germany to have a slightly higher one, and Brazil to have the highest degree 
of narrativity in comparison. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed at first sight. 
However, a closer look also reveals differences (F(5,864) = 5.92; p<.001) between the 
newspapers in the sample, as also shown in Table 5.  
Table 5 Degree of narrativity in countries and newspapers 
 M SD n 
Brazil 1.72 1.17 319 
Folha de S. Paulo 1.72 1.21 145 
104 
O Globo 1.71 1.14 174 
Germany 1.34 1.08 363 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 1.46 1.07 185 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1.22 1.08 178 
USA 1.31 .99 188 
The New York Times 1.34 1.1 95 
The Washington Post 1.29 .88 93 
All countries 1.47 1.11 870 
It is remarkable that there is no consistent pattern between the two German newspapers 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which differ quite a lot from 
each other in their degree of narrativity while the Brazilian and US newspapers are 
rather close to each other. Although the average degree of both German newspapers 
together is very similar to the average of the newspapers from the US, the single 
newspapers deviate much more. While the more left-leaning Süddeutsche Zeitung has a 
higher degree of 1.46 narrative elements per article, the conservative Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung has the lowest degree of all newspapers in the sample, even lower 
than both US newspapers. A Scheffé post-hoc test provides more information on where 
exactly we can find significant differences. In this case, it is the FAZ that differs 
significantly from both Brazilian newspapers in the degree of narrativity, but both 
German newspapers as well as both US newspapers do not differ significantly from 
each other. However, one should keep in mind that since I do not have a random sample 
but an event-based full sample, those measures of significance are only to a certain 
extent instructive and can only give more hints for the interpretation (see footnote 14). 
The actual values are more informative, especially in case where it is obvious that the 
two German newspapers differ to a much greater degree than the other newspapers do 
within one country. Nevertheless, it is therefore difficult to confirm the second part of 
the hypothesis that the German coverage has a higher degree of narrativity than the US 
coverage. 
Figure 1 gives further implications on the different use of narrative characteristics in the 
countries and newspapers. At first sight, there is a peculiarly high use of narrative 
dramatization in the Brazilian coverage (51.2 percent), while the American coverage 
has the highest share of articles using narrative personalization (46.3 percent). After all, 
as Albuquerque and da Silva (2009) explain, Brazilian journalists still privilege 
narrative aspects of “modern” journalism rather than news-gathering and reporting 
techniques. This finds a remarkable expression in the fact that more than half of the 
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Brazilian articles in the sample use the element of dramatization, which refers to a 
sequential plot-like composition rather than to the use of the inverted pyramid style. 
Also, almost half of all Brazilian articles include a display of emotions, which is also 
less common in Germany and the US (both around 30 percent), where the notion of a 
detached journalism is much stronger (Hanitzsch et al., 2011), which could account for 
such a difference. Besides, Brazilian newspapers are not as significant compared to the 
TV landscape of the country (Albuquerque, 2012). It is also possible that newspapers 
try to adapt storytelling forms that are more typical for television formats.  
The German coverage does not use one of the narrative characteristics in such an 
extensive way when looking at the average. Comparing both German newspapers, 
however, shows that the “dramatization” is strong within the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
while “narrative personalization” is strong within the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
The Süddeutsche Zeitung again resembles the Brazilian pattern, whereas the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung is more similar to the US newspapers. Within the German 
newspaper landscape, one should further investigate if there are actually two narrative 
cultures that correspond to a left–right classification. Narrative journalism is more of a 
tradition of the left in Germany. Representatives of the literary period “Neue 
Sachlichkeit”, such as Egon Erwin Kisch, a socialist and a journalist, discarded the 
American ideal of objectivity as a bourgeois means of information selectivity (Hartsock, 
2011). Such tendencies could continue to have an effect which would need further 
consideration and investigation. 
The measures of association presented below the figure support the impression that 
countries and newspapers significantly differ in their application of narrative 
characteristics, except for the element of fictionalization.  
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Figure 1 Narrative characteristics (country and newspaper comparison) 
Note: N=870 newspaper articles overall; numbers above bars represent relative frequencies of narrative 
characteristics within all articles of a country or a newspaper (subsample size displayed behind country or 
newspaper name)  
Country Comparison: Dramatization: χ2=55.21*** df(2); λ=.03 (asymmetric with ‘dramatization’ as 
dependent variable); V=.25***; Emotion: χ2=18.68*** df(2); λ=.00 (asymmetric with ‘emotion’ as 
dependent variable); V=.15***; Narrative Personalization: χ2=5.42 df(2); λ=.00 (asymmetric with 
‘personalization’ as dependent variable); V=.08; Fictionalization: χ2=1.58*** df(2); λ=.00 (asymmetric 
with ‘fictionalization’ as dependent variable); V=.04 
Newspaper Comparison: Dramatization: χ2=77.58*** df(5); λ=.05 (asymmetric with ‘dramatization’ as 
dependent variable); V=.3***; Emotion: χ2=20.66*** df(5); λ=.00 (asymmetric with ‘emotion’ as 
dependent variable); V=.15***; Narrative Personalization: χ2=15.98** df(5); λ=.01 (asymmetric with 
‘personalization’ as dependent variable); V=.14**; Fictionalization: χ2=6.05 df(5); λ=.00 (asymmetric 
with ‘fictionalization’ as dependent variable); V=.08 
 
Research question 1 also asked for the contexts in which narrative characteristics are 
used. To get an answer to this, we should regard two general variables coded for all 
articles: the overall trigger that “caused” the article for the topical context, as well as the 
classification of an article according to its form for the formal context.  
The “trigger” variable was supposed to note the event that caused an article. The four 
COPs caused most of the articles in the whole sample, followed by the presentation of 
scientific research, the display of a domestic debate on climate change or an 
international debate. Keeping in mind that the average degree of narrativity is 1.47, 
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articles about the climate change conferences score close to that average. Articles on the 
presentation of new scientific research generally score below that average, while the 
presentation of new technology as well as of scientific controversy have a degree of 
narrativity above that average. This pattern is true for all three countries. 
Comprehensive differences in the combination of the degree of narrativity and specific 
thematic contexts are difficult to detect due to differing (and often rather small) 
numbers of articles concerned with a particular topic (such as NGO protest or any 
weather events for example).  
Beyond this thematic context, the formal context in which narrativity is used, can be 
regarded. Table 6 shows notable differences in the means of the degree of narrativity 
when looking at the formats of the articles, with press reviews having the lowest degree 
of narrativity (M=0.7; SD=0.88), followed by letters to the editor (M=1.11; SD=0.85), 
fact-based articles (M=1.36; SD=1.12), opinion-based articles (M=1.7; SD=1.06), and 
other formats (M=1.71; SD=0.95). 
Table 6 Degree of narrativity in fact-based and opinion-based articles, country comparison 
N=870 articles Fact-based 
articles 
Opinion-based 
articles 
Press reviews Letter to the 
editor 
Other forms of 
articles 
 M SD n M SD n M SD n M SD  n M SD n 
Brazil 1.6 1.2 255 2.2 .88 60 - - 0 - - 0 1.75 .96 4 
Folha de S. 
Paulo 1.61 1.25 116 2.17 .89 29 - - 0 - - 0 - - 0 
O Globo 1.60 1.17 139 2.23 31 .88 - - 0 - - 0 1.75 .96 4 
Germany 1.35 1.08 263 1.52 1.09 61 .7 .88 23 1.33 1.05 15 3.00 - 1 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 1.42 1.10 138 1.76 1.03 31 1.00 .71 5 1.13 .64 8 3.00 - 1 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
1.28 1.06 125 1.24 1.11 28 .61 .92 18 1.57 1.4 7 - - 0 
USA 1.24 0.98 129 1.56 1.03 41 - - 0 1.2 .94 15 1.27 0.96 18 
The New York 
Times  1.31 1.11 68 1.45 1.05 20 - - 0 1.4 1.52 5 1.00 - 2 
The 
Washington 
Post 
1.16 .82 61 1.67 1.02 21 - - 0 1.10 .98 10 3.00 - 1 
All countries 1.43 1.12 647 1.78 1.04 162 .7 .88 23 1.27 .98 30 1.88 .99 8 
Comparing countries and newspapers in detail, one detects the general trend that 
opinion-based articles have a higher degree of narrativity than fact-based articles. 
Especially the Brazilian opinion-based articles are notable for their particularly high 
degree of narrativity. The only case where this does not apply is the German Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, which also has the lowest degree of narrativity of all newspapers 
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in the sample. Again, both German newspapers differ from each other, with the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung having a remarkably higher degree of narrativity. But one can also 
detect a particularity in both US newspapers. While the difference in the degree of 
narrativity between fact-based and opinion-based articles is smallest in The New York 
Times compared to all other newspapers, the degree of narrativity in opinion-based 
articles in The Washington Post is almost as high as in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, while 
the degree of fact-based articles is the lowest of all fact-based articles. This gap 
indicates a clear association of narrative journalism with opinion, which seems to apply 
to the other newspapers as well, except for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, even if 
to less pronounced degree.  
7.1.2 Story Types 
To get an impression of the kinds of stories that are actually told, I coded a set of genre 
variables consisting of theme, tone, and outcome. With their values recoded into binary 
variables I calculated a hierarchical cluster analysis.21 
Table 7 presents a four-cluster solution that gives more insights into the stories on 
climate change. Bold numbers are decisive for the interpretation of a cluster. Italic 
numbers help to further interpret, even if their relative share is slightly lower. The 
names for each cluster are the results of this interpretation process.  
The first cluster is the largest one with 363 articles and is called Futile Struggle. These 
are either stories about climate change as a struggle over destiny and therefore the 
biggest challenge for mankind or stories about climate politics and the UNFCC process, 
which seems to bring no solution to the real problems. These stories are mostly written 
in a pessimistic tone and almost all articles suggest that the conflict is not going to be 
solved. 
                                                            
21 The hierarchical cluster analysis was calculated as proposed by Matthes and Kohring (2008) using the 
narrative variables ‘overall theme’, ‘tone’ and ‘outcome’. All three variables were recoded, transforming 
their original nominal values into dummy variables with a binary code (‘0 = not present’ and ‘1 = 
present’). All articles that missed values on one or more dimensions of the three variables theme, tone or 
outcome, were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, 829 articles out of the original 870 articles were 
part of the cluster analysis. All variables were present in more than 5 percent of the articles and could 
therefore be included in the cluster analysis that was conducted using the Ward method and binary 
Euclidic distance. Four distinct story-type clusters were identified through the use of the elbow criterion. 
To apply the 'elbow criterion', I checked the increase in the Sum of Squared Distances (SSD) for different 
cluster solutions and stopped clustering after an observed 'jump' in the increase. To facilitate better 
interpretation I calculated the relative 'slope' between SSDs for the last ten clustering steps and then the 
'slope quotient' between slopes. The resulting 'quotients' provide a quite clear numerical indication for the 
'jump' in the increase of SSDs. The clusters are cross-tabulated with all variables included in the cluster 
analysis to be able to describe the narrative content of each group (Table 7) 
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The following example22 presents the beginning and the end of the New York Times 
article titled “At Climate Talks, a Familiar Standoff Between U.S. and China” and 
represents articles from this story type that shed a pessimistic view on climate 
negotiations: 
DURBAN, South Africa — China, the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter, has 
once again emerged as the biggest puzzle at international climate change talks, 
sending ambiguous signals about the role it intends to play in future negotiations. 
This week, the nation’s top climate envoy said that China would be open to signing 
a formal treaty limiting emissions after 2020 — but laid down conditions for doing 
so that are unlikely ever to be met. 
[…] 
This preoccupation with ‘binding’ has become more an obstacle than a means of 
progress,” he [Elliot Diringer, executive vice president of the Center for Energy and 
Climate Solutions] said in an e-mail. “The reality is that key players including the 
United States and China are not prepared at this stage to take on binding 
commitments to reduce their emissions. “Rather than arguing over that year after 
year, we should focus on strengthening the international climate framework step by 
step. (The New York Times, December 8, 2011) 
Table 7 Cluster analysis with genre variables (all articles; column percentages of respective characteristic within each 
variable) 
N = 829 total 4 -cluster Solution  
   Futile 
Struggle 
Constant 
Challenge 
Business 
as Usual 
Stories of 
Success 
V Lambda 
n   363 151 203 112   
 n % % % % %   
Theme 
Everyday 
business 
197 23.8 19.3 21.2 46.8 0 0.34 0.04 
Failure after 
struggle 
100 12.1 25.1 4.6 1 0 0.36 0 
Triumph over 
adversity 
152 18.3 0 6.6 14.8 100 0.85 0.36 
Struggle over 
destiny 
232 28 31.7 48.3 21.7 0 0.31 0 
(Political/ 
Social) Conflict 
148 17.9 24 19.2 15.8 0 0.2 0 
         
Tone 
Fatalistic 30 3.6 6.6 0.7 2.5 0 0.15 0 
Optimistic 168 20.3 0 31.8 3.9 100 0.84 0.35 
                                                            
22 The following exemplary quotes for illustrating the narrative story types all emanate from the two US- 
newspapers only for reasons of language compatibility. However, one would find similar examples in the 
Brazilian and German material.   
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Unexcited/ 
neutral 
305 36.8 27.3 38.4 72.9 0 0.48 0.18 
Passionate 91 11 11.8 17.2 10.8 0 0.16 0 
Pessimistic 235 28.3 54.3 11.9 9.9 0 0.51 0.07 
         
Outcome         
No 
conceivable 
outcome 
211 25.5 1.1 11.3 93.6 0 0.9 0.54 
Conflict fixed 238 28.7 0.6 81.1 0 100 0.92 0.47 
Conflict not 
fixed 
380 45.8 98.3 6.6 6.4 0 0.93 0.63 
Note: BOLD elements decisive for cluster interpretation with a frequency of at least 35 percent of the 
articles in the cluster; italic elements subordinate for cluster interpretation with a frequency of at least 20 
percent of articles in the cluster. 
Stories in the second cluster are named Constant Challenge and contain 151 articles that 
represent the ongoing struggle against climate change, which is also told as the struggle 
over destiny but in an unexcited/neutral or even optimistic tone. The problem seems 
manageable after all; conflicts can be fixed probably with small steps in the negotiation 
processes of the climate change conferences. How hard negotiators have to struggle 
during the conferences is expressed in the article “At Climate Summit, the Real Action 
is Behind the Scenes”, published in the US- newspaper The Washington Post. The 
article is optimistic in its tone, expressing that the task to come to an agreement is 
challenging for all parties but that there are steps taken in the direction of finding a 
solution and parties with high ambitions that push the negotiations:  
Hundreds of bleary-eyed bureaucrats - from powerhouse countries, tiny island 
nations and almost everything in between - have begun the serious wheeling and 
dealing in climate talks here, jostling over individual words in final texts that will 
steer how hundreds of billions of dollars could be spent trying to save the planet. 
(Washington Post, December 9, 2010) 
A third cluster named Business as Usual with 203 articles contains those stories that 
deal with the year in and year out continuous process of climate change and climate 
change politics as an everyday business in an unexcited/ neutral way with no outcome 
to be conceived. These can be short updates in the middle of the conferences, for 
example when progress is made but when there is no final result yet expected. To give 
again an example of this story type, the New York Times article “From Copenhagen to 
Cancun” reminds the reader that the next climate change conference is coming up 
during which the problems are still the same:  
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A year ago, delegates from 193 countries went to Copenhagen with hopes of signing 
a treaty limiting emissions of greenhouse gases and committing each country to hard 
targets. 
[…]  
Delegates are now in Cancun, Mexico, for the latest round of United Nations climate 
talks. Differences between rich and poor countries -- and the biggest emitters, China 
and the United States -- remain unresolved, which means there will be no binding 
agreement. (New York Times, December 3, 2010) 
The last cluster, Stories of Success, is the smallest one with only 112 articles. It is the 
most unambiguous one, too, with all stories containing some triumph over an adversity, 
narrated in an optimistic tone, and a conflict that is solved in the end. These can be 
stories on successful negotiations with some kind of (partial) agreement or a story of 
successful individuals or collective actions of civil society members and organizations 
to fight climate change as some kind of behavioral role model. An example of an article 
presenting a successful ending of the negotiations is provided by the Washington Post. 
Headlining “193 Nations Sign Climate-Change Package,” the article summarizes the 
outcome and accompanies the results with optimistic statements of different actors:  
Cancun has done its job," UNFCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres said in a 
statement. "Nations have shown they can work together under a common roof, to 
reach consensus on a common cause. 
[…] 
The reality is we really got what we were looking for," said U.S. special climate 
envoy Todd Stern in an interview Saturday.” On issues such as forests, financing 
and scrutiny of major emitters' carbon reductions, he said, "we got good, substantive 
decisions on all of those things. (Washington Post, December 12, 2010) 
Figure 2 presents the occurrence of the four story types in the coverage. Across all 
countries, the Futile Struggle is the story type that is found most often, followed by the 
Business as Usual story type. The country comparison reveals more details and relevant 
differences.  
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Figure 2 Story types (country and newspaper comparison) 
 
Base: N=829 newspaper articles; numbers above bars refer to the relative frequencies of the articles of the 
country or newspaper that belong to the particular story cluster;  
OVERALL:χ2=134.68*** df(15); λ=.032 (asymmetric with ‘story type’ as dependent variable); 
V=0.23***; BRAZIL: χ2=2.47 df(3); λ=.00 (asymmetric with ‘story type’ as dependent variable); 
V=0.23***; GERMANY: χ2=19,99*** df(3); λ=.00 (asymmetric with ‘story type’ as dependent variable); 
V=0.24***; USA: χ2=1.12 df(3); λ=.00 (asymmetric with ‘story type’ as dependent variable); V=0.08 
 
In Brazil and Germany, the Futile Struggle dominates, while in the US, the Business as 
Usual stories are most often presented (40.6 percent). This type of story is also 
dominant in Germany (32.2 percent) but very rarely used in Brazilian coverage (only 7 
percent). Climate change as a Constant Challenge is also much more prevalent in Brazil 
than in Germany and the US.  
To find an answer to research question 1, and in particular to the aspect of the topical 
contexts in which narrative elements appear, it seems worthwhile to regard which story 
types are used when covering a particular climate change conference. Table 8 gives 
detailed information about which story types are used in which country (and across all 
countries) to cover each COP within the sample.  
Across countries, again, the Futile Struggle represents the dominant story type for all 
four COPs investigated. Among the COPs, Doha, however, seems to be the one which 
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was perceived most unpromising for a positive outcome, since almost half of all articles 
were told with that Futile Struggle story type. Nevertheless, there are interesting 
country differences that reveal different perceptions of the particular COPs. For 
example, Cancún was presented in the US coverage only in one fifth of the articles as 
Futile Struggle. While it was mostly Business as Usual, there are still 26.1 percent of 
the US articles that presented Stories of Success. It seems like that after the failure of 
Copenhagen – to which the US had significantly contributed by failing to compromise 
with China – Cancun was supposed to poor oil on troubled water. Pointedly expressed: 
Things are going their usual ways (high use of Business as Usual story types), it is not 
as bad at it may seem after Copenhagen (only few stories representing the Futile 
Struggle), and there is even progress to be reported (more than one fourth of articles as 
Stories of success). However, this pattern does not hold in the years afterwards in the 
US coverage. The Business as Usual as well as the Futile Struggle are more balanced 
and there are less Stories of Success to be told. Durban also stands out against the other 
COPs since more than half of the articles use the Futile Struggle story type. Those 
articles mostly lament the non-existing progress that is expected for Durban, the 
repeating conflicts between the US and China as well as the exit of Canada from the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
The Brazilian COP coverage is clearly dominated by the pessimistic Futile Struggle 
story type which is used in about half of the article on every COP. A little variance can 
be seen in the use of the Constant Challenge story type. Obviously, Durban was 
perceived as mostly challenging, while in Doha a few more Stories of Success could be 
told. The Germany coverage is also dominated by the Futile Struggle story type. Among 
all COPs, Warsaw seems to be the one that was perceived most negatively, as the Futile 
Struggle story type appears in 55 percent of all articles. Warsaw is also the conference 
for which the Brazilian coverage applied the Futile Struggle story type most often.  
 
Table 8 Coverage of climate change conferences with particular story types 
 Futile 
Struggle 
Constant 
Challenge 
Business 
as Usual 
Stories 
of 
Success 
Overall 
(story 
types) 
COP16 
Cancún 
 Brazil n 65 36 12 21 134 
%
  
48.5% 26.9% 9.0% 15.7% 100.0% 
Germany n 45 12 46 15 118 
%
  
38.1% 10.2% 39.0% 12.7% 100.0% 
USA n 14 7 30 18 69 
% 20.3% 10.1% 43.5% 26.1% 100.0% 
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Overall 
(countries) 
n 124 55 88 54 321 
%
  
38.6 17.1% 27.4% 16.8% 100.0% 
COP17 
Durban 
 Brazil n 24 21 4 7 56 
%
  
42.9% 37.5% 7.1% 12.5% 100.0% 
Germany n 32 12 18 12 74 
%
  
43.2% 16.2% 24.3% 16.2% 100.0% 
USA n 18 5 9 1 33 
%
  
54.5% 15.2% 27.3% 3.0% 100.0% 
Overall 
(countries) 
n 74 38 31 20 163 
%
  
45.4% 23.3% 19.0% 12.3% 100.0% 
COP18 
Doha 
 Brazil n 29 18 2 10 59 
%
  
49.2% 30.5% 3.4% 16.9% 100.0% 
Germany n 41 8 25 4 78 
%
  
52.6% 10.3% 32.1% 5.1% 100.0% 
USA n 12 1 12 4 29 
% 41.4% 3.4% 41.4% 13.8% 100.0% 
Overall 
(countries) 
n 82 27 39 18 166 
%
  
49.4% 16.3% 23.5% 10.8% 100.0% 
COP19 
Warsaw 
 Brazil n 33 18 4 10 65 
%
  
50.8% 27.7% 6.2% 15.4% 100.0% 
Germany n 36 7 19 3 65 
%
  
55.4% 10.8% 29.2% 4.6% 100.0% 
USA n 14 6 22 7 49 
%
  
28.6% 12.2% 44.9% 14.3% 100.0% 
Overall 
(countries) 
n 83 31 45 20 179 
%
  
46.4% 17.3% 25.1% 11.2% 100.0% 
All 
countries 
 Brazil n 151 93 22 48 314 
%
  
48.1% 29.6% 7.0% 15.3% 100.0% 
Germany n 154 39 108 34 335 
%
  
46.0% 11.6% 32.2% 10.1% 100.0% 
USA n 58 19 73 30 180 
%
  
32.2% 10.6% 40.6% 16.7% 100.0% 
Overall 
(countries) 
n 363 151 203 112 829 
%
  
43.8% 18.2% 24.5% 13.5% 100.0% 
 
The dominant story types used for a particular COP in the coverage of a country can 
give us more insights into how the conference was perceived in the media debate of that 
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country. And it is obvious that between the countries, the conferences are perceived 
slightly differently, which has certain implications for the second hypothesis which 
suggested that the stories told in the coverage resemble the political role of a country. 
The results I obtained from the cluster analysis as well as the analysis of the story types 
of the COPs point to such an interpretation.  
In Brazil, the story types Futile Struggle and Constant Challenge are the ones most 
present in the coverage. In Germany, it is the Futile Struggle but also the Business as 
Usual story type that is most prominent, while it is the Business as Usual type in the US 
(while Durban, for example, presents an interesting exception with a distinctly higher 
use of the Futile Struggle story type). I suggested that Brazil might differ from the US 
and Germany by applying a more urgent story type more often, while Germany and the 
US would rather tend towards more neutral and unexcited story types. This mostly 
applies to Brazil as well as to the US, whereas Germany is a mixed case. Both story 
types used in Brazil most often emphasize the severity of the situation with regard to 
both the climate change situation in general as well as to climate politics (all four COPs 
are predominantly told with the Futile Struggle story type in the coverage). Against this 
background, it does not seem very surprising that the dominant narratives in Brazil 
emphasize the urgency of the situation to such a degree, while in countries that are 
confronted with such severe demands dominant narratives would depict the situation 
more calmly. Germany, however, in certain ways occupies an “in-between” position, 
which seems to be expressed in the two dominant story types in the coverage. Together 
with the EU, Germany, as the country of the “Energiewende,” tried to push towards 
more ambitious targets for the fight against climate change in recent years. Within the 
political process, they had to face resistance from different sides while the EU tried to 
claim leadership and uphold negotiations (Wurzel & Connelly, 2011). However, this 
pattern was ruptured at the 2013 conference in Warsaw, which might account for the 
strong dominance of the Futile Struggle story type during this conference (more than 55 
percent of the articles). Holding the conference in Poland was especially controversial 
since Poland had just launched new programs to support its coal industries. In addition 
to that, Poland had blocked climate change goals of the EU in the period leading up to 
the conference. Another event overshadowed the summit: A severe storm had just 
struck the Philippines and Philippine delegates announced to go on hunger strike if no 
serious commitments were made at once. Several major NGOs showed their solidarity 
with the victims of climate change worldwide by leaving the conference early. 
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Nevertheless, grand steps in the negotiations were not expected since Warsaw was also 
planned as a transitional COP to prepare a new climate treaty and to set a timetable to 
reach an agreement in Paris two years later.  
Beyond these directly COP related events, the questions of how ambitious climate 
change goals should be, has met with controversy in Germany, too, which could also be 
an explanation for the mixed use of story types. Conflicts between economic and 
ecological interests have been very present in the past years (e.g., debate about 
extending the operational life span of nuclear reactors, debates about abandoning coal 
altogether and in what time span, etc.). The two dominant story types in the German 
coverage reflect the situation in which Germany is well aware of the need to act on the 
one hand and handle the recurring negotiations with certain habituality and with respect 
to domestic matters of dispute on the other hand.  
The dominance of the Business as Usual narrative in the US and Germany might also be 
explained with regard to journalistic roles. In Germany and the US, the role that is most 
prevalent is the one of the detached observer, who reports on events from a more neutral 
position.    
7.1.3 Narrative Roles 
As another important element to characterize the stories that are told in the media 
coverage of the three countries, narrative roles were coded according to their 
occurrence. Coders could mark the one most prominent victim, villain and hero per 
article as being decisive for the story to be told. Across all countries, the role of the 
villain is the one most often assigned, as Figure 3 demonstrates. By naming a villain, 
responsibility either for climate change itself or for blocking progress in the 
negotiations is linked to particular actors.  
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Figure 3 Share of articles in which narrative roles occur 
Base: N= 870 newspaper articles;  
Country Comparison:Victim: χ2=.35 df(2); λ=0. 00 (asymmetric with ‘victim’ as dependent variable); 
V=0.02; Villain: χ2=7.24** df(2); λ=0. 00 (asymmetric with ‘victim’ as dependent variable); V=0.09**; 
Hero: χ2=20.06*** df(2); λ=0. 00 (asymmetric with ‘hero’ as dependent variable); V=0.15*** 
Newspaper Comparison:Victim: χ2=8.85 df(5); λ=0. 00 (asymmetric with ‘victim’ as dependent 
variable); V=0.1; Villain: χ2=16.34** df(5); λ=0. 04 (asymmetric with ‘victim’ as dependent variable); 
V=0.14**; Hero: χ2=24.31*** df(5); λ=0. 00 (asymmetric with ‘hero’ as dependent variable); V=0.17*** 
 
Looking at each country in particular, Figure 3 reveals rather similar patterns in its use 
of these narrative roles. The role of the villain is most often used in all three countries. 
About one fourth of all articles contain a victim. The countries do not differ much in the 
share of the use of victims. There are somewhat greater differences regarding the use of 
the roles of villain and hero. In the Brazilian and the German coverage, a villain is 
named in almost half of all articles. While the German and American coverage are more 
reluctant to use the role of a hero, a third of all Brazilian articles contain a hero. 
If we look at whom these roles are ascribed to in particular, more distinct country 
differences are revealed. Figure 4 specifies which kind of actor types (individual, 
collective, or institutional) can be found in combination with which roles in each 
country. One can detect several similar patterns here. Victims are most often collective 
actors in all three countries. There are hardly any individual victims specified. Villains 
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are either institutional actors or collective actors, while the heroes are dominated by 
institutional actors. However, individual actors are more likely to be assigned the role of 
a hero in all countries.  
Figure 4 Narrative roles and actor types 
 
Base: 838 actor codings in 871 newspaper articles; numbers above bars represent the share of an actor 
type within all codings of a particular narrative role in one country 
Each actor was also coded by its name or particular labeling. Knowing which actors are 
assigned to which roles sheds valuable light on the stories that are actually told. It also 
reveals country-specific constellations and positions within the process. In Brazil, the 
most salient victim is the country itself, either alone or in combination with other 
countries or allies in similar situation, such as the BASIC countries South Africa, India, 
and China. Besides its own country, the Brazilian coverage mostly depicts other 
developing countries, small island states and poor people. The Philippines are explicitly 
named various times. The Brazilian coverage also depicts its own country as villain, and 
in particular the Brazilian government and the presidents Lula and Rousseff. However, 
much more prominent in the Brazilian coverage is another villain, who is specified 
clearly: the US. The US (either alone or in combination with other Western countries) is 
the most salient villain in the Brazilian coverage. This is followed by more unspecific 
actor constellations such as the West, rich countries, developed countries and 
industrialized countries. A few times, other countries such as Canada, Japan and Russia 
are also explicitly named. There is one very clear and salient hero in the Brazilian 
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coverage, and this is again the country itself, whether it be the Brazilian government or 
individual politicians. No other actor is presented as hero in such a way. 
A different pattern can be detected in the German coverage. The own country is hardly 
depicted as victim. Instead, the victims are mostly “other” and rather unspecified actors 
such as developing countries, poor countries, and mankind as a whole. The German 
coverage often highlights “poor people” (from developing countries, from specific 
regions such as mountains, coasts or tropics, from Africa) or future generations. The 
most dominant villain in the German coverage is also one of the most unspecified: It is 
mankind as a whole that is to blame. Besides this very general and often repeated 
declaration, the focus is clearly put on states that have been blocking negotiations at 
some point during the last years’ climate change conferences, in particular Bolivia and 
China during Cancún, Canada and the US during Durban, and China and the US during 
the Doha conference. One individual villain sticks out in the German coverage: The 
former Minister for Economic Affairs, Philipp Rösler, who is blamed for Germany’s 
poor performance during Durban in several articles, because he blocked the intentions 
of the Environmental Minister, Peter Altmaier, for the Durban negotiations. When it 
comes to the assignment of the role of the hero, a similar pattern as in Brazil is revealed 
in the German coverage, in which it is Germany and even slightly more often the 
European Union that is depicted as the hero. 
The US coverage also focuses on unspecified others as victims of climate change. Poor 
people from developing countries are also salient in the US, but to a lower extent than in 
the German coverage. The US coverage more often points to the Philippines in 
particular as a victim. The US coverage does not show a very clear pattern with regard 
to the villains. There are also a few unspecified villains, such as humans in general or 
the developed world. China is named a few times as a specific villain (sometimes in 
combination with other countries such as India or Brazil), also the US itself and 
especially conservative politicians from the Republicans are presented a couple of 
times, but beyond that there is no especially salient villain. The US, too, is named a few 
times as a hero in the US coverage, but this is not as salient as in both other countries. 
The US coverage rather names specific individuals as heroes: Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
Felipe Calderon (Mexican president during the COP in Cancun), the former mayor of 
New York Michael Bloomberg, and also several NGO activists.  
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By looking at the allocation of these narrative roles, the stories that are told in the 
coverage of each country become more subsumable. They also give an impression of 
how the own domestic country is seen in the overall actor constellation in the political 
process.  
The third hypothesis can therefore be confirmed: A country’s position in the political 
process as well as its relation to other actors is reflected in the narrative role 
constellations. Brazil, suffering from climate change and representing the classical 
position of an emerging country, can blame the industrialized countries for climate 
change and demand support and compensation. Out of this position, it can easily be the 
hero by pushing others to act or by making any kind of concessions (even if small). 
Germany, which as a single small country can be held less accountable for climate 
change than countries like the US, for example, and which does not deny the 
responsibility of the developed world, tries to be a role model with its own 
“Energiewende”. The often-assigned role of the hero that pushes negotiations in order to 
save the poor and week seems plausible. The confrontation with countries that block 
negotiations completes this picture. The impression is furthermore reinforced by the 
occasional blaming of German politicians as villains, such as the former Minister of 
Economic Affairs Philipp Rösler, who was accused of blocking the internal decision-
making within the German cabinet which would have been necessary to support the 
Environmental Minister Peter Altmaier’s progressive position in the negotiations in 
Doha 2012. For the US, the overall picture is more diffuse: The country has not had a 
clear political line during the last years except that, in order to protect own economic 
interests, they would not agree to any treaty as long as emerging countries such as 
China and India are not held responsible to the same extent. The issue itself seems to be 
farther away since victims are mostly “others,” especially the poor and developing 
countries, while villains remain more unspecified and less salient (except for 
“humankind” and “China”), compared to both other countries. At the same time, US 
coverage does not see the US as being a hero either, but rather emphasizes individual 
actors as such.  
7.1.4 Use of Narrative Features in Different Contexts 
Regarding research questions 1a and 1b, we now know more about how and in which 
contexts narrative elements are used and what country differences could be detected. 
First, one fifth of all articles in the sample can be considered as having a high degree of 
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narrativity. The countries deviate from that average, with Brazil being above and 
Germany and the US below this value. The use of narrative characteristics also differs 
between the countries. While Brazilian coverage most often uses dramatization, the US 
newspapers clearly focus on narrative personalization, and Germany is a mixed case 
with dramatization most often used by the Süddeutsche Zeitung and narrative 
personalization as the dominant characteristic in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In 
general, high narrativity is more closely connected to articles that deal with topics like 
the presentation of new technology or scientific controversy. Beyond that, higher 
degrees of narrativity are more closely connected to opinion-based articles.  
When it comes to the application of specific story types and the assignment of narrative 
roles, we could also detect country differences between Brazil, Germany, and the US. 
Different dominant stories as well as different actor constellations reflect country 
particularities of journalistic traditions and roles as well as political situations. Within 
the transnational setting of the climate change conferences, these narrative elements are 
used for connecting particular audiences with the events and producing some degree of 
cultural resonance.  
7.2 Deliberative Qualities of the News Coverage 
The second set of research questions asked for the contributions of news narratives to 
the deliberative quality of newspaper coverage as well as whether there are country 
differences. Before being able to give answers to these questions, it is necessary to 
assess the general deliberative quality of the coverage on climate change to have a point 
of comparison when focusing on narrative coverage in particular.  
To assess the deliberative quality of the news coverage on climate change I will focus 
on four indicators: the inclusiveness of actors (and in particular of actors of the political 
periphery in comparison to actors from the political power center) in section 7.2.1, the 
inclusiveness of ideas (section 7.2.2), the direct contrasting of opposing ideas within 
articles (section 7.2.3) and the outcome orientation (section 7.2.4). This section briefly 
characterizes these indicators before investigating the relationship with narrative 
characteristics in the next chapter.  
7.2.1 Inclusiveness of Actors 
The inclusiveness of actors is measured by the number of statements of different actors 
within articles (see Table 9). Overall, the articles of the sample contain 4.45 actor 
122 
statements on average. The first notable finding is that German newspaper articles fall 
below that average and contain the fewest actor statements per article (M=3.99, 
SD=3.07), followed by Brazilian newspaper articles (M=4.58, SD=2.99), whereas US 
newspaper articles contain the most (M=5.16; SD=3.85). An analysis of variance shows 
that these differences are significant (F(2,897)=8.87, df=2, p<.001), while the Scheffé 
post-hoc test reveals that the significant difference can be found between the US and 
Germany (at a significance level of p<.001) and between Germany and Brazil (at a 
significance level of p<.05) but not between Brazil and the US. Another set of mean 
comparisons show no significant differences between the newspapers of one country.  
The number of actor statements alone does not give complete insights on the spectrum 
of actors within the coverage. A newspaper could only give voice to the political elite, 
which would not account for a highly inclusive coverage. In a next step, I therefore rate 
the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the actor sample in the coverage. One way to 
measure diversity or concentration is provided by the Herfindahl index (Benson, 2009). 
Based on this, I calculated an actor concentration index (ACI) which helps to assess 
how even the dispersion of different actor types in the coverage is.23According to this 
calculation, the German coverage has the smallest ACI value and therefore the highest 
heterogeneity (ACI = .191), closely followed by the US (ACI=.193). The presented 
actor statements in the Brazilian coverage are slightly less diverse (ACI=.229). This 
result is instructive since it reveals that even if the German coverage contains the least 
actor statements, those actors that are given voice are still the most diverse. 
Wessler and Rinke (2014) suggest that rating inclusiveness from a deliberative 
perspective should especially concentrate on the appearance of actors from the political 
periphery (rather than the power center), such as civil society actors, experts (e.g., 
scientists) and politicians from the opposition, as well as ordinary citizens. Overall, the 
articles contain on average 1.18 actor statements from the periphery. Again, Germany is 
below that average (1.05 actor statements from the periphery per article), closely 
followed by Brazil (1.09). The US coverage scores significantly higher above the 
average with 1.67 actor statements from the periphery per article. The analysis of 
variance reveals a difference between countries when it comes to the average inclusion 
                                                            
23 The index is calculated by squaring the relative frequencies of one groups’ statements (relative to all 
actor statements) and summing the total. The highest possible score for such an index is 1. This would 
mean total homogeneity (only one actor type accountable for all statements). The smaller the index, the 
more even the dispersion between different types of actors. 
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of statements from these peripheral actors (F(2,897) = 13.31; p<.001) as well as 
between newspapers (F(5,894) = 8.18; p<.001). 
Table 9 Average number of actor statements per article 
 
Actor 
statements in 
general 
M (SD) 
Civil society 
actor  
statements  
M(SD) 
Brazil 4.58 (3.07) 1.09 (1.35) 
Fohla de Sao Paulo 4.46 (2.79) .94 (1.3) 
O Globo 4.67 (3.29) 1.21 (1.36) 
   
Germany 3.99 (2.99) 1.05 (1.45) 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 4.12(2.89) 1.30 (1.5) 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 3.85 (3.07) .79 (1.32) 
   
USA 5.16 (3.85) 1.67 (1.72) 
The New York Times 5.06 (3.51) 1.68 (1.5) 
The Washington Post 5.27 (4.2) 1.66 (1.86) 
   
OVERALL  4.45 (3.24) 1.18 (1.48) 
Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188) 
Scheffé post-hoc tests give information on where the differences are situated especially. 
Significant country differences are found between the US and Germany as well as the 
US and Brazil, while there are no significant differences between Germany and Brazil. 
At the newspaper level, it is Fohla de Sao Paulo that differs significantly from both US 
newspapers, as well as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that differs significantly 
from both US newspapers and the Süddeutsche Zeitung. This difference between both 
German newspapers again makes it difficult to only look at country differences in 
further analyses. 
Beyond the absolute numbers of actor statements from civil society it is also the ratio 
between the number of actor statements from the political center and the periphery that 
can reveal further information on the representation of actors from civil society, 
scientists, politicians from the opposition, and ordinary citizens in the coverage. In this 
case, the US—where civil society actors have a share of 33.93 percent of all 
statements—differs significantly from Germany (22.93 percent) and Brazil (23.95 
percent). The analysis of variance again shows significant differences in the share of 
actor statements from the periphery between countries (F(2,897) = 10.45; p<.001) as 
well as newspapers (F(2,894) = 5.94; p<.001). At the newspaper level, both US 
newspapers differ significantly from Fohla de Sao Paulo and Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung. There are no significant differences between newspapers of one country. When 
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it comes to the general actor inclusiveness, the US therefore would score highest on this 
deliberative dimension, followed by Brazil and Germany. 
7.2.2 Inclusiveness of Ideas 
To rate the inclusiveness of ideas in the coverage, I investigate three categories of idea 
elements at the article level: consequences and causes of climate change as well as 
suggested solutions to the problem. Each of these categories consisted of multiple 
elements that could have been mentioned in an actor statement or not24. The total 
number, the number of different idea elements in an article, as well as the diversity of 
idea elements25, will be closely regarded in order to evaluate the inclusiveness of news 
coverage in the three countries.  
The coverage of the US newspapers contains on average the most idea elements in the 
category of consequences (2.28 idea elements per article) as well as the most different 
idea elements (1.26 different idea elements per article). Germany finds itself in second 
place (1.75 idea elements per article and 1.14 different idea elements per article), while 
Brazil contains the fewest idea elements in general (1.12 idea elements per article) and 
fewest different idea elements (.69 different idea elements per article) in this category. 
The analysis of variance suggest significant differences between the countries in the 
total amount of idea elements for consequences (F(2,897) = 14,71; p<.001). The 
Scheffé post-hoc test reveals these differences to be significant between all three 
countries. For the number of different idea elements, there is also a significant overall 
difference (F(2,897) = 18,57; p<.001), but the Scheffé post-hoc test reveals that the 
significant difference is between Brazil and Germany as well as Brazil and the US, but 
not between Germany and the US. Also, when it comes to diversity, the idea elements 
in the US coverage are slightly more diverse as the index suggests (.69 compared to .71 
in Brazil and Germany). However, there are no significant differences in the means.  
                                                            
24Originally, the idea elements were coded on the statement level. For the following analysis the elements 
were aggregated on the article level since the article is seen as the result of deliberative construction by 
the journalist who chooses different sides and statements to complement or contrast them to each other. It 
is not to be expected that the whole range of different ideas is represented in one statement, but different 
statements in one article can more likely be used to show a diverse picture.  
25 The diversity index was calculated similarly to the Herfindahl index of heterogeneity by dividing the 
number of similar idea elements through the number of all idea elements in one article, squaring these 
ratios and then adding up the terms. The highest possible value would be ‘1’, representing perfect 
homogeneity (only one kind of idea element in the article), while smaller terms represent more 
heterogeneity. 
125 
The US coverage also contains the most causes per article (1.26 causes per article 
compared to 1.15 in Brazil and 1.12 in Germany), but Germany contains the most 
different causes (.75 different causes compared to .71 in Brazil and .72 in the US), 
though it also has the fewest idea elements of causes compared to both other countries. 
However, the differences in this category are rather small, and the analysis of variance 
also reveals no significant country differences.  
As in both other categories, the US coverage again contains the most idea elements in 
the category of solutions (3.51 compared to 2.81 in Brazil and 2.79 in Germany). The 
analysis of variance shows significant differences (F(2,894)=4.17; p<.05). The Scheffé 
test reveals that the significant differences are to be found between Brazil and the US as 
well as Germany and the US but not between Brazil and Germany. There are no 
significant differences between the groups in the number of different idea elements or 
the diversity of idea elements.   
Looking at all idea elements, it becomes clear again that the US coverage contains by 
far the most idea elements on average (7.06 idea elements per article), followed by 
Germany (5.66) and Brazil (5.07). The significant overall difference (F(2,896) = 10.91, 
p<.001) is supplemented by a post-hoc test that reveals that the significant difference 
can be found between Germany and the US as well as Brazil and the US but not Brazil 
and Germany.  
A slightly different pattern is found for the number of different idea elements per article. 
Again, the US has the highest average (4.12 different idea elements per article), 
followed by Germany (3.96) and Brazil (3.34) with a significant difference (F(2,839) = 
7.54, p< .001). However, the post-hoc test here indicates that the differences are higher 
between Brazil and Germany and Brazil and the US but not significant between 
Germany and the US. There are no notable differences in the diversity of idea elements. 
By and large, regarding this deliberative dimension of idea inclusiveness across the 
complete coverage of the sample, the US scores highest, followed by Germany and 
Brazil on the third rank.  
7.2.3 Competing Arguments 
Competing arguments are idea elements that directly oppose or contradict each other. 
Taken together, 70 articles contain such opposing idea elements, which makes up 7.8 
percent of the whole sample. The three countries differ slightly: Only 3.3 percent of all 
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articles in Brazil contain such directly opposing ideas, while in Germany it is 9.9 and in 
the US 11.7 percent of the articles.  
7.2.4 Outcome Orientation 
Whether an outcome to any kind of conflict is displayed or not in the coverage is an 
important deliberative criterion since it is assumed that it is necessary for the public to 
be informed about political decisions that affect processes. For an outcome to be 
displayed, a political decision needed to be made (or at least anticipated) in the first 
place. This makes this category to a certain degree dependent on the actual real-world 
events, e.g., the outcome of the negotiations. If there is no outcome, for example, no 
treaty negotiated, no outcome can be reported in the coverage. However, differences in 
outcome orientation nevertheless reveal how much focus is put on reporting results in 
the coverage of the countries. We find that, in Brazil, 43.6 percent of all articles report 
some kind of outcome (actually decided or at least anticipated) while only 15.6 percent 
of the articles in Germany and 23.7 percent in the US contain information about 
conflicts that have been fixed. However, all three also explicitly report if no solutions 
are found and conflict could not be fixed (49.5 percent of articles in Brazil, 45.3 percent 
of articles in Germany and 34.4 percent of articles in the US). Nevertheless, in Germany 
and the US there is also a large number of articles that contain no outcome orientation at 
all (39.2 percent in Germany, 41.9 percent in the US compared to only 6.9 percent in 
Brazil). Comparing newspapers does not reveal much more information. The only 
remarkable exceptions are again both German newspapers. While only 8.6 percent of 
the articles in the Süddeutsche Zeitung report about the outcome as a solution of the 
conflict and 50.8 percent that the conflict will not be solved, 22.9 percent of the articles 
in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung perceive the conflict to be fixed, and only 39.4 
percent of the articles explicitly report that the conflict will not be solved. This may be 
due to ideological differences in the assessment of what is actually perceived as a 
solution for a conflict and what is not. One newspaper (FAZ) can display a roadmap 
towards a new treaty already as an outcome to solve the problem, while the other (SZ) 
would only accept an actual treaty. However, since both newspapers somehow report on 
the outcome (whether it is sufficient or not in the sense that it will or will not be a 
solution to a conflict), the overall outcome orientation is still about the same. 
It is difficult to assess the overall meaning of these results and offer explanations for the 
differences. The Brazilian coverage seems to have the highest outcome orientation, 
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depicting conflicts as (about to be) fixed as well as not (about to be) fixed. For readers, 
this means a certain transparency about the state of events. It is, however, hard to say 
whether German and US newspapers concentrate less on conflicts, or whether they do 
not recognize the solutions offered as such. It is also difficult to assess whether varying 
political interpretations of the events account for the differences, in the sense that a 
proposal made in the negotiations is interpreted as sufficient for solving the problems by 
one newspaper, while it is assessed as not sufficient by the other. Comparing the 
depicted outcome orientation in articles with different degrees of narrativity in section 
8.3 might help to find further answers. While the absolute outcome orientation is of less 
interest for this study, it will be relevant to see if different patterns of interpretation 
about the outcome (fixed or not fixed?) will be detected as a sort of alternative 
interpretation in narrative news coverage.  
7.2.5 Evaluating the Overall Deliberate Quality 
The second research question asked for the contributions of news narratives to the 
deliberative quality of newspapers and, again, whether there are country differences. As 
originally assumed, it cannot be concluded that determines narrative journalism to be 
either good or bad with regard to deliberative qualities. Instead, I proposed a hypothesis 
that takes the overall deliberative quality into account and suggests that narrative 
journalism differs less in the deliberative quality if the latter is high in the first place. If, 
however, deliberative qualities are lower in general, narrative journalism will have a 
positive relation. To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to evaluate the overall 
deliberative quality in the three countries. Four basic categories are used to get an idea 
about the deliberative quality: the inclusiveness of actors, the inclusiveness of ideas, the 
use of competing arguments (directly opposing ideas), and the outcome orientation. In 
three out of these four categories, the US coverage reaches the highest values for 
deliberative quality: The coverage includes most actor statements in general as well as 
most actor statements from civil society actors, the highest total average of idea 
elements per article as well as the highest average of different idea elements per article, 
and the highest share of articles that contained directly opposing ideas. On the 
dimension of the outcome orientation, US articles have the highest share of articles with 
no conceivable outcome. The deliberative quality of the German newspapers is 
generally more mixed. At the dimension of actor inclusiveness, Germany scored lowest. 
The coverage contains the fewest actor statements in general as well as the fewest civil 
society actor statements in relation to all actor statements. The general diversity of actor 
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statements is still high, so even if they use fewer statements from actors overall, a voice 
is at least given to more different kinds of actors. Looking at the idea inclusiveness, it 
becomes clear that less actor statements do not automatically mean a smaller range of 
included ideas. Germany only differs slightly from the US in this dimension. The 
average of idea elements per article as well as the average of different idea elements per 
article is only a little lower than in the US coverage. The same is true for the use of 
directly opposing idea elements, where the share of articles that contain such competing 
arguments is two percentage points lower in Germany than in the US. The outcome 
orientation is rather mixed in both German newspapers.  
The Brazilian coverage contains the second most actor statements, and the share of civil 
society actor statements is slightly higher than in German coverage. The diversity of 
actor statements is lowest in Brazil compared to both other countries. It also has the 
lowest average of idea elements and the lowest average of different idea elements as 
well as a very low share of articles with opposing idea elements. The share of articles in 
which the conflict is in the end depicted as fixed is highest in Brazil.  
However, one can conclude that the overall deliberative quality is highest in the US, 
followed by Germany and then by Brazil. The difference between the US and Germany 
in the inclusiveness of actor statements is in accordance with Ferree et al. (2002b), who 
also concluded that the US coverage is more inclusive than the German one. One can 
find an explanation for that in the general political system. In cooperative democracies 
like Germany, particular interests are expressed mainly through the parties of the 
multiparty system and well-organized interest groups, whereas in majoritarian systems 
like the US, with presidential systems and fewer political parties, civil society actors are 
more dependent on representing themselves in the debate. However, as one could see 
with regard to the idea inclusiveness, this does not make a big difference. In the mixed 
system of Brazil, where there is a presidential system with a highly fragmented 
multiparty parliament, the actor inclusiveness is slightly higher than in Germany, but 
the diversity of actors is still lower, as is the inclusiveness of ideas. This would 
consequently mean that many actors from the same type of actors (e.g., politicians from 
the government or opposition) repeat more or less the same messages. Due to this very 
low level of opposing arguments it seems that there is not much controversy exhibited 
or debate displayed. This could have various reasons: One interpretation could be that 
Brazilian newspapers tend to see themselves as the voice of the people while following 
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a catch-all logic (Albuquerque, 2012) and that they would therefore try to keep 
complexity and controversy rather low.   
 
7.3 Relating Narrative Features and Deliberative Qualities 
Further analyses in this section will shed more light on the relation of narrative 
characteristics, especially regarding the degree of narrativity and the story types, and 
deliberative qualities. The information gathered will be important to find answers to the 
second set of research questions that asked for the contribution of news narratives to the 
deliberative quality of the newspaper coverage (RQ2a) and the country-specific 
relationships between narrativity and deliberative quality (RQ2b). Two perspectives are 
important to focus on: first, whether there is a general relationship of narrative elements, 
story types and deliberative qualities, in the sense of very general effects, and second, 
whether narrative elements, story types and deliberative qualities have different 
relations in different contexts. Two multi-level analyses will give a general overview of 
the degree of narrativity (Table 10) and the story types (Table 11), before I will go into 
detail on the deliberative qualities in each country.  
Table 10 is a multilevel linear regression to which a set of variables was added 
stepwise. The empty two-level model (Model 0) without any explanatory variables is 
not shown in the table. Models 1 to 5 gain complexity by adding explanatory variables: 
Model 1 uses the country context to explain the degree of narrativity.26 Model 2 adds 
the format of the article. Model 3 looks at the story type, while in model 4 the 
deliberative qualities are added. Model 5 controls for the length of an article.  
Model 1 confirms the significant influence of the country context on the degree of 
narrativity. Compared to Brazil, the German and US coverage have a significantly 
lower degree of narrativity. Model 2 reveals that especially opinion-based articles have 
a significantly higher degree of narrativity, while press reviews in general have a lower 
degree of narrativity. Looking at the story type variables in model 3 shows that only the 
Business as Usual-story type has a significantly lower degree of narrativity. Model 4 
includes the deliberative qualities. There are hardly any general effects. Only a higher 
total number of actors from the political periphery is related to a higher degree of 
narrativity. But when adding the length of the article as last variable in model 5, this 
                                                            
26 Another model that also contained the media organizations significantly lowered the statistical fit of the 
models, which is why the final models leave out the media organizations as another context variable.  
130 
effect, as well as the effects for the Business as Usual story type, and the press reviews 
do not remain significant (while letters to the editor show a significant effect). It will 
therefore be important to examine the role of the length of an article and its relation to 
narrativity more closely in the next section. Articles with a higher degree of narrativity 
include more people from the political periphery, but when the articles that have a 
higher degree of narrativity are significantly longer and therefore simply have more 
room to include different voices, we will have to check if the higher inclusion is 
connected to the length of an article or to its narrative form.  
Table 10 Multilevel linear regression of the degree of narrativity in newspapers 
 Model 1: 
National 
Context 
Model 2 
+ Format 
Model 3 
+ Story Type 
 
Model 4 
+ Deliberative 
Qualities 
Model 5 
+ Length 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Issue Level          
Countries (base: 
Brazil) 
         
Germany -.37*** 
(.08) 
-.32***  
(.08) 
-.23** 
(.09) 
-.31*** 
(.09) 
-.46*** 
(.09) 
USA -.4*** 
(.1) 
-.42*** 
(.1) 
-.28** 
(.11) 
-.43*** 
(.11) 
-.69*** 
(.11) 
Article level          
Format (base: fact-based article)        
Opinion-
based article 
 .37*** 
(.09) 
.36*** 
(.09) 
.44*** 
(.24) 
.29** 
(.1) 
Press review  -.63**  
(.23) 
-.77** 
(.25) 
-.54** 
(.25) 
-.24 
(.24) 
Letter to the 
editor 
 -.01 
(.02) 
-.004 
(.2) 
.21 
(.25) 
.6** 
(.24) 
Other 
format 
 .43  
(.38) 
.24 
(.4) 
.26 
(.61) 
.27 
(.58) 
Story Type (base: Futile Struggle)         
Constant 
Challenge  
  .06 
(.1) 
.44 
(.24) 
.33 
(.23) 
Business as 
Usual  
  -.3** 
(.09) 
.17 
(.22) 
.08 
(.21) 
Stories of 
Success  
  -.14 
(.11) 
.34 
(.27) 
.12 
(.26) 
Deliberative Qualities     
Number of 
CS actor 
statements  
   .11* 
(.04) 
.04 
(.04) 
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Share of CS 
actor 
statements  
   -.21 
(.22) 
-.28 
(.21) 
Number of 
idea 
elements  
   .003 
(.01) 
-.02 
(-.01) 
Number of 
different 
idea 
elements 
   .05 
(.03) 
.03 
(.03) 
Diversity of 
idea 
elements 
   -.12 
(.22) 
-.09 
(.21) 
Contest 
(base: no 
opposing 
arguments) 
   .04 
(.14) 
.004 
(.14) 
Outcome (base: no conceivable outcome)    
Conflict 
fixed 
   -.03 
(.25) 
-.04 
(.24) 
Conflict 
not fixed 
   .37 
(.22) 
.3 
(.21) 
Length of 
article 
    .001*** 
(.0001) 
Intercept     .98 
           
N (Issue level) 364         
N (Article level) 870         
-2LL 2625.1 2600.59 2446.9 2265.96 2185,98 
AIC 2635.11 2618.58 2470.9 2305.96 2227.98 
BIC 2658.95 2661.5 2527.54 2399.12 2325.08 
Note: Cell entries are fixed effects estimates from random intercept models. B(SE) denotes the 
unstandardized regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses; -2LL denotes -2 log likelihood; 
AIC denotes the Akaike’s information criterion; BIC denotes the Bayesian information criterion; all 
models could significantly improve their fit values at a level of at least p<.05 compared to the less defined 
model. 
 
Another multilevel analysis is depicted in Table 11. These four logistic multilevel 
regressions present the attempt to reveal the relation between the single story types as 
well as several context variables and deliberative qualities. Each of the models reports 
the estimated logit coefficients (with their standard errors) as well as the average 
marginal effect (AME). Again, empty two-level models without explanatory variables 
were calculated first. The models presented were built stepwise securing an increasing 
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model fit (Menard, 2002), but in this case, only the final models are displayed. 
Regarding the country context, differences can be detected.27  
The probability of the Futile Struggle story type to be present in the US coverage is 
significantly lower. The AME suggests that the probability is about 18 percentage 
points lower in the US than in Brazil. Likewise, the probability for the Constant 
Challenge narrative to be present in the German or US coverage is about 20 percentage 
points lower than in the Brazilian coverage, while the Business as Usual narrative is 
significantly more likely to be present in Germany (27 percentage points) and the US 
(34 percentage points) than in Brazil. Whether an article is an opinion-based one 
compared to a fact-based article makes a difference for the Constant Challenge as well 
as the Business as Usual narrative. While the former is about 13 percentage points more 
likely to be present in an opinion-based article, the latter is about 12 percentage points 
less likely. Only a few deliberative qualities seem to be directly connected to certain 
story types. The probability of having a higher share of civil society actor statements 
(compared to all actor statements in an article) is, for example, significantly lower in the 
Stories of Success. Regarding the diversity of ideas in an article (measured by a 
diversity index that is smaller the greater the heterogeneity is, with a highest value of 1 
representing complete homogeneity of actors), two story types stick out: The likelihood 
for greater diversity is higher in the Constant Challenge narrative (the negative 
coefficient representing lower index values for more heterogeneity), while it is 
significantly lower in the Business as Usual narrative.  
  
                                                            
27 Again, all models were also calculated with the media organization as additional context variable but 
with no positive effect on the fit statistics of the models.   
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Table 11 Logistic multilevel regressions of story types in newspapers 
 Futile Struggle Constant Challenge Business as Usual Stories of Success 
 B (SE) AME B (SE) AME B (SE) AME B (SE) AME 
Issue Level        
Countries (base: Brazil)        
Germany -.12 
(.17) 
-.03 -1.36*** 
(.24) 
-.2 2.33*** 
(.31) 
.27 -.48 
(.31) 
-.04 
USA -.81*** 
(.22) 
-.18 -1.34*** 
(.3) 
-.2 2.7*** 
(.34) 
.34 .25 
(.33) 
.02 
         
Article Level        
Format (base: fact-based article)      
Opinion-
based article 
-.2  
(.21) 
-.05 .85*** 
(.23) 
.13 -.88** 
(.29) 
-.12 .16 
(.3) 
.02 
Press review .95  
(.51) 
.22 .27 
(.79) 
.04 -1.4* 
(.69) 
-.17 -.37 
(.08) 
-.03 
Letter to the 
editor 
.002 
(.51) 
.00 .6 
(.7) 
.09 -.81 
(.56) 
-.11 .74 
(.79) 
.08 
Other 
format 
-.56 
(1.3) 
-.12 1.7 
(1.3) 
.32 -.25 
(.44) 
-.04 - - 
Deliberative Qualities      
Number of 
CS actor 
statements  
-.07 
(.08) 
-.02 .13 
(.11) 
.02 -.02 
(.11) 
-.002 .04 
(.16) 
.003 
Share of CS 
actor 
statements  
.72 
(.45) 
.17 -.43 
(.56) 
-.06 .45 
(.55) 
.07 -1.75* 
(.8) 
-.16 
Number of 
idea 
elements  
.04 
(.03) 
.01 -.03 
(.05) 
-.005 -.08 
(.05) 
-.01 .04 
(.05) 
.004 
Number of 
different 
idea 
elements 
.07 
(.07) 
.02 -.13 
(.1) 
-.02 .12 
(.09) 
.02 -.15 
(.12) 
-.01 
Diversity of 
idea 
elements 
-.15 
(.46) 
-.04 -1.89** 
(.65) 
-.26 1.92*** 
(.57) 
.28 -.2 
(.7) 
-.02 
Contest 
(base: no 
opposing 
arguments) 
.04 .01 -.19  
(.42) 
-.02 .22 
(.34) 
.03 -.13 -.01 
         
N (Issue level) 364       
N (Article level) 870       
-2LL 1028.72  672.68  719.74  601.48 
AIC 1056.72  700.7  746.74  627.48 
BIC 1121.94  765.91  811.95  687.98 
Note: Cell entries are fixed effects estimates from random intercept models. B(SE) denotes the 
unstandardized logit coefficient with standard error in parentheses; AME denotes the average marginal 
effect on predicted probabilities; -2LL denotes -2 log likelihood; AIC denotes the Akaike’s information 
criterion; BIC denotes the Bayesian information criterion; all models could significantly improve their fit 
values at a level of at least p<.05 compared to the respective empty model (Futile Struggle: -2LL = 
1136.3, AIC = 1140.31, BIC = 1149.75; Constant Challenge: -2LL = 786.5, AIC = 790.49, BIC = 799.94; 
Business as Usual: -2LL = 911.88, AIC = 915.88, BIC = 925.32; Stories of Success: -2LL = 645,16, AIC 
= 649.16, BIC = 658.6) 
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These analyses give first insights into general relationships of narrativity and certain 
context factors as well as into deliberative qualities. The countries seem to differ 
significantly in their use of dominant story types. Also, important deliberative qualities, 
such as the inclusion of civil society actors and the diversity of the ideas presented, do 
not seem to apply to all story types in the same way, which would support the 
assumption that narratives are not in general positive or negative for the deliberative 
quality but that it obviously depends, on the type of story that is told (e.g. in what 
country and in which format). 
To further disentangle country-specific relationships and effects, I will go into detail on 
each of the deliberative qualities in the next paragraphs and regard the relation of the 
degree of narrativity and deliberative qualities as well as the deliberative quality of the 
different story types for each country separately.  
7.3.1 Deliberative Quality and the Degree of Narrativity 
7.3.1.1 Inclusiveness of Actors 
To bring narrativity and deliberative elements together, I initially looked at the 
inclusiveness of actors on the input dimension, because it is an important requirement of 
deliberation to allow popular inclusion of actors, speakers and ideas into the debate. 
Table 12 compares how many actor statements per article can be found in Brazilian, 
German and US newspaper articles with high narrativity (two and more narrative 
elements) and lower narrativity. An analysis of variance between the newspapers in 
each country revealed no significant differences between the newspapers within the 
countries themselves. For this reason, in the following analyses I only look at 
differences between countries. 
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Table 12 Mean actor statements per article and actor statement concentration index (ACI) 
 Low narrativity High narrativity Overall 
Brazil 
M 
SD 
n 
ACI 
 
3.55 
2.5 
141 
.223 
 
5.5 
3.25 
178 
.243 
 
4.58 
2.99 
319 
.229 
Germany 
M 
SD 
n 
ACI 
 
3.48 
2.78 
211 
.197 
 
4.79 
3.17 
152 
.194 
 
3.99 
3.07 
363 
.191 
USA 
M 
SD 
n 
ACI 
 
4.89 
3.54 
118 
.207 
 
5.63 
4.32 
70 
.194 
 
5.16 
3.85 
188 
.193 
Overall 
M 
SD 
n 
ACI 
 
3.86 
2.97 
470 
.203 
 
5.29 
3.44 
400 
.213 
 
4.45 
3.24 
870 
.202 
Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188) 
Across all three countries, articles with low narrativity contain less actor statements than 
articles with higher narrativity. American narrative news articles also include more 
actor statements on average (M=5.63) than Brazilian (M=5.5) and German narrative 
news articles (M=4.79).  
However, we can also detect that narrative articles are significantly longer (Pearson’s 
r=0.31, p<0.01 for the relationship of the degree of narrativity and the length of an 
article), which simply gives articles more space for actor statements. Hence, the length 
of an article functions as a mediator28 between the degree of narrativity and the total 
number of actor statements, as already became obvious in the last model of the multi-
level regression above. The significant indirect effect of the degree of narrativity on the 
number of actor statements in an article through the length of the article is b=0.43, BCa 
CI [.34, .54]. This represents a small but notable effect, κ²=.15, 95% BCa CI [.12, .18], 
which we can interpret as the indirect effect being 15% of the maximum value that it 
could have been if the length would explain the number of actor statements all by 
itself.29  
                                                            
28 Analysis was performed with the Process Macro for SPSS by Andrew Hayes (Hayes 2013) 
29 The countries differ regarding the relation of the degree of narrativity, the length of an article and the 
number of actor statements. In Brazil, the indirect effect is stronger with b=0.8, BCa CI [.62, 1.03] and 
κ²= .31, 95% BCa CI [.25, .37]. In Germany, the indirect effect is slightly stronger than the overall 
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Looking at the actor concentration index (ACI) in Table 12, we detect that German 
news stories are in general most even in their dispersion of types of actors; the Brazilian 
news stories are the least even in their dispersion of types of actors compared to German 
and American articles. At the same time, the actor ensembles in news stories with 
higher narrativity are less concentrated in Germany and the US than in news stories 
with lower narrativity, while it is the other way around in Brazilian news stories. 
Therefore, in the cases of Germany and the US, narrative news stories seem to give 
more room for different voices. Figures 5 to 7 shed more light on the actor statements in 
both articles with a low and a high degree of narrativity. In all three countries, 
statements from political actors have the highest share in articles with low as well as 
with high narrativity. In Brazil and Germany, the share of statements from political 
actors is even higher in articles with a higher degree of narrativity. In the US, the share 
is slightly smaller than in articles with lower narrativity, but statements from political 
actors by far remain the most often quoted. In Brazil and Germany, statements directly 
made by journalists decrease with higher narrativity of an article. The presence of NGO 
representatives differs between the countries. While in Brazil the share of statements 
made by NGO representatives is similar in articles with high and low narrativity, in 
Germany and the US the share is slightly higher in articles with higher narrativity. It is 
also interesting to note that in the US the share of business and industry representatives 
increases in articles with higher narrativity. However, comparing measures of 
association in all three countries (below each figure), one will note that it only makes a 
significant difference in Germany and Brazil whether articles have a higher or lower 
degree of narrativity and which actors are represented.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
indirect effect with b=0.47, BCa CI [.34, .62] and κ²=.16, 95% BCa CI [.12, .21]. In the US, the indirect 
effect is b=0.6, BCa CI [.3, 1.00] and κ²=.16, 95% BCa CI [.08, .25]. 
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Figure 5 Brazil: Relative frequencies of actor statements in newspaper articles with a low or high degree of 
narrativity 
 
Note: N=1480 actor statements; numbers above bars are percentages based on all articles with either a 
low or high degree of narrativity; χ2=24.35*** df(8); λ=0. 00 (asymmetric with ‘type of actor’ as 
dependent variable); V=0.13*** 
 
Figure 6 Germany: Relative frequencies of actor statements in newspaper articles with a low or high degree of 
narrativity 
Note: N=1481 actor statements; numbers above bars are percentages based on all articles with either a 
low or high degree of narrativity; χ2=15.72** df(8); λ=0.03* (asymmetric with ‘type of actor’ as 
dependent variable); V=0.1** 
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Figure 7 USA: Relative frequencies of actor statements in newspaper articles with a low or high degree of narrativity 
Note: N=971 actor statements; numbers above bars are percentages based on all articles with either a low 
or high degree of narrativity; χ2=11.32 df(8); λ=0. 01 (asymmetric with ‘type of actor’ as dependent 
variable); V=0.12 
Looking at the direct relationship between the degree of narrativity and the 
inclusiveness of actors, further country differences can be found. Since we have learned 
above that both German newspapers differ in their degree of narrativity as well as in 
their average presentation of actors from the political periphery, I will also consider 
newspapers in the following analysis.  
Table13 depicts regression coefficients for the degree of narrativity of an article and the 
number of actor statements made by actors from the political periphery. Across all 
countries, there is a general significant relationship of higher narrativity and a higher 
number of actor statements from the periphery. This significant relationship can also be 
found in Brazil and Germany but not in the US. 
Table 13 Within-regressions of ‘number of actor statements from the periphery’ on ‘degree of narrativity’ 
 Actor 
statements  
M (SD) 
Regression 
Constant 
b0 
Regression 
Coefficient b 
Pearson’s 
r 
R² in 
% 
Brazil 1.09 (1.35) .79 .18** .15** 2.3 
Fohla de Sao Paulo .94 (1.3) .8 .09 .08 0.6 
O Globo 1.21 (1.36) .76 .26** .22** 4.7 
      
Germany 1.05 (1.45) .74 .24*** .175*** 2.8 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 1.30 (1.5) .93 .25* .18** 3.2 
Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung .79 (1.32) .59 .17* .135* 1.8 
12
33
.3
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6
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17
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7 5
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USA 1.67 (1.72) 1.53 .11 .06 .4 
The New York Times 1.68 (1.5) 1.34 .26 .18* 3.2 
The Washington Post 1.66 (1.86) 1.83 -.14 -.06 .4 
      
OVERALL  1.18 (1.48) .95 .17*** .12*** 1.5 
Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188) 
However, since the degree of narrativity differs between newspapers, especially 
between the German ones, we cannot take it for granted that the relationship between 
the degree of narrativity and the number of actor statements from the periphery is the 
same in the newspapers of one country. Regression coefficients and correlations for 
each newspaper are therefore included in Table 13. Figure 9 clearly illustrates that the 
relationship between the number of actor statements from the periphery and the degree 
of narrativity varies between newspapers. Intercepts as well as slopes differ, as is also 
expressed in the different regression constants and coefficients in Table 13.  
While we see positive relationships between the degree of narrativity and the number of 
actor statements from the periphery in German and Brazilian newspapers, one of the 
American newspapers deviates from this pattern: For the Washington Post, the 
regression coefficient is negative, but this result has to be handled with some caution 
since there are only six WP articles that contain three narrative elements and only one 
article that contains all four narrative elements. I would therefore not draw a general 
conclusion from this small number of examples.  
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Figure 8 Regression lines for within-regression of ‘number of actor statements from periphery’ on ‘degree of 
narrativity’ 
 
As we have learned above, there is also a relationship between the length and the 
number of actor statements in the article. Therefore, the question remains whether civil 
society actors are more or less likely to appear in articles with a higher degree of 
narrativity compared to other actors, while all appear more often in narrative articles 
because of their length. As Table 14 indicates, about one fourth of all articles contain 
actor statements from the periphery. The highest share of actor statements from civil 
society, scientists, and politicians from the opposition and ordinary citizens is found in 
the US, where these actors give one third of all statements in the coverage. In Brazil and 
Germany, the share is slightly below the average at about 23 (Germany) and 24 (Brazil) 
percent. Only in Germany, however, there is a significant positive correlation between 
the share of peripheral actor statements and the degree of narrativity. At newspaper 
level, there are no significant correlations, and the explanatory power of within-
regression tended against 0, which is why these results are not reported for the sake of 
parsimony.  
Table 14 Correlations between the degree of narrativity and the share of peripheral actor statements 
 Brazil Germany USA ALL  
Share of Peripheral 
Actor Statements 
23.95 % 22.93% 33.93 % 25.6 % 
Pearson’s r .038 .111 -.011 .044 
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p .505 .034 .878 .194 
Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188) 
Germany is the only country in which the share of peripheral actor statements 
continuously increases with the degree of narrativity, as Figure 9 reveals. In the US and 
Brazil, articles with the highest degree of narrativity have the lowest share of peripheral 
actor statements. Again, we have to keep in mind that there are only five articles in the 
US sample that contain all four narrative elements and it is therefore difficult to confirm 
if these results account for a general trend. In the Brazilian sample, there are 17 articles 
with all four narrative elements and the drop in the share of the peripheral actor 
statements is most obvious. Regarding the headlines of these 17 articles, one gets an 
impression about the content of these articles and one easily notices that they mostly 
focus on COP proceedings and the actions of specific countries (10 out of 17 articles 
mention countries as protagonists of the stories), e.g. “Bolivia to Contest Climate Deal”, 
“Islands Propose New Protocol at COP 16”, “Poland Clings to Coal Use” or “Obama 
and the Fear of a Green China” (complete list in the appendix, headlines translated from 
Portuguese to English). As these headlines suggest, Brazilian narrative articles focus on 
countries as actors and obviously give less room for peripheral voices.  
Figure 9 Degree of narrativity (number of narrative elements contained) and share of peripheral actor statements 
 
Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188); numbers represent the relative 
frequencies of articles that contain statements from peripheral actors within all articles of a country, which have the 
same degree of narrativity 
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7.3.1.2 Inclusiveness of Ideas 
To assess the relation of the inclusiveness of ideas and the degree of narrativity, Table 
15 summarizes the average number of idea elements per article, the average number of 
different idea elements, the diversity of idea elements for each of the three dimensions 
(consequences of climate change, causes and solutions), and the total amount of idea 
elements across all dimensions as well as correlation coefficients with the degree of 
narrativity for each variable.  
Consequences of Climate Change 
In this category, Germany is the only country in which we find significant correlations 
between the degree of narrativity and the amount of idea elements. The higher the 
degree of narrativity, the more idea elements as well as the more different idea elements 
are included in the coverage. Also, the diversity significantly increases with a higher 
degree of narrativity (a negative correlation here means higher diversity, since the index 
represents homogeneity at the level of ‘1’).  
Causes of climate change 
The US coverage contains the most causes per article, but Germany contains the most 
different causes, though it also has the least idea elements of causes compared to both 
other countries. However, the differences in this category are rather small and the 
analysis of variance has also shown no significant country differences, as reported 
above. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that there are significant correlations between the 
total number of idea elements and the number of different idea elements and the degree 
of narrativity in Brazil and Germany. In all three countries, the diversity of idea 
elements increases slightly with a higher degree of narrativity but not to a significant 
degree. 
Solutions for climate change 
In the category of solutions, it is only Brazil that has notable correlations with the 
degree of narrativity. The higher the degree, the more idea elements as well as the more 
different idea elements are contained; but the diversity also significantly increases, 
which hints at a lower concentration of more of the same elements in one article.     
All idea elements 
Looking at all idea elements across all articles in the three countries, there are 
significant correlations between the degree of narrativity and the number of idea 
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elements as well as between the number of different idea elements and the diversity of 
ideas. However, this effect can be detected in Brazil and Germany, but not in the US. In 
the US, where the number of idea elements is generally quite high, it initially seems that 
there is not much difference between articles with lower or higher degrees of 
narrativity.  
But the means are misleading here, as Figure 10 clearly demonstrates. In Brazil and 
Germany, there clearly are linear relationships between idea elements and the diversity 
of idea elements and the degree of narrativity. However, there are no such relationships 
in the US. The articles with the highest degree of narrativity have the least total number 
of idea elements and different idea elements per article as well as the highest 
homogeneity of idea elements. However, there are only five articles in the US sample 
that have a degree of narrativity of ‘4’ (meaning that they include all four narrative 
characteristics at the same time). When looking into these five articles, they reveal what 
they are about and give an idea about the use of idea elements. To give two short 
examples: A first short letter to the editor titled “Bloomberg and Climate” from the New 
York Times (November 19, 2012) tells from a first-person perspective how the author 
(a former Chair Woman of the democratic party in New York) highly respects New 
York City’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s endorsement of Barack Obama due to the 
severity of the climate change issue, for which the US should provide leadership. There 
is nothing said about causes or solutions to the problem but rather a personal call for 
bipartisan action is made. A second article titled “Rising Temperatures Threaten 
Fundamental Change for Ski Slopes” (New York Times, December 13, 2012) focuses 
the 18 year old college student and college ski –team member Helena Williams in 
Newbury (New Hampshire) and the difficulties of the region to guarantee a full snow 
season. The detailed article provides statistic information about temperature and the 
amount of snow in this region and others, but when counted for idea elements, only 
these three consequences of climate change can be detected: rising temperatures, 
extreme weather, and economic difficulties. The article does not shed light on either 
causes or remedies. It nevertheless makes an important contribution to the debate by 
emphasizing the severe consequences of global climate change for local communities 
and businesses. However, those two articles as well as the other three US articles with 
the highest degree of narrativity, all focus on specific details of the climate change 
issue. They are examples of  rather straightforward individual stories with a clear focus 
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on a person or an event rather than a complex narratives that tries to draw a bigger 
picture.  
Figure 10 Degree of narrativity and (1) average of all idea elements per article; (2) the average of 
different idea elements per article; and (3) the average diversity index per article 
 
 
Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188) 
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Table 15 Inclusiveness of idea elements and correlations with the degree of narrativity 
  Brazil Germany USA All 
  M (SD) Pearson’s r M (SD) Pearson’s r M (SD) Pearson’s r M (SD) Pearson’s r 
Co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 Idea elements per 
article total 
1.12 (1.93) .087 1.75 (2.23) .107* 2.28 (3.3) .058 1.63 (2.46) .054 
Different idea 
elements per 
article 
.69 (1.09) .089 1.14 (1.21) .149** 1.26 (1.3) .062 1 (1.2) .070 
Diversity index .71 (.29) -.039 .71 (.29) -.2** .69 (.3) -.112 .71 (.29) -0.129** 
Ca
us
es
 
Idea elements per 
article total  
1.15 (1.14) .143** 1.12 (1.45) .166** 1.26 (1.45) .077 1.16 (1.46) .137*** 
Different idea 
elements per 
article 
.71 (.76) .167** .75 (1.44) .185*** .72 (.7) .104 .73 (.75) .159*** 
Diversity index .86 (.22) -.025 .87 (.22) -.128 .89 (.2) -.066 .87 (.21) -.085 
So
lu
tio
ns
 
Idea elements per 
article total  
2.81 (2.77) .261*** 2.79 (2.75) .127* 3.53 (4.0) .110 2.95 (3.07) .159*** 
Different idea 
elements per 
article 
1.94 (1.68) .266*** 2.07 (1.73) .102 2.14 (2.12) .108 2.04 (1.8) .153*** 
Diversity index .55 (.27) -.274*** .58 (.38) -.067 .59 (.36) -.023 .58 (.34) -.132*** 
Al
l I
de
a E
lem
en
ts Idea elements per article total  
5.07 (4.06) .273*** 5.66 (4.21) .199*** 7.06 (6.21) .124 5.73 (4.7) .176*** 
Different idea 
elements per 
article 
3.34 (2.38) .282*** 3.96 (2.51) .198*** 4.12 (2.93) .130 3.77 (2.58) .187*** 
Diversity index .44 (.28) -.308*** .39 (.26) -.177* .43 (.29) -.141 .41 (.27) -.183*** 
Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188) 
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7.3.1.3 Competing Arguments 
Since there are only a few articles that actually contain directly opposing arguments, I 
will again only look at differences between articles with a high or a low degree of 
narrativity rather than calculating correlations for each country. Table 16 provides 
information on the absolute and relative frequencies of opposing idea elements in 
articles with a low and high degree of narrativity. In Brazil, there is no difference 
between articles with low and high narrativity. In Germany, articles with a high degree 
of narrativity have a slightly higher share of opposing arguments but the difference is 
only one percentage point. The difference in the US is higher. There, opposing idea 
elements in articles with a high degree of narrativity have a share that is more than six 
percentage points higher than in articles with a low degree of narrativity.  
Table 16 Opposing arguments in articles with low and high narrativity (absolute and relative frequencies) 
 Brazil Germany USA All 
 n % n % n % n % 
Low 5 3.5 20 9.5 11 9.3 36 7.7 
High  6 3.4 16 10.5 11 15.7 33 8.3 
ALL 11 3.4 36 9.9 22 11.7 69 7.9 
Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188), relative frequencies 
relate to the number of articles of either low or high narrativity in a country 
However, across all three countries, there is only a very small (and not significant) 
correlation between the degree of narrativity and the amount of opposing idea elements 
in an article.  
7.3.1.4 Outcome Orientation 
There are two consistent patterns across countries when we regard outcome orientation 
and the degree of narrativity. First of all, in all three countries the stories with a lower 
degree of narrativity have a higher share of stories with no conceivable outcome than 
those with a higher degree of narrativity. The difference in Brazil is smallest with a 
margin of three percentage points, second highest in Germany with about 10 percentage 
points, and highest in the US with a difference of 12 percentage points. The general 
outcome orientation is therefore higher in stories with a higher degree of narrativity. 
The second pattern is that in all three countries the share of stories in which a conflict 
could not been fixed is considerably higher in stories with higher narrativity than in 
stories with lower narrativity. Only in the US, however, the share of stories in which a 
conflict could be fixed is higher in stories with higher narrativity (with a difference of 
10 percentage points), while in Germany and Brazil the share is a few percentage points 
lower. The difference of the share of stories in which the conflict is not fixes in stories 
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with a higher degree of narrativity compared to stories with a lower degree is 
remarkably high in Germany: About 39 percent of all stories with a low degree of 
narrativity report an outcome that is not fixed while about 53 percent of the stories with 
a high degree of narrativity end with an unsolved conflict. This might indicate that there 
is more critical assessment of the events in stories with a higher degree of narrativity.  
7.3.1.5 Interim conclusion 
The analyses above revealed mixed results about the general relationship of narrativity 
and deliberative quality. Articles with a higher degree of narrativity contain more actor 
statements but the actors represented are less diverse (higher actor concentration index). 
There is a higher number of statements from actors from the periphery, but the share of 
those actor statements does not increase. As for the ideas represented in the articles: a 
higher degree of narrativity has as a consequence more ideas, more different ideas and a 
more even dispersion of different ideas. There are also more competing arguments in 
articles with a higher degree of narrativity, as well as a higher outcome orientation.  
However, a closer look at each country revealed stark differences and individual 
patterns for the relation of narrativity and the respective deliberative qualities. 
Hypothesis 4 suggested that, if the deliberative quality is higher in general, the 
difference between narrative and less narrative news is smaller. This seems to be partly 
supported. In the US coverage, it hardly makes a difference in the deliberative quality 
whether narrative or non-narrative writing is applied: There is only a small positive 
relationship between the number of actor statements in the New York Times and a very 
small negative relationship in the Washington Post, but no relation with the share of 
civil society actor statements. There is also no link between a higher degree of 
narrativity and the number of idea elements, different idea elements or more or less 
diversity of idea elements. However, especially the diversity of ideas would need 
further investigation since there are indications that one cannot assume a linear 
relationship between the degree of narrativity and the number of idea elements (see 
Figure 10). Articles with the highest degree of narrativity seem to have very low 
numbers of idea elements, but since there were only very few of these articles, it is risky 
to draw general conclusions from that. The low diversity of the strongly narrative 
articles would nevertheless support Benson (2009), who criticizes the low frame 
diversity of narrative-driven US journalism.  
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There is a greater difference between articles with high and low narrativity with respect 
to the opposing arguments criterion. Articles with a higher degree of narrativity have a 
share of opposing ideas that is five percentage points higher compared to articles with 
lower narrativity. The outcome orientation (referring to those articles that report about 
conflicts that are either solved or remain unsolved) is also higher in articles with a 
higher degree of narrativity: The latter more often explicitly contain a kind of conflict 
that is either (about to be) fixed or not fixed. So, for the US coverage, one can conclude 
that narrativity and inclusiveness do not seem to be connected to each other, but that 
narrative articles display more controversy as well as outcomes of conflicts.  
In the Brazilian coverage, the link between the degree of narrativity and the deliberative 
qualities is ambiguous. There is only a positive relation between the number of actor 
statements and the degree of narrativity in the newspaper O Globo, but in both 
newspapers, there is no correlation between the share of civil society actor statements 
and the degree of narrativity. However, there is a positive relationship between the 
degree of narrativity and the number of idea elements and different idea elements as 
well as the diversity of idea elements. Narrative articles are therefore more inclusive 
towards ideas than towards actors. There is no difference between articles with a higher 
or lower degree of narrativity with regard to opposing arguments, where the levels are 
equally low. The outcome orientation is in general slightly higher in articles with a 
higher degree of narrativity. These articles less often display no conceivable outcome. 
Within the narrative articles, stories in which the presented conflict will not be solved in 
the end prevail, while stories in which the conflict is actually fixed have a lower share 
than in articles with a lower degree of narrativity. In the case of Brazil, which has a high 
general degree of narrativity and a low level of deliberative quality, this means that 
narrativity does not make it better or worse.  
The picture is clearer in the German coverage, which up until now was rated as a mixed 
case with regard to narrativity as well as deliberative quality. Narrative news stories 
contain more actor statements in general and a higher share of civil society actors. They 
also contain more idea elements as well as different idea elements, and the diversity of 
ideas is also higher. The share of articles with opposing ideas is also slightly higher 
among articles with a higher degree of narrativity. Also, articles with a higher degree of 
narrativity contain less articles with no conceivable outcome, and the stories with a 
higher degree of narrativity assess the described conflicts as not solved which may be a 
sign for more debate and more critical assessment of the events, which would be in 
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accordance with the result that more civil society voices are represented in articles with 
higher degrees of narrativity. Concluding from this, the relation between the degree of 
narrativity and deliberative quality is most positive in the case of Germany.  
7.3.2 Deliberative Quality and Story Types 
7.3.2.1 Inclusiveness of Actors 
The next set of analyses aims at assessing the deliberative qualities of the four different 
story types. Comparing the average number of actor statements, the four story types do 
not differ significantly. Recalling that the average number of actor statements across all 
articles was 4.45, the three story types Futile Struggle (4.77), Constant Challenge (4.71) 
and Stories of Success (4.91) have actor statement numbers above and the Business as 
Usual (4.41) below that average. If we look at actor statements from the periphery, this 
pattern only differs slightly. While the general average was 1.18 peripheral actor 
statements per article, all story types range close to that with 1.28 for the Futile 
Struggle, 1.21 for the Constant Challenge, 1.21 for Business as Usual and the lowest 
value of .94 for the Stories of Success.  
Looking at each country in particular, story types vary more in their average inclusion 
of actors in general and from the periphery (Table 17). For example, in articles with the 
Futile Struggle story type, US articles are well above the average of all actor statements 
within this story type and compared to peripheral actor statements. Compared to the 
average, all four story types are above average when it comes to actor statements in 
general and actor statements from the periphery in particular. Articles with the Constant 
Challenge story types in Germany, for example, are well below the average of all 
articles of this story type. The low value of only 0.36 average actor statements from the 
periphery in Brazilian Business as Usual stories also stick out in this direct comparison.  
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Table 17 Story types and average numbers of actor statements 
Story 
Type 
Country All actor statements Peripheral actor 
statements 
Fu
til
e 
St
ru
gg
le
 
Brazil M  4.52 1.10 
N 151 151 
SD 2.744 1.355 
Germany M 4.42 1.20 
N 154 154 
SD 2.878 1.466 
USA M 6.36 1.98 
N 58 58 
SD 4.352 1.811 
All M 4.77 1.28 
N 363 363 
SD 3.176 1.510 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 C
ha
lle
ng
e 
Brazil M 5.31 1.41 
N 93 93 
SD 3.356 1.476 
Germany M 3.26 .56 
N 39 39 
SD 3.210 1.119 
USA M 4.74 1.58 
N 19 19 
SD 3.619 1.805 
All M 4.71 1.21 
N 151 151 
SD 3.444 1.481 
Bu
sin
es
s a
s U
su
al
 
Brazil M 3.09 .36 
N 22 22 
SD 2.136 .727 
Germany M 3.94 1.08 
N 108 108 
SD 2.485 1.361 
USA M 4.41 1.66 
N 73 73 
SD 3.166 1.758 
All M 4.01 1.21 
N 203 203 
SD 2.733 1.515 
St
or
ie
s o
f S
uc
ce
ss
 
Brazil M 4.67 .79 
N 48 48 
SD 3.663 1.129 
Germany M 4.59 .85 
N 34 34 
SD 4.398 1.258 
USA M 5.67 1.27 
N 30 30 
SD 4.302 1.484 
All M 4.91 .94 
N 112 112 
SD 4.059 1.275 
 
Again, the study looked at the share of peripheral actor statements (Figure 11). Here 
too, there is a high share of peripheral actor statements in the US: Within all story types, 
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the US coverage is the most inclusive. In Brazil, civil society has the highest chance to 
be represented in stories on the constant challenges of climate change. In Germany, it is 
the Futile Struggle in which peripheral actors are most likely to be quoted. Probably the 
most striking is the difference in the Business as Usual story type, where the share of 
peripheral actors in the US is almost 37 percent, while in Brazil it is only about 10 
percent. Since these are stories that chronicle the ongoing political process and the 
progress of the negotiations, it seems that civil society actors are more naturally part of 
them in the US than in Brazil, where the focus clearly lies on the political elites. In 
Germany, the story type that represents the most urgency regarding climate change, is 
also the one with the highest share of peripheral actors, which points to the assumption 
that in the German coverage, civil society actors represent a specific urgent perspective 
in the media coverage.  
Figure 11 Share of peripheral actor statements in story types 
 
Base: 829 newspaper articles; numbers above bars represent the relative frequencies of articles in which 
actor statements from civil society actors are included within all articles belonging to a particular story 
type in a country  
7.3.2.2 Inclusiveness of Ideas 
The inclusiveness of ideas in the four story types differs between countries and 
newspapers. Overall, the Futile Struggle story type has the highest average of idea 
elements, the highest average of different idea elements, and the lowest diversity index. 
Within this story type, US newspapers both stand out with particular values of the 
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average numbers of idea elements and different idea elements. Both German 
newspapers also have the highest average values of idea elements and lowest value of 
the diversity index for stories within this Futile Struggle story type. That it is especially 
the Futile Struggle story type that is most inclusive is remarkable, since one would 
probably not expect such a pessimistic story type to be inclusive but to contain a limited 
and repeating set of arguments. However, these stories actually comprise the whole 
range of cause and consequence idea elements. Climate change is obviously depicted as 
a highly complex phenomenon, which makes it especially difficult to handle. When it 
comes to the solutions that are offered, this story type is weak and only in third place 
compared to the other story types. However, since this story type is also the one with 
the highest inclusiveness of actors from the political periphery, it seems that this is one 
of the most important story types for civil society in which the dramatic urgency of the 
situation is expressed, which can raise awareness of the need for action.  
The Constant Challenge story type is generally less inclusive. Only in Brazil it is more 
inclusive at the idea element level, which goes hand in hand with a high inclusiveness 
of civil society actor statements. In Germany as well as in Brazil, the story types with 
the highest shares of actor statements from the periphery are also the ones with the 
highest inclusiveness of idea elements. This is not true for the US coverage, however, 
where most of the actor statements from the periphery are found in the Business as 
Usual story type, which actually is the least inclusive at the level of idea elements.  
The Business as Usual-story type is the least inclusive one, especially because of the 
remarkably low values of both Brazilian newspapers. In Germany, the inclusiveness of 
this story type does not differ to this extent from the other story types. At the same time, 
however, the story types in the German newspapers have the smallest range in the 
average inclusiveness of idea elements in general, compared to the other newspapers.  
Differences in the inclusiveness of the Stories of Success are again especially obvious 
due to the high level of idea inclusiveness in US newspapers. For the German 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, this story type is the least inclusive of all, for the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung the second least inclusive.  
Table 18 Inclusiveness of idea elements in story types per country and newspaper 
  n 
Average number of 
idea elements per 
article 
Average number of 
different idea elements 
per article 
Idea 
diversity 
index 
Fu
til
e 
St
ru
g  Brazil 151 5.16 (4.26) 3.39 (2.47) .44 (.31) 
Fohla de Sao Paulo 74 4.43 (3.3) 3.03 (2.02) .48 (.31) 
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O Globo 77 5.86 (4.94) 3.74 (2.81) .4 (.28) 
Germany 154 6.6 (4.56) 4.53 (2.45) .32 (.19) 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 88 6.75 (4.21) 4.75 (2.45) .31 (.21) 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 66 6.41 (5.0) 4.23 (2.45) .34 (.19) 
USA 56 9.55 (7.29) 5.07 (3.19) .37 (.29) 
New York Times 30 10.5 (8.76) 5.19 (3.54) .4 (.31) 
Washington Post 25 8.46 (5.38) 4.93 (2.79) .34 (.26) 
OVERALL 361 6.46 (5.19) 4.14 (2.67) .38 (.26) 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 C
ha
lle
ng
e 
Brazil 93 5.82 (3.87) 3.71 (2.06) .39 (.21) 
Fohla de Sao Paulo 36 5.28 (3.46) 3.39 (1.96) .4 (.19) 
O Globo 57 6.16 (4.11) 3.91 (2.11) .38 (.23) 
Germany 39 4.9 (3.7) 3.72 (2.46) .38 (.26) 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 25 5.24 (3.78) 3.76 (2.44) .39 (.3) 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 14 4.29 (3.06) 3.63 (2.59) .34 (.15) 
USA 19 6.11 (4.57) 4.16 (2.41) .38 (.23) 
New York Times 9 6.44 (4.04) 5.0 (2.35) .31 (.2) 
Washington Post 10 5.8 (5.2) 3.4 (2.32) .45 (.21) 
OVERALL 151 5.62 (3.9) 3.77 (2.2) .38 (.23) 
Bu
sin
es
s a
s U
su
al
 
Brazil 22 3.23 (3.3) 2.5 (2.57) .55 (.37) 
Fohla de Sao Paulo 10 4.1 (4.28) 3.0 (3.3) .45 (.38) 
O Globo 12 2.5 (2.15) 2.08 (1.83) .62 (.35) 
Germany 108 5.32 (4.22) 3.55 (2.61) .46 (.3) 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 56 5.07 (4.08) 3.09 (2.29) .53 (.32) 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 52 5.6 (4.09) 4.04 (2.86) .39 (.28) 
USA 72 5.51 (5.32) 3.45 (2.78) .5 (.33) 
New York Times 38 4.95 (5.43) 3.19 (2.68) .57 (.36) 
Washington Post 34 6.15 (5.21) 3.76 (2.9) .42 (.27) 
OVERALL 202 5.16 (4.59) 3.4 (2.68) .48 (.31) 
St
or
ie
s o
f S
uc
ce
ss
 
Brazil 48 4.79 (3.85) 3.02 (2.14) .51 (.3) 
Fohla de Sao Paulo 22 4.45 (2.94) 2.86 (1.73) .47 (.26) 
O Globo 26 5.08 (4.52) 3.15 (2.85) .55 (.32) 
Germany 34 5.15 (3.05) 3.65 (1.82) .43 (.27) 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 6 4.5 (2.17) 3.17 (2.14) .48 (.3) 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 28 5.29 (3.22) 3.76 (1.78) .41 (.27) 
USA 30 7.9 (5.73) 4.63 (2.68) .36 (.18) 
New York Times 13 6.85 (3.56) 4.15 (2.15) .38 (.18) 
Washington Post 17 8.71 (6.96) 5.0 (3.04) .34 (.17) 
OVERALL 112 5.73 (4.4) 3.64 (2.39) .44 (.27) 
7.3.2.3 Competing arguments  
Comparing story types according to their competing arguments does not prove to be 
particularly revealing. Within all articles written with the Business as Usual story type, 
8.9 percent contain competing arguments (18 articles). 32 articles (or 8.8 percent) of the 
articles in the Futile Struggle story type, 7 articles (6.3 percent) of the Stories of Success 
and 8 articles (5.3 percent) of the Constant Challenge stories contain competing 
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arguments. Due to small absolute numbers, a distinct country comparison is not 
instructive.   
7.3.2.4 Outcome Orientation 
The outcome variable was one of the variables included in the cluster analysis and is 
therefore also decisive for the interpretation of the resulting story types. Table 4 
depicted the relative frequencies of the outcome variable in each story type cluster. 
According to this table, there are two story types with a high outcome orientation and 
two with either a low or no outcome orientation. The story types Constant Challenge 
and Stories of Success both have a very high share of articles in which a certain conflict 
is solved in some way. These story types therefore reflect events that lead to some kind 
of (political) decision or solution. The Futile Struggle story type has the highest share of 
articles in which a certain conflict is not solved. The events reported in those articles do 
not lead to political action. The Business as Usual story type is the one where there is 
no conceivable outcome.     
Beyond looking at the outcome of the overall conflict, one can also approach the 
outcome orientation by assessing the inclusion of solution idea elements more closely. 
Table 11 depicted that there is a positive correlation of idea elements on the dimension 
of solutions to climate change and the degree of narrativity in all countries (though this 
correlation is only significant in Brazil and Germany for the total number of idea 
elements and in Brazil also for the number of different idea elements).   
Further comparing the story types for differences in the outcome orientation, an analysis 
of variance reveals that, indeed, the Stories of Success also contain the most idea 
elements on the dimension of solutions (M = 3.97, SD = 3.5), followed by the Constant 
Challenge (M = 3.17, SD = 2.73), and the Futile Struggle (M = 3.1, SD = 2.1). The 
Business as Usual story type is the one with the least solution elements (M = 2.4, SD = 
2.1). There is a significant difference (F(3,822) = 6.46, p< .001), while the Scheffé post-
hoc test discloses that the significant difference lies between the Stories of Success and 
Business as Usual narrative.  
Figure 12 more particularly shows how the solution orientation differs between 
countries within the different story types. At first sight, the average use of solution idea 
elements in the US compared to both other countries is noticeable, especially within the 
Futile Struggle and the Stories of Success narrative. However, especially in the Stories 
of Success, solution elements are used above average in all countries. The Business as 
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Usual narrative uses the least solution idea elements in all countries. While in Brazil the 
Constant Challenge narrative is the one with the second highest average of solution idea 
elements, this is the case for Futile Struggle narrative in Germany.  
Figure 12 Solution idea elements in story types 
Base: 829 newspaper articles; numbers above bars denote the average representation of solution idea 
elements per article in articles of the respective story type within a country 
7.3.2.5 Interim conclusion 
Comparing the deliberative qualities of the different story types revealed some notable 
country differences. Within each country, the story types vary greatly in their 
deliberative quality. In the Brazilian coverage, it is the Constant Challenge story type 
that scores highest on deliberative qualities with the highest inclusiveness of civil 
society actors, the most idea elements as well as the most different and diverse idea 
elements and a higher outcome orientation (conflicts with prospect of solution as well as 
explicit solution idea elements). In the German coverage, the Futile Struggle story type 
contains most actors from the periphery (and the highest share), most idea elements as 
well as the most different and diverse idea elements. The Futile Struggle is a story type 
with a high outcome orientation in the sense that it depicts conflicts that are either not 
solved or are not expected to be sufficiently approached with the solutions at hand. In 
the German coverage, solution ideas are often included in this story type which 
indicates that proposed solutions are at least up for debate. In the US coverage, the 
Futile Struggle story type contains on average most actor statements from the periphery, 
but the share of those actor statements is highest in the Business as Usual story type. 
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The Futile Struggle also has the highest average of idea elements per article but the 
most even inclusion of different ideas is found in the Business of Success story type, 
which also has the highest average of solution elements. Therefore, for the US it is most 
difficult to judge which story type would be the one with highest deliberative quality 
while we can state this for the Constant Challenge story type in the Brazilian, and the 
Futile Struggle story type in the German coverage.  
With this information, we can come to conclusions on the fifth hypothesis that stated 
that in the US and in Germany the dominant story types score lower when it comes to 
deliberative quality, while in Brazil the dominant story type is the one with highest 
deliberative quality. The results presented are not unambiguous enough to confirm this 
hypothesis. The dominant story types in Brazil were the Futile Struggle as well as the 
Constant Challenge. Both of them score higher in deliberative qualities than the other 
two (while the Constant Challenge is the second most often used story type but scores 
highest in deliberative quality). This could partly confirm the second part of the 
hypotheses. However, for Germany, the dominant story type – the Futile Struggle – has 
the highest deliberative quality, while for the US no such clear conclusion can be 
reached. We should keep in mind though that the deliberative quality is high in the US 
coverage (across all story types) and the idea and actor inclusiveness in almost all story 
types exceeds the values found in the German and Brazilian coverage.  
7.3.3 Contribution of News Narratives to the Deliberative Quality 
With regard to the second set of research questions concerning the contribution of news 
narratives to the deliberative quality, the results presented above support the overall 
assumption of this study that narrativity in the news context can hardly be judged as 
being either good or bad, or whether it has universal effects. Instead, we have seen that 
there are significant effects of for example the higher degree of narrativity and for 
certain deliberative qualities. Usually, they still do not apply to all countries in the same 
way. Chapter 8 will therefore further engage in pointing out the circumstances that 
facilitate a positive relationship between narrativity and deliberative qualities. Before, 
section 7.4 will give a summary of all the results of this research.  
7.4 Summary 
In this result section, different analyses gave insight into the use of narrative features in 
the coverage of Brazil, Germany, and the US. For the purpose of clarity, Table 19 
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summarizes the results and reveals a mixed picture for final conclusions in the next 
chapter. 
Table 19 Summary of results 
  Brazil Germany USA 
Na
rr
at
iv
e 
fe
at
ur
es
 
Degree of 
Narrativity 
High 
(strong dramatization) 
Mixed 
(SZ: dramatization, 
FAZ: personalization) 
Low 
(strong 
personalization) 
Story Types Futile Struggle and 
Constant Challenge 
Futile Struggle and 
Business as Usual 
Business as Usual 
Narrative 
Roles 
Brazilian victim and 
hero, West as villains 
Others as victims, 
nations or humankind 
as villains, Germany 
and EU as heroes 
Others as victims, 
others as villains, 
especially individual 
heroes 
Ac
to
r i
nc
lu
siv
en
es
s 
Actor 
Inclusiveness 
in General 
Second most actor 
statements in general 
 
Highest ACI (less 
diverse) 
 
Slightly higher number 
and share of CS actors 
than Germany 
Least actors 
statements in general 
 
Smallest ACI (highest 
diversity) 
 
Smallest number and 
smallest share of CS 
actor statement 
Most actor statements 
in general 
 
Slightly higher ACI  
 
 
Highest number and 
highest share of CS 
actor statement 
Actor 
Inclusiveness 
and 
Narrativity 
Significant relation of 
number of civil society 
actor statements only 
in O Globo 
 
Share of statements: 
no significant relation 
Strongest positive 
relation of civil society 
actor statements in 
both newspapers 
 
Share of statements: 
small positive 
significant relation 
Small positive relation 
in NYT, negative (but 
not significant) relation 
in WP 
 
Share: no significant 
relation 
Actor 
Inclusiveness 
in Story 
Types 
Highest share in 
Constant challenge 
Highest share in Futile 
Struggle 
Highest share in 
Business as Usual 
Id
ea
 In
clu
siv
en
es
s 
Idea 
Inclusiveness 
in General 
Lowest total average of 
idea elements per 
article 
 
Lowest average of 
different idea elements 
per article (significantly 
different from US and 
Germany)  
Second highest total 
average of idea 
elements per article 
 
Second highest average 
of different idea 
elements per article 
(but not significantly 
different from US)  
Highest total average 
of idea elements per 
article 
 
Highest average of 
different idea elements 
per article (but not 
significantly different 
from Germany)  
Idea 
Inclusiveness 
and 
Positive significant 
relationship between 
average of total 
number of idea 
Positive significant 
relationship between 
average of total 
number of idea 
No significant 
relationship between 
average of total 
number of idea 
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Narrativity elements and number 
of different idea 
elements (linear 
relationship) 
 
Strongest relationship 
of higher diversity and 
higher degree of 
narrativity  
elements and number 
of different idea 
elements (linear 
relationship) 
 
Positive relationship of 
higher diversity and 
higher degree of 
narrativity (but less 
strong than in Brazil) 
elements and number 
of different idea 
elements (NO linear 
relationship) 
 
No relationship 
between diversity and 
degree of narrativity 
Idea 
Inclusiveness 
in Story 
Types 
Highest inclusiveness in 
constant challenge 
(also highest 
inclusiveness of civil 
society actor) 
Highest inclusiveness in 
Futile Struggle (also the 
one with the highest 
inclusiveness of civil 
society actor) 
 
Story types differ least 
from each other in 
their inclusiveness of 
idea elements 
Highest inclusiveness in 
Futile Struggle (NOT 
the one with the 
highest inclusiveness of 
civil society actor) 
Op
po
sin
g 
Ar
gu
m
en
ts
 
Opposing 
Arguments in 
General 
3.3 percent of all 
articles 
9.9 percent of all 
articles 
11.7 percent of all 
articles 
Opposing 
Arguments 
and 
Narrativity 
No difference between 
articles with low and 
high degree of 
narrativity 
Only small difference: 
articles with higher 
degree have slightly 
more often opposing 
arguments 
Largest difference 
between articles with 
low and high degree of 
narrativity: higher 
degree of narrativity 
with 5 percentage 
points higher level of 
opposing arguments  
Opposing 
Arguments in 
Story Types 
Country differences not instructive because of small number of overall 
occurrence; no big differences between story types in general but slightly 
more opposing arguments in Business as Usual and Futile Struggle 
compared to Constant Challenge and Stories of Success   
Ou
tc
om
e 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
Outcome 
Orientation 
in General 
Highest share of 
articles with an 
outcome in which the 
conflict is fixed 
Mixed outcome 
orientation in both 
newspapers 
Highest share of 
articles with no 
conceivable outcome 
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Outcome 
Orientation 
and 
Narrativity  
Less stories with no 
conceivable outcome 
in stories with lower 
degree of narrativity 
 
Stories in which 
conflict not fixed with 
higher share, stories in 
which context is fixed 
with lower share in 
stories with higher 
degree of narrativity 
 
Less stories with no 
conceivable outcome in 
stories with lower 
degree of narrativity 
 
Stories in which conflict 
not fixed with higher 
share, stories in which 
context is fixed with 
lower share in stories 
with higher degree of 
narrativity 
Less stories with no 
conceivable outcome in 
stories with lower 
degree of narrativity 
 
Stories in which conflict 
not fixed with slightly 
higher share, stories in 
which context is fixed 
with remarkably higher 
share (13 percentage 
points) in stories with 
higher degree of 
narrativity 
Outcome 
Orientation 
in Story 
Types 
Higher solution 
orientation in Constant 
Challenge and Stories 
of Success, lowest in 
Business as Usual 
Not much difference 
between story types  
Highest share of 
solution elements in all 
story types (except for 
Business as Usual) 
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8 Discussion and Conclusion 
It has become clear from this study that there are different relations between the 
narrativity of news stories and their deliberative qualities. This last chapter will offer 
explanations built on the context knowledge gained in Chapter 5 for the dispersion and 
the deliberative quality of news narratives, as research question 3 had asked for. Since 
this is a small-N case study comparing three countries, this question cannot be answered 
finally. With the theoretical understanding of the concepts of narrativity and 
deliberation, the context knowledge previously gained about the countries and the 
results of the analyses at hand, we can still try to come to conclusions about under 
which circumstances news narratives are more likely to occur and what influences their 
deliberative qualities. 
The three cases investigated in this project are very different from each other on many 
dimensions, as we have seen throughout this work. Their journalistic traditions and role 
perceptions are embedded in different political and media system environments. A 
relevant constant within this research design, however, is the occasion that is covered by 
the investigated news media: the climate change conferences. Newspaper reports on the 
phenomenon of climate change as well as on climate politics are triggered by these 
transnational events year by year. Furthermore, as one could see, these reports cover the 
event in different ways with regard to narrativity of the news as well as to deliberative 
qualities.  
Three patterns could be detected. In the US, a low level of narrativity and the dominant 
Business-as-Usual story type that tells the stories about climate change and its politics 
as a recurring event in the least agitated way comes with a generally high level of 
deliberative qualities on the dimensions measured here. There are almost no relations 
between narrativity and deliberative qualities. A higher degree of narrativity neither 
implies more deliberative quality nor entails less. None of the story types stick out with 
significantly higher or lower deliberative quality across the measured dimensions.  
Contrary to the low level of narrativity in the US, Brazil is characterized by the highest 
degree of narrativity and two dominant story types, that emphasize the utmost urgency 
of the situation. But deliberative qualities are rather mixed in the general coverage here, 
and though narrative writing is not worse in terms of deliberative quality, there is no 
consistent pattern that it would increase the quality either. On the side of story types, 
one of the two dominant story types, the Constant Challenge, is also the one with the 
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highest deliberative qualities. This story type also emphasizes the urgency but is less 
pessimistic than the Futile Struggle narrative.  
Pertaining to a positive contribution of narrativity to the deliberative quality of the 
coverage, the German case meets the hopes of the supporters of narrative journalism 
best. These scholars, who emphasize that narrative styles could have positive effects 
towards reaching deliberative ideals, would see their arguments probably confirmed in 
this case. Exhibiting inconsistent patterns of narrativity and a general degree of 
deliberative quality, the increase in deliberative quality of narrative news compared to 
less narrative news is most salient. Narrative news includes a wider range of actors in 
general and from the periphery, it presents more idea elements, more different idea 
elements, and a higher diversity of those. There are more articles in which opposing 
arguments are contained in articles with higher narrativity than in those with lower. 
Articles with higher narrativity more often point to insufficient outcomes (e.g. in 
conference proceedings) in terms of solutions (while overall more solution idea 
elements are presented), accounting for a higher outcome orientation. One of the 
dominant story types, the Futile Struggle, diverges slightly in its deliberative quality 
because of its higher inclusiveness of actors and idea elements.  
However, what are the specific circumstances that facilitate the positive relation of 
narrative news writing and deliberative qualities in Germany compared to the US and 
Brazil? What we have learned from the journalistic role perceptions is that German 
journalists very strongly support the detached observer role. At the same time, 
providing interesting information as well as motivating people to participate in civic 
activity plays a more important role for German journalists compared to their colleagues 
in Brazil and the US (Hanitzsch et al., 2011). This suggests that watchdog journalism 
can appear in different forms and that a certain variety can increase diversity. Especially 
since the inclusion of civil society is less common in Germany due to the political 
representation of various groups in the multi-party consensus system (Ferree et al., 
2002b), narrative writing seems to allow exceptions to the rules in two ways, namely 
variation in the conventional news form as well as allowing different points of view by 
explicitly including different speakers, more ideas, and more controversy.  
What should not be forgotten, though, is that both German newspapers differ quite 
remarkably in their overall use of narrativity as well as in their overall inclusion, 
especially of civil society voices. The conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has 
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the lowest degree of narrativity compared to all other newspapers in the sample. It also 
has the lowest average of civil society actor statements within an article. However, the 
relationship between a higher degree of narrativity and a higher average of civil society 
actor statements is found in both newspapers. In the more left liberal Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, we also detected an even higher degree of narrativity in opinion-based articles. 
As the separation of fact and opinion is also an important element in the role perception 
of German journalists, it may be the case that SZ reporters use narrative writing also to 
distinguish both these types of reporting, and while civil society actors may express 
their assessments of the situation in strong opinions, they are more likely to find their 
way into this more narrative opinion-based coverage. As we have learned from the 
historic contemplations, narrative writing has been an attempt to break with the notion 
of objectivity, which was already perceived by leftist writers as a bourgeois ideal 
decades ago. This demarcation effort could resonate into the present by finding an 
expression in this combination of narrative commentary writing that includes more 
perspective and more controversy. This is also supported by the higher outcome 
orientation of articles with a higher degree of narrativity, especially since these articles 
assess conflicts as not (to be) fixed and therefore seem to take a more critical standpoint 
towards the events. 
A higher degree of narrativity in opinion-based articles is also the case in Brazil and the 
US. But since the relation of higher inclusiveness of civil society actors and idea 
elements is not in the same way detectable, the same argument – that narrativity is used 
to promote opinion-based debate and controversy – cannot be applied for these cases.  
The results found for the US seem to be in line with our notion of the US as 
representative of the liberal media system, as proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). 
Lower levels of narrativity and high deliberative quality go along with high 
professionalism, a strong tradition of detached writing style with the inverted pyramid 
as the dominant form, and the inclusion of different sides of the story. In this light, the 
higher levels of narrative personalization and the higher representation of individual 
actors within stories in the US can also be a sign of increasing commercialization that 
Hallin and Mancini emphasize for the liberal model: 
Another important manifestation of the new logic of commercial media is the 
tendency to focus on the experience and perspective of the "common citizen". [...] 
Many analysts have noted, these changes very likely have contributed to the erosion 
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of the influence of the traditional mass party and the social organizations connected 
to it. (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 278) 
Against the normative deliberative background, such a development would have to be 
viewed critically. It also supports Benson’s (2014) concerns, who criticizes that, 
compared to French media, the US media depict individuals without affiliation to any 
organization or societal structure, which in consequence contributes to the circumstance 
that, in his view, narrative journalism can hardly transport abstract political ideas:  
[T]here seems to be an underlying rhetorical tension between personalized narrative 
and the "deliberative exchange of ideas." In the midst of telling a story, trying to 
inject "abstract political ideas" almost inevitably comes across as an inelegant, even 
tangential, disruption. (Benson, 2014, p. 77) 
Lastly, the results of the Brazilian case confirm some of the previous assumptions that 
were made about the constitution of Brazilian climate change coverage but certainly 
still leaves many questions open. From the high levels of narrativity in the Brazilian 
coverage, one can discern its roots within a French essayistic journalism style. 
However, Brazilian journalism has been trying to adapt to the American model for some 
time, creating its own journalistic practices and a mixture of styles and values 
(Albuquerque, 2005). It may be due to widely differing political and economic contexts 
within the country, the minor relevance of the press within the wider population, and a 
perceived distance between society and political institutions(ibid.), that the public 
discourse is limited to a certain extent and deliberation. A clear connection between 
narrativity and deliberative quality is nevertheless most difficult to draw for Brazil.  
There is one last research question that has to be answered. Research question 4asked 
for an evaluation of the usefulness of deliberative qualities as a measurement for 
assessing narrative writing in the newspaper environment. To come to a conclusion on 
this, one has to start with reflecting on the measurement of narrativity first. Narrativity 
is a complex concept, which is why investigating it with quantitative measures is an 
uncommon approach in the first place. The approach suggested in this study covers 
basic narrative characteristics such as the degree of narrativity that refers to formal 
narrative features, the story types with which I tried to characterize the content, and 
three narrative roles to characterize relations of central actors in the text. These narrative 
elements are not all-embracing and cannot capture every particularity in detail. 
However, for the purpose of this study, these aspects already enabled us to get a 
comprehensive idea about the use of narrative elements within the news coverage of 
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climate change and climate politics – managing to process greater amounts of content 
analysis data from three countries and four climate change conferences. Nevertheless, 
several aspects, such as the temporal layers and sequential order (Berning, 2011; 
Franzosi, 2010; Neiger & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2016), the point of view from which a 
story is told and the handling of subjectivity (Harbers & Broersma, 2014), as well as the 
stylistic ornamentation and its poetic form (Lucaites & Condit, 1985), were not part of 
this analysis. The latter was originally included in the coding scheme but turned out to 
be too hard to measure reliably comparative in different linguistic context. The attempt, 
however, reminded our team of researchers (who had developed the coding scheme 
quite straightforwardly) that narrativity is a culturally sensitive construct which also 
finds its expression in the use of language through culturally specific metaphors, 
comparisons, examples, allusions, and so on. There is certainly a lot of potential for 
future studies to improve the measurement in these points to characterize narrative 
forms in the non-fictional environment more comprehensively. In an ideal scenario, 
future content analysis projects with similar aims should be conducted by teams that 
include members from all countries investigated to discuss such problems when 
developing the instrument. The indicators used in this study can nevertheless give 
insights into narrative structures and reveal several similarities and differences between 
the countries that make further engagement and enhancement in future studies 
worthwhile.  
One of the research’s aims was to characterize narrative elements in the news coverage 
of the three countries Brazil, Germany, and the US, but the study also attempted to 
assess the deliberative quality of narrative writing and the different stories that are told 
to contribute to a scholarly debate on the benefits and harms of narrative news writing. 
Again, measurements that were chosen for the analysis are quite basic indicators for 
deliberative qualities. More sophisticated elements such as the true dialogic form, the 
use of civil language, forms of rebuttal, and different forms of reasoning and 
justification could not be part of this study. By investigating the inclusiveness of actors 
and ideas, the presentation of opposing arguments and the outcome orientation, very 
basic but also necessary deliberative categories were used to get a first idea about the 
different deliberative constitutions of narratives in the news context. Further 
investigations can build on the findings as a starting point. In order to truly confirm the 
hypothesis, for example, that narratives would bring marginalized and alternative ideas 
into the debate, even more detailed analyses of the roles of different actors and their 
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respective ideas and arguments would be required. Questions of power and resources of 
different kinds of actors would also need more attention in that case (keeping in mind 
also that civil society groups or NGOs can vary vastly according to the financial and 
personal resources with which they try to get heard in public debates). However, the 
basic analysis of who is represented and whether actors from the political periphery 
have more chances to be included in narrative writing could be gauged with the 
instrument as well as the recording of the diversity of ideas.  
The assessment of opposing arguments within one article could also be conducted to a 
certain extent. A finer measurement for future investigations would try to capture 
whether an opposing argument was a direct reply to the first idea or whether the 
presentation of both was rather coincidental (regarding the situations in which they were 
uttered), and the result of journalistic juxtaposition. A direct reply to an argument of 
another actor can also entail a new argument without rejecting the first one: If actor 1 
proposes solution X and actor 2 directly replies that solution Y would be a better 
alternative without explicitly rejecting solution X, such a case would not have been 
captured in this analysis, but it would certainly be an important indicator of deliberative 
debate. Context knowledge about positions and the actors’ respective interest would be 
needed here to assess whether arguments truly compete. Additional qualitative analysis 
could help to further investigate the role of such replies for narrative purposes. 
Narratives evolve around a conflict that triggers the story to be told in the first place. A 
dialogic form of some competing protagonists could be an important stylistic device. 
The measurement of the outcome orientation could probably be improved for 
deliberative purposes. The distinction between ‘no conceivable outcome,’ a ‘conflict 
that is displayed but not solved/not about to be solved,’ and a ‘conflict that is displayed 
and solved/about to be solved’ was useful for characterizing the story types and their 
outcome orientation (as part of the cluster analysis) but rather difficult to interpret in a 
general way. Also, the deliberative significance of this outcome orientation remains 
insufficiently resolved without further qualitative analysis. Results have shown that the 
Brazilian coverage most often depicts a conflict that has been solved. However, this 
plain information does not help to understand whether, for example, a political decision 
is seen as valid and will be translated into political action. If a newspaper article reports, 
for example, that negotiations have come to an agreement, then a conflict has been 
solved but the wider consequences remain unclear. If the writer of an article accepts the 
outcome as a solution to the conflict and expresses his or her approval while the author 
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of another article refers to the same outcome but does not recognize it as a solution to a 
conflict at hand (e.g., measurements taken will not solve climate change), then the first 
would have been classified as “conflict fixed” while the latter would be referred to as 
“conflict not fixed”. And what would that mean for the deliberative debate and its 
proceeding? By using only these two categories it is not possible to assess the degree of 
closure of the debate or even recognize a premature ending. Especially when comparing 
articles with a higher or lower degree of narrativity, it is difficult to evaluate the value 
of a debate if a conflict is depicted as fixed or not fixed. If articles with higher degrees 
of narrativity more often tend to depict a conflict as not fixed, they can of course still be 
a good contribution to the debate which is not yet terminated. But without further 
investigation, the mere quantitative coding of the three options of an outcome loses a lot 
of information that would help to assess the overall outcome orientation.  
To sum up: It is possible and meaningful to use deliberative measures for evaluating the 
quality of narrative writing in a non-fictional news environment. Setting deliberative 
standards as ideals for the evaluation of narrative news helps preventing one-sided 
conclusions about whether the phenomenon is good or bad and can show under which 
conditions deliberative ideals are met or not. Especially the country comparison helped 
to reveal specific constitutions of news narratives in order to gain a better understanding 
of the relation of deliberative and narrative elements. Measurements can certainly be 
further improved, but the findings of this study nevertheless shed more light on 
narrative elements in news writing and conditions in which narrative writing adds to the 
deliberative quality of a debate. By emphasizing the context dependency of the 
deliberative performance of narrative news, the approach contributes to a debate on 
potential chances and harms of narrative writing.  
What should be kept in mind is that there are other narrative values that can enhance the 
deliberative quality that were not a direct part of this analysis but that can be paid 
attention to in further studies. Scholars have argued, for example, that narratives can 
help to understand other perspectives and to enable role-taking. It would be the strength 
of narratives to open up the readers’ view to other social realities (Neveu, 2014; 
Benson, 2014). This goes beyond the mere representation of voices and ideas as they 
were invetigated. How these realities are described, how authors relate to them and their 
protagonists would be important aspects to investigate closely in order to confirm or 
reject the assumption that narrative writing can help to foster understanding for different 
situations. If, for example, people from civil society groups are represented but their 
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demands are at the same time repelled as illegitimate or extreme, it could to an 
exclusion from a societal debate. However, the question of role-taking through narrative 
writing is of course one that needs to be investigated on the reception side of 
communication. Under which circumstances would people accept a view and respond 
with more openness to other people’s situations (and arguments)? Oliver et al. (2012) 
have investigated with an online experiment if narrative news formats can foster 
empathy and compassion for stigmatized groups and found evidence to support such 
considerations. A next step for further reflections would be to assess if this has 
consequences for a deliberative debate and if people would take arguments into account 
that specifically apply to the situation of people of such groups. This form of 
recognition would imply an even stronger degree of inclusiveness.   
However, inclusiveness is not an end in itself. The deliberative idea of inclusiveness 
aims at creating the best informational basis for finding a solution to a problem (Gastil, 
2008). Different arguments and perspectives must be made transparent to weigh 
alternatives and let the best argument prevail in the end. In this process, interests need to 
be laid out and balanced. To ensure this, the particular interests need to be revealed in 
the first place. Not every perspective can be brought into a debate by direct 
representatives of an affected group. Small children, very old people, or people who 
cannot express themselves for whatever reason still need representation by advocates or 
interest groups that can transport their contribution to a debate. Whatever constitution it 
is, to really contribute to a debate, a connection must be drawn to the problem at hand. 
Therefore Benson (2014) urges that narratives can only be useful in an educational way 
if they connect stories to the systemic context in which they evolve. Stories used in a 
news context need to make a point and show connections in order to avoid distraction 
from what is at stake. In how far the narrative news stories in this study fulfill this 
criterion could not be clarified. This again would certainly leave room for further 
studies that engage in the role and performance of narrative writing in the news context.  
In how far narrative news writing can also be more entertaining, and if this has possible 
positive effects for deliberation processes when people can more easily engage in an 
important topic and learn about societal debates, could also not be answered in this 
study. However, it is plausible to assume such an effect, since climate change and 
climate politics are both complex and abstract issues which are not easy to fully 
comprehend. Comprehension is not only dependent on the issue itself but also on how it 
is presented. The inverted pyramid provides information quickly and efficiently, but it 
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does not necessarily foster understanding and interest (Bird & Dardenne, 1997). 
Lowering the threshold to enter a debate by offering a variety of forms for people to 
choose from, may be one possibility to raise interest in a topic. Some kind of mixture, in 
which narrative news writing can be one element, would also come closer to what 
Benson (2010) calls a “debate ensemble.” As the results of this study have also shown 
and as Lück, Wessler, and Wozniak (2016) investigated in more detail by comparing 
framing and narratives in the news coverage in five countries, narrative elements relate 
to a countries’ wider (political) context, and global media frames are balanced by 
nationally colored narratives. Qualitative analysis could build on this to investigate how 
and through which specific devices narratives in the news context can create cultural 
resonance and relate to audiences’ life worlds. Again, this may be worthwhile especially 
in the context of climate change coverage in order to find out how the issue can be 
communicated meaningfully to people. Nerlich, Koteyko, and Brown (2010) also 
emphasize the importance of diverse approaches when it comes to raising awareness for 
climate change issues:  
What is needed is a mix of measures of which communication is only one, and it 
will only work when it is embedded in other approaches which are more directly 
linked to practical behavior in social life. Communication also has to use a mixture 
of modes and strategies, from verbal to visual, from the spoken word to the digital 
message. Communicators can only be sure that their messages will be understood if 
they understand their audiences, their values, fears, hopes, and the situation of 
communication. (Nerlich, Koteyko, & Brown, 2010, p. 101) 
This dissertation started off with thoughts on the crisis of the press, which is also often 
connected to a crisis of (traditional) journalism in times of information availability 
through a variety of channels that are out of editorial control, e.g. because of direct 
reports from people eye witnessing or commenting on events and communicating their 
impressions through social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and 
the like. Traditional newspapers adapt to this development and increase their online 
representation. The barriers between offline and online staff and editorial offices 
vanish.30 And while time pressure is nothing new for the media, these developments 
further increase competition and economic pressure. Breaking news that is reported 
instantly may have been an invention of television, but online news reaches people via 
mobile devices virtually everywhere, and classical media outlets have to keep up with 
                                                            
30 As, for example, in the case of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, see: http://reportagen.sueddeutsche.de/20-
jahre-sz-im-netz(Retrieved May 16, 2016) 
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this. News that is consumed through these devices receives less attention and is 
perceived more superficially. Concerns about the decline of news quality accompany 
this development when newsmakers react by increasing audience or service orientation, 
replacing so-called hard news by soft news, or introducing more entertaining elements 
that catch more attention and are more easily consumable. The question remains: What 
will this mean for newspapers and traditional journalism in the near future? From a 
normative democratic and deliberative perspective, the function of traditional news 
media and journalism of facilitating public debate and contributing to opinion formation 
is still needed. This is true for established democracies like the US and Germany but 
also for emerging countries with a more unstable democracy like Brazil, in which the 
printed press is weaker. But also in Germany and the US an open public debate is 
needed in times when political alienation and radical right-wing populism rapidly enter 
public debates. If newspapers provided these debates by offering well-investigated 
background information, commentary, and assessment (offline as well as online), they 
could still play an important part in society in the future ahead. A certain stylistic 
creativity can contribute to diversion, which may help classical journalism to compete 
with the variety of alternatives that aim at entertaining and providing easily consumable 
products. 
However, especially since there is such a wide variety of alternatives today, 
investigating nationwide quality newspapers as done in this study can only provide 
limited conclusions on the state of journalism or the media as a whole, since only a very 
small part of the media landscape of the three countries was actually researched. This 
study also provided a first glimpse into the public debates on the issue. Which role 
narrative forms of journalism play in different kinds of media, which quality they have, 
and what they contribute to a general discourse, are certainly questions for a further 
engagement that aims at tracking down developments in journalism and the constitution 
of the public sphere.   
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10 Appendix 
10.1 Intercoder Reliability 
Table 20 Intercoder reliability overall and across countries31 
Variables 
Overall  Germany  United States 
N PA κn α  N PA κn α  N PA κn α 
Actor-statements               
Type of actor 
Occupation/office of actor 
Origin of actor 
Type of quotation 
Length of statement 
Type of 'We' reference 
Denial of reality of climate 
change 
Denial of problematic character 
205 
95.4 
82.3 
85.3 
93.9 
75.9 
88.6 
97.1 
95.9 
.93 
.82 
.85 
.91 
.70 
.85 
.96 
.95 
.86 
.80 
.82 
.91 
.83 
.62 
.04 
.11 
 55 
99.0 
89.4 
93.2 
94.4 
76.3 
97.7 
98.9 
98.9 
.99 
.89 
.93 
.91 
.70 
.98 
.99 
.99 
.91 
.84 
.91 
.91 
.86 
.73 
-.01 
-.01 
 78 
95.3 
89.0 
81.5 
93.0 
73.5 
86.5 
97.1 
95.1 
.93 
.89 
.82 
.90 
.68 
.85 
.96 
.93 
.85 
.75 
.66 
.89 
.84 
.54 
.09 
.08 
Problem definition               
Consequences of climate 
change32 1,230 87.5 .86 .60  330 90.0 .88 .73  468 81.9 .79 .51 
                                                            
31 For computing and reporting the agreement coefficients for the consequence, cause, and remedy variables as well as for objects and persons depicted in photos, the variables 
were re-coded into their respective categorical variables, e.g., the five binary cause variables were re-coded as five parameter values of one categorical variable “cause of 
climate change.” The number of coding decisions that feed into the reliability scores for such composite categorical variables increases accordingly (in this case 5 x 205 = 
1,025 coding decisions). 
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Causal interpretation               
Causes of climate change33 1,025 95.3 .94 .56  275 94.2 .93 .62  390 96.7 .96 .48 
Countries responsible for climate 
change because of greenhouse 
gas emissions 
205 98.2 .98 .69  55 98.3 .98 .78  78 99.2 .99 .66 
Moral evaluation               
Countries responsible for solving 
the problem by reducing their 
greenhouse gas emissions 
205 97.7 .98 .43  55 96.4 .96 -.01  78 98.9 .99 .40 
Treatment recommendation               
Remedies for climate change34 1,435 93.1 .92 .56  385 94.4 .93 .67  546 94.6 .94 .56 
Narration               
Narrativity               
Dramatization* 
Emotion* 76 
80.5 
81.1 
.62 
.62 
.60 
.55  18 
91.7 
89.8 
.84 
.80 
.80 
.78  20 
80.0 
71.0 
.60 
.42 
.60 
.37 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
32 The following variables could be coded (0 = not mentioned, 1 = mentioned): Extreme weather events, melting ice/glaciers or rising sea levels, economic opportunities, 
economic difficulties and hardships, societal consequences. 
33 The following variables could be coded (0 = not present, 1 = present): Natural causes, burning of fossil fuels/greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, colliding national 
interests, other causes. 
34 The following variables could be coded (0 = not present, 1 = present/endorsed, 2 = present/rejected): No action, clean energy, reforestation and avoided deforestation, 
adaptation in agriculture, adoption of legally binding, all-inclusive emissions treaty, more focus on ground level/'grassroots' efforts, financial assistance to disadvantaged 
countries. 
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Narrative personalization* 
Fictionalization* 
82.5 
81.7 
.66 
.64 
.64 
.57 
84.3 
75.9 
.68 
.52 
.70 
.45 
88.0 
70.0 
.76 
.40 
.71 
.38 
Narrative genre               
Theme 
Tone 
Outcome 
76 
63.4 
66.6 
71.5 
.56 
.60 
.63 
.56 
.57 
.56 
 18 
66.7 
75.0 
72.2 
.60 
.70 
.63 
.60 
.65 
.55 
 20 
61.5 
59.5 
69.5 
.55 
.52 
.60 
.50 
.46 
.52 
Narrative characters               
Victim present* 
Victim – type of actor 
Victim – name 
Victim – action taken 
76 
79.1 
78.1 
81.8 
74.3 
.58 
.67 
.81 
.71 
.57 
.54 
.65 
.47 
 18 
87.0 
87.9 
87.0 
85.2 
.74 
.82 
.86 
.83 
.63 
.64 
.66 
.6 
 20 
81.0 
74.5 
82.0 
73.0 
.62 
.61 
.81 
.70 
.54 
.43 
.61 
.43 
Villain present* 
Villain – type of actor 
Villain – name 
Villain – action taken 
76 
78.8 
71.3 
77.5 
62.7 
.58 
.57 
.77 
.58 
.60 
.59 
.73 
.49 
 18 
88.9 
81.5 
88.9 
77.8 
.78 
.73 
.88 
.75 
.73 
.72 
.86 
.69 
 20 
77.0 
71.5 
81.0 
67.5 
.54 
.58 
.80 
.64 
.46 
.40 
.63 
.38 
Hero present* 
Hero – type of actor 
Hero – name 
Hero – action taken 
76 
81.6 
78.0 
80.8 
80.8 
.64 
.67 
.80 
.79 
.56 
.53 
.58 
.57 
 18 
92.6 
89.8 
89.8 
92.6 
.86 
.85 
.90 
.92 
.81 
.78 
.79 
.81 
 20 
80.0 
75.0 
79.5 
79.0 
.60 
.63 
.79 
.76 
.46 
.38 
.49 
.49 
Note: Cell entries are average percent agreement (PA), Brennan and Prediger’s kappa (κn), and Krippendorff’s alpha (α) values indicating agreement between coders. N is the 
number of coding decisions in the pretest on which the calculations are based. 
*denotes binary variable (0 = not present, 1 = present) 
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November 29, 2012 
Der sichtbare Wandel 
2012 geht als Jahr der Wetterextreme in die Statistik ein  
Die ersten zehn Monate des Jahres 2012 waren geprägt von Wetterextremen, stellt die 
Meteorologische Weltorganisation (WMO) fest. Fast alle Weltregionen haben 
Hitzewellen, Dürren, schwere Regenfälle, Überflutungen oder extreme Kälte erlebt, 
manche Länder sogar mehrere davon, teilweise unmittelbar nacheinander. In Europa 
zum Beispiel folgte der extremen Kälte im Januar und Februar von Ende März an eine 
Hitzewelle. China erlebte Dürre wie Fluten.  
  Die WMO hat ihre vorläufige Bilanz an ihrem Sitz in Genf und in Doha am Rande des 
Klimagipfels vorgelegt. Sie erwartet, dass 2012 zu den zehn wärmsten Jahren der 
Klimastatistik gehören wird. In den Monaten Januar bis Oktober habe die globale 
Durchschnittstemperatur 0,45 Grad Celsius über dem langjährigen Mittel gelegen. Das 
entspricht Platz neun, obwohl das Jahr mit einer La-Niña-Phase begonnen hat. Diese 
Verschiebung der Wetterverhältnisse im Pazifik bewirkt eine leichte globale 
Abkühlung. Das halbe Jahr nach dem Abklingen von La Niña, Mai bis Oktober, war 
dann die viertwärmste solche Periode.  
  Natürliche Klimavariabilität „ändert nichts am langfristigen Trend der steigenden 
Temperaturen“, sagte WMO-Generalsekretär Michel Jarraud. „Der Klimawandel 
passiert vor unseren Augen und wird wegen steigender Spiegel der Treibhausgase in der 
Atmosphäre weitergehen.“ 
  Viele Schwergewichte bei den Verhandlungen in Doha waren von den Extremen 
betroffen. Die USA haben bisher das wärmste Jahr in den Aufzeichnungen und 
außergewöhnliche Dürre in vielen Bundesstaaten erlebt. Kanada hatte den wärmsten 
Sommer der Statistik, Russland den zweitwärmsten seiner Geschichte, übertroffen nur 
vom Jahr der Waldbrände 2010. Brasiliens Norden verzeichnete die schwerste Dürre 
seit 50 Jahren, so die WMO, in China traf es den Süden heftig.  
Neue Temperaturrekorde meldeten Ende Mai Grönland mit 24,8 und Norwegen mit 
31,1 Grad. In Australien erreichte das Thermometer im Frühling früher die 40-Grad-
Marke als je zuvor, am 20. September. Rekorde meldete auch Frankreich, wo es heißer 
war als während der Hitzewelle von 2003. Großbritannien hingegen hatte den nassesten 
Sommer seit 1912.  
Bei keinem dieser Ereignisse ist mit Sicherheit nachzuweisen, dass sie durch den 
Klimawandel ausgelöst wurden. Aber viele Forscher sind inzwischen bereit zu sagen, 
dass die globale Erwärmung Wetterexterme deutlich wahrscheinlicher mache. In den 
USA kursierte im Sommer die Formulierung: „So also fühlt sich der Klimawandel an.“ 
Christopher Schrader  
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December 13, 2010 
Allein gegen den Rest der Welt 
Bolivien akzeptiert Ergebnis nicht  
Allmählich kommt den Teilnehmern des Klimagipfels die Kritik von Pablo Solón 
bekannt vor. Schon im Laufe der Verhandlungen hatte sich der bolivianische UN-
Botschafter immer wieder gegen ihre Entwürfe gestellt; zwischenzeitlich hatte Solón 
auch einmal die Konferenz verlassen, weil er die Position seines Landes zu wenig 
repräsentiert fand. Erst unterstützten befreundete südamerikanische Staaten den 
Bolivianer noch, doch am Schluss ficht Solón einen Kampf alleine gegen den Rest der 
Welt.  
In den letzten Stunden der Konferenz liefert er sich mit der Gipfel-Präsidentin Patricia 
Espinosa ein Rededuell. Erst beklagt er sich, dass er vom Sicherheitspersonal nicht in 
den Verhandlungssaal gelassen worden sei, dann meldet er sich im Plenum nach der 
langen Verhandlungsnacht unermüdlich zu Wort, um aufs Neue seine Bedenken gegen 
die angestrebten Beschlüsse der Konferenz auszudrücken. Solón schaltet auf stur: Die 
Vorschläge gingen nicht weit genug; sein Land werde keinem Abkommen zustimmen, 
das einen Anstieg der Temperaturen mit sich bringe, sagt er. Unnachgiebig fordert er, 
dass die reichen Länder ihre Treibhausgas-Emissionen bis 2017 im Vergleich zu 1990 
halbieren sollen. Er fühlt sich im Recht, auf der Seite der Wissenschaft: Das Abkommen 
führe dazu, dass sich die Erde nicht um zwei, sondern um vier Grad erhitze, sagt Solón 
– das sei „Völkermord“, ein sogenannter Ökozid; ein Wort, das Boliviens Präsident Evo 
Morales geprägt hatte. Mit einer Entourage aus 15 farbenfroh gekleideten 
Ureinwohnern und Maya-Priestern war er der wohl markanteste Politiker in Cancún. 
„Bolivien ist nicht bereit, ein Dokument zu unterzeichnen, das noch mehr Menschen 
sterben lässt, als ohnehin schon durch den Klimawandel umkommen“, sagt sein 
Botschafter Solón vor den Delegierten.  
Doch in der entscheidenden Stunde ist Bolivien isoliert. Befreundete Staaten plädieren 
bloß dafür, die Kritik von Solón im Plenum zu hören – sie unterstützen ihn dabei aber 
nicht. Dann nimmt Patricia Espinosa ihr Hämmerchen in die Hand. Als die Gipfel-
Präsidentin damit auf ihren Tisch schlägt, hat Pablo Solón verloren. Seinen Widerstand 
will Bolivien trotzdem nicht aufgeben. „Wir werden weiterhin alleine in den Kampf 
ziehen“, kündigte Präsident Evo Morales bereits an.  
Martin Kotynek  
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The Washington Post 
 
December 5, 2011 Monday   
Suburban Edition 
 
Chinese set terms for climate deal by 2020 
By Juliet Eilperin 
 
Chinese negotiators raised the prospect of negotiating a legally binding climate pact at 
U.N. talks over the weekend in South Africa, but they laid out stringent requirements. 
In separate remarks to reporters and nongovernmental groups, two of China's top 
climate officials suggested they might participate in talks aimed at forging a new, 
enforceable agreement on global warming by 2020. That issue, along with the question 
of whether industrialized countries will agree to a new set of emissions reductions under 
the 1997 climate treaty, are key stumbling blocks in the ongoing talks in the coastal city 
of Durban.  
But it remains unclear how much China - which ranks as the world's biggest emitter of 
greenhouse gases linked to climate change - would commit to as part of a future 
international treaty.   
"We do not rule out the possibility of [a] legally binding" agreement, China's lead 
climate negotiator, Su Wei, said in a news conference Saturday. "It is possible for us, 
but it depends on the negotiations."  
In a subsequent meeting with environmental groups on Sunday, Xie Zhenhua, vice 
chairman of China's National Development and Reform Commission, elaborated on 
what his country needs before it would negotiate a binding treaty. According to several 
meeting participants, he laid out demands that have bedeviled negotiators for the past 
few years.  
The list included ensuring a second commitment period of emissions targets under the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol; delivery of $30 billion in climate aid to poor countries by the end 
of 2012 and a process for raising $100 billion annually in climate aid by 2020; the 
fulfillment of several programs aimed at helping developing nations cope with climate 
change and cut their emissions; an international framework for reporting on greenhouse-
gas emissions; a scientific review to determine by 2015 whether deeper emissions cuts 
are needed; and a pact that recognized nations have "common but differentiated 
responsibilities" under any global agreement. 
"China is signaling that they are trying to be flexible and constructively negotiate over 
the next week," Alden Meyer, who directs strategy and policy for the advocacy group 
Union of Concerned Scientists and attended Sunday's meeting with Xie, wrote in an e-
mail. 
Negotiators from several nations, however, were more skeptical about the possibility of 
reaching a broad compromise with China, which has taken action to slow the growth of 
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its carbon output but has resisted the idea of enshrining these commitments as part of an 
international pact.  
"Minister Xie spoke warmly about the need for a legally binding deal," E.U. 
Commisioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard tweeted. "Does that then mean that 
China will also be legally bound?" 
Europeans have called upon the nearly 200 countries that participate in U.N. climate 
talks to finalize a new treaty by 2015, which could take effect five years later. 
"What is their commitment to an international legally binding agreement for all?" the 
official asked. 
Chinese government officials could not be reached for comment Sunday. State 
Department officials declined to comment because negotiations are underway. 
Jake Schmidt, international climate policy director for the advocacy group Natural 
Resources Defense Council, said that if Chinese officials agree to negotiate a binding 
treaty, it will put pressure on the Obama administration, which has argued that the 
details of such a pact still need to be fleshed out. 
"We'll have to see if they take the next step of committing in Durban to a mandate to 
negotiate a new treaty by 2015," Schmidt, who also attended the session with Xie, wrote  
in an e-mail. "If they do, it sure makes it hard for the U.S. to block [the] agreement 
[just] because every single aspect of their conditions weren't met." 
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The Washington Post 
 
November 12, 2013 Tuesday   
Every Edition 
 
Following in the carbon footprint of Thanksgiving's first diners 
 
by Brian Palmer 
 
It's easy to romanticize the 1621 coming-together of the Wampanoag tribe with the 
struggling European settlers, which many people now view as the original 
Thanksgiving. 
From an environmental perspective, the nostalgic urge is stronger still. The carbon 
footprint of the first Thanksgiving meal was approximately zero. Seventeenth-century 
farmers grew food, ate food and used those calories to grow more food. The energy loop 
was closed, and the climate was unaffected. 
Fossil fuels changed that equation. The modern idea of "food miles," or the distance 
your food travels from farm to table, would have left the Wampanoag bemused. When 
they needed corn, they walked from their wetu - communal huts made of saplings and 
cattail mats - to their assigned cornfields. They hunted for meat on communal lands 
adjacent to their villages.  
By contrast, despite some local corn production in the summer and early fall, much of 
the corn coming to the Washington area now originates in states as far away as Illinois 
and Iowa. Most of the turkeys sold in the region come from North Carolina, Arkansas 
and Minnesota. 
As you prepare to gather your family together for Thanksgiving, it's worth taking a 
moment to consider the impact your meal will have on the Earth and the climate. Using 
data compiled by the Environmental Working Group, it's possible to estimate the carbon 
footprint of each element of your meal. It takes fossil fuels to plant, fertilize and 
transport the food, but not everything on the menu contributes equally. (All of these 
numbers are national averages.) 
Let's start with the turkey. Compared with other meats, turkey is fairly easy on the 
planet. Overall, producing and delivering a pound of beef to your home emits 21 / 2 
times as much greenhouse gas as bringing a turkey to the table. Poultry, in general, 
requires far less feed per pound of meat produced than beef does. Also, a bird emits a 
significantly smaller amount of the greenhouse gas nitrous oxide in its waste than a cow 
or a sheep does. (Chicken, on the other hand, produces 63 percent as much greenhouse 
gas as turkey; this is probably because chickens have been bred to grow really fast on 
very little food.) 
In total, a 31 / 2-ounce serving of turkey is responsible for approximately 2.4 pounds of 
carbon dioxide equivalents, which is about the same as you produce by driving a car 
three miles. Of course, you're not really going to limit yourself to one serving of turkey, 
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so the actual footprint is likely to be larger. I'll put you down for two servings, or the 
equivalent of six miles of driving. 
Look down the table at those mashed potatoes. Plant-based foods are generally better 
for the environment than meats. Potatoes, however, are among the more carbon-
intensive plant foods on a pound-for-pound basis. Although it takes very little energy to 
grow tubers, transporting and cooking them emits large amounts of carbon. One cup of 
mashed potatoes will release approximately 1.5 pounds of carbon dioxide equivalents. 
(Mashed potatoes typically include some milk and butter, which are responsible for 
slightly less greenhouse gas than potatoes per pound, but they constitute such a small 
proportion of the dish that we can ignore them.) Again assuming that you go for 
seconds, that means the equivalent of driving 3.7 miles. 
What about your vegetables? Whether it's green beans, broccoli or something more 
exotic, the green veggies are likely to be the most Earth-friendly part of your 
Thanksgiving meal. A one-cup serving of broccoli is responsible for only 0.4 pounds of 
carbon dioxide equivalents. Even if you go for seconds of your green vegetables, you'd 
be on the hook for only about one mile of driving. 
If you have a taste for wine - or a particularly difficult family - alcohol may be another 
significant contributor to the carbon footprint of your Thanksgiving meal. According to 
numbers generated by the beverage industry, drinking half a bottle of North American 
wine accounts for nearly two pounds of carbon dioxide equivalents, which is equal to 
2.4 miles of driving. (This is for illustrative purposes only. I do not condone drinking 
and driving.) 
When you add up the turkey, potatoes, vegetables and wine, your Thanksgiving meal 
might be responsible for emitting more than 10 pounds of greenhouse gas into the 
atmosphere. If you're traveling fewer than 10 miles, there's a good chance you'll emit 
more carbon dioxide eating than driving to and from your meal. 
I'm not one to idealize the past. Our exploitation of fossil fuels has brought us the joys 
of the Internet and global travel, among many other things, and it has played a part in 
the spectacular lengthening of the human life span. Especially at this time of year, we 
ought to be thankful for those things. I have no desire to turn back the clock to 17th-
century life, which strikes me as having been cold, boring and rather sickly. But we also 
ought to give thanks for the resources that remain available to us, and that means using 
them thoughtfully, both in our cars and in our kitchens. 
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10.3 Lists of Articles with High Degree of Narrativity 
Brazil 
Title English translation COP Date Medium 
A tormenta de Durban The Durban Storm COP17 
Durban 
11.12.2011 O Globo 
Bolivia vai contestar 
acordo do clima 
Bolivia to contest climate 
deal 
COP16 
Cancún 
13.12.2010 Folha de Sao Paulo 
Canadá é favorito ao 
Fóssil do ano 
Canada is the favorite 
Fossil of the Year 
COP17 
Durban 
02.12.2011 O Globo 
Choro de diplomata cala 
cúpula do clima 
Diplomat's cry makes 
climate summit silent 
COP18 Doha 07.12.2012 Folha de Sao Paulo 
Clima do clima The state of the climate COP17 
Durban 
13.12.2011 O Globo 
Conferência do clima 
quer manter a bola 
rolando 
Climate conference wants 
to keep the ball rolling 
COP16 
Cancún 
29.11.2010 Folha de Sao Paulo 
De resíduo industrial à 
matéria-prima 
From industrial waste to 
the raw material 
COP18 Doha 04.12.2012 O Globo 
EUA não acreditam em 
acordo definitivo 
US does not believe in 
definitive agreement 
COP16 
Cancún 
29.11.2010 Folha de Sao Paulo 
Falta coragem em 
Cancún, diz diplomata 
"There's a lack of courage 
in Cancún", a diplomat 
says 
COP16 
Cancún 
09.12.2010 Folha de Sao Paulo 
Falta de consenso pode 
suspender COP-17 
Lack of consensus may 
suspend COP-17 
COP17 
Durban 
11.12.2011 Folha de Sao Paulo 
Ilhas propoem novo 
protocolo na COP 16 
Islands propose new 
protocol at COP 16 
COP16 
Cancún 
02.12.2010 Folha de Sao Paulo 
Lula "cacarejou" sobre 
clima, dizem EUA 
Lula "cackled" about 
climate, says US 
COP16 
Cancún 
09.12.2010 Folha de Sao Paulo 
Metas de reducao de 
emissoes sao trunfo do 
Brasil 
Emission reductions 
targets are Brazil's trump 
card 
COP16 
Cancún 
23.11.2010 O Globo 
Obama e o medo de uma 
China verde 
Obama and the fear of a 
green China 
COP16 
Cancún 
13.12.2010 O Globo 
País de Gales, um 
exemplo internacional 
Wales, an international 
example 
COP18 Doha  O Globo 
Para vice boliviano, país 
nao se isolou na cúpula 
do clima 
For Bolivian vice, country 
has not isolated itself at 
the climate summit 
COP16 
Cancún 
 Folha de Sao Paulo 
Polônia se aferra ao uso 
do carvão 
Poland clings to coal use COP19 
Warsaw 
 Folha de Sao Paulo 
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Germany 
Title English translation COP Date Medium 
Allein gegen den Rest der 
Welt 
Alone against the rest of 
the world 
COP16 
Cancún 
13.12.2010 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Bis einer umfällt Until one falls over COP17 
Durban 
08.12.2011 Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Die neue Generation: Im 
Gespräch mit Ricarda 
Winkelmann 
The new generation: 
Talking to Ricarda 
Winkelmann 
COP17 
Durban 
07.12.2011 Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Gelübde auf Eis Vow on ice COP16 
Cancún 
30.11.2010 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Im Namen der Kohle In the name of coal COP19 
Warsaw 
20.11.2013 Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Kolonien in der 
Atmosphäre 
Colonies in the 
atmosphere 
COP16 
Cancún 
06.12.2010 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Labor Deutschland Laboratory Germany COP17 
Durban 
10.12.2011 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Mutiger Rückblick eines 
Klimawissenschaftlers 
Brave review of a climate 
scientist 
COP17 
Durban 
07.12.2011 Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Südafrikas schwarzes 
Gold gerät ins Zwielicht 
(literally)South Africa's 
black gold gets into 
twilight 
COP17 
Durban 
29.11.2011 Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Superminister gesucht Wanted: Super minister COP18 Doha 11.12.2012 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Tore gegen den 
Untergang 
Gate against sinking  COP18 Doha 27.11.2012 Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zwei Wochen, eine 
Chance 
Two weeks, one chance COP17 
Durban 
28.11.2011 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
 
USA 
Title COP Date Medium 
Bloomberg and climate COP18 Doha 20.11.2012 The New York Times 
Following in the carbon 
footprint of 
Thanksgiving's first 
diners 
COP19 Warsaw 
 
12.11.2013 The Washington Post 
For first time, E.P.A. 
proposes reducing 
ethanol requirement for 
gas mix 
 
COP19 Warsaw 
 
16.11.2013 The New York Times 
In lab lit, fiction meets 
science of the real 
world 
COP18 Doha 
 
04.12.2012 The New York Times 
rising temperatures 
threaten fundamental 
change for ski slopes 
COP18 Doha 
 
13.12.2012 The New York Times 
199 
11 Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung 
 
Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe Dritter und 
ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus 
anderen Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Daten und Konzepte sind unter 
Angabe der Quelle gekennzeichnet. Insbesondere habe ich nicht die entgeltliche Hilfe 
von Vermittlungs- bzw. Beratungsdiensten in Anspruch genommen. 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Datum, Unterschrift 
 
 
